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THE DEBATES COMMENTARY

(Kathāvatthupakkaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā)

Translated into English for the first time

by

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
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PREFACE

THE Kathāvatthu-Commentary, here translated for the first time into English, was edited by Minayeff (*J.P.T.S.*, 1889). This commentary differs from the Atthasālinī or the Sammahavinodanī¹ in that it does not bear a title independently of the name of its Abhidhamma text, the *Kathāvatthupakkaraṇa*.

The commentary on the Kathāvatthu is an indispensable aid to the study of the text, which is not clear in many of its contexts. It helps us to clarify many knotty points of the text. It is also not without historical importance.

The text introduces us to controversies after controversies that took place between the orthodox Sangha and other early Buddhist schools of thought, *without specifically mentioning the name of the actual or probable disputants*. The commentary gives us the names of upholders of controverted points. These were not only one or other of the seventeen schismatic schools that arose prior to the reign of Asoka, but some schools that arose after Asoka's reign. It may be noted that the account of the earlier eighteen schools is based upon the authority of the earlier Pali Chronicle, *Dīpavamsa*, *quoted by name* (pp. 3-5). One new point added in our commentary is that the Bāhulikas were otherwise known as Bahusrutikas (p. 2).

The commentary, in its introduction, categorically speaks of six post-Asokan schools—viz., Hemavata-kā, Rājagirikā, Siddhatthikā, Puhha-seliyā, Aparā-seliyā and Vājiriyā (p. 5)—while in its body it attributes some of the views to such schools as Uttarāpathakā, Andhakā, Vetulyakā, Hetuvādā and Mahā-Suññatāvādins, but none to the Vājiriyas and Hemavatakas.

¹ Commentaries on the first two books of Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

The general agreement between the tradition of the schools in Buddhaghosa's Commentary, on the one hand, and that in the works of Vasumitra, Bhavya, Vinītadeva and others has been ably discussed by Mrs. Rhys Davids in her Preface to the *Points of Controversy*, or translation of the Kathāvatthu, shared by S. Z. Aung. What remains for me to point out is that the Commentary expressly mentions that the name Andhakā comprised these four schools: Pubba-seliyā, Aparaseliyā, Rājagirikā and Siddhatthikā (I. 9). The omission of the Vājiriyas, the name of which was obviously derived from Vajirā, a place in the north-west region of India, may have been due to the fact that they were identical with the Uttarāpathakas. But the connection is nowhere indicated. There may be some force in the suggestion that the Pali Vetulyakā or Vetullakā was a wrong spelling of Vepulyakā or Vepullakā, Sanskrit Vaipulyakas.

It is interesting to note that the Commentator has associated the Vetulyakas with the Mahāsuññatāvādins in certain contexts (XVII. 6-10), the latter being a most appropriate name for a Prajñā or Vajra school of Mahāyāna. He keeps us in the dark as to who the Hetuvādins were, although certain views are definitely attributed to them. All such points await a careful examination.

The commentary on Book I, namely, the Puggalakathā, is really important for the history of the Saṅgha together with a few following Kathās. All the rest is a gradual accretion to the text itself.

I am grateful to Mrs. Rhys Davids for kindly editing and passing through the press the typescript of this translation and helping me with many valuable suggestions. She has laid me under a debt of gratitude by accepting it for P.T.S. Translation Series.

BIMALA CHURN LAW.

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CALCUTTA.

September 23rd, 1939.

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INTRODUCTION

ADORATION to the Exalted One, the Arahāṇ the perfectly enlightened.

Seated in devaworld and surrounded by the company of devas, he, the unrivalled person, teacher of earth and of devas, skilled in all terms and concepts—the supreme person, ending his discourse on designations: the ‘Designation of Human Types,’ etc., set forth in outline the book of the *Points of Controversy*, giving an account of ‘person’ and similar controverted points. By just the table of contents thus laid down in delectable mansions, Moggallāna’s son filled out, here on earth, the full detail. Now, inasmuch as the way for the comment is achieved, I will comment thereon. Listen attentively !

After the display of the Twin-Miracle, the Exalted One spent the rains in the city of the Thrice Ten, beneath the Coral Tree, on the Paṇḍukambala Rock. (And there) making his mother present witness, he discoursed to the assembly of devas on matters of extra-dhamma. After he had expounded the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, the Vibhaṅga, the Dhātukathā and the Puggala-paññatti treatises, he thought: “When in future the turn for expounding the Kathāvatthu shall arrive, my disciple, the greatly wise Thera Tissa, son of Moggallāna, having purged the blemishes that have arisen in the teaching (*sāsana*), and holding a Third Council will, seated in the midst of the Order, divide this compilation into a thousand discourses (*suttāna*), five hundred being assigned to his own views (*Sakavādin*), five hundred to views of his opponents (*Paravādin*).” Making occasion for this, beginning with an eight-sectioned inquiry into the theory of ‘person’ in four questions, each of two fivefold divisions, he drew up, with

respect to the course to be adopted in all the discourses, a table of contents in a text uncompleted by just one section for recitation. Then delivering in detail the remainder of the Abhidhamma discourse, after he had spent the rains, he descended by the jewelled stairway that was in the midst of the gold and silver stairways from the world of devas to the city of Saṅkassa, and so accomplishing the welfare of beings, attained Parinibbāna by the nibbāna-conditions without remainder.¹

Thereupon the company of his adherents, headed by Great Kassapa, with the assistance of King Ajātasattu, made a collection of the body of Doctrine (*Dhamma*) and Discipline. After one hundred years had expired, the Vajjiputtaka bhikkhus declared (for the relaxation of rules on) Ten Points.² On bearing this, Elder Yasa, son of the brahmin Kākaṇḍaka with the assistance of King Asoka, son of Susunāga, selected seven hundred Elders from among the twelve thousand monks and, quashing the Ten Points, made a collection of the body of Doctrine and Discipline. Refuted by those Elders who made this collection of Doctrine (and Discipline), ten thousand of the Vajjiputtaka monks, seeking followers, and gaining but a weak following among themselves, formed separately the school (lit. teachers' clan) called (1) Mahāsaṅghika. Seceding from this there arose two other schools: the (2) Gokulikas and the (3) Ekobbohārikas. Seceding from the Gokulikas there arose yet two other schools: the (4) Paṇṇativādins and the (5) Bāhulikas, or, as they were also called, the Bahussutikas. Among just these arose other teachers: the (6) Cetiyavādins. Thus from the school of the Mahāsaṅghikas, in the second century, five schools arose. These, together with the Mahāsaṅghikas, were six.

In that second century only two schools seceded from the Theravāda: the (1) Mahimsāsakas and the (2) Vajjiputtakas.

Now seceding from the Vajjiputtakas four other schools arose: the (3) Dhammuttariyas, the (4) Bhadrāyānikas, the

¹ *Anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā*.

² *Dasavālikāni*. For a list of these Ten Points, see *Vinaya Texts* (S.B.E.), *Cullavagga*, ch. xii.

(5) Channāgarikas and the (6) Saṃmitiyas. Again, in that second century, seceding from the Mahimsāsakas, two schools arose: the (7) Sahhatthivādins and the (8) Dhammaguttikas. Then again, falling off from the Sahhatthivādins, arose the (9) Kassapikas. And the Kassapikas splitting up, the (10) Saṅkantikas came into existence. The Saṅkantikas splitting up, there arose the (11) Suttavādins. Thus, falling off from the Theravādins, arose these eleven schools. These together with the Theravādins were twelve.

Thus these twelve, together with the six schools of the Mahāsaṅghikas, constitute in all the eighteen schools which arose in the third century. They are also known as the eighteen groups, and as the eighteen sects. Of these (eighteen), seventeen schools are to be understood as being schismatic, the Theravādins being non-schismatic. Moreover, it is said in the *Dīpavaṃsa*:

“The wicked monks, the Vajjiputtakas, who had been excommunicated by the Theras (Elders), gained another party, and many people holding the wrong doctrine. Ten thousand assembled and (also) held a council. Therefore this Dhamma-Recital is called the Great Recital.

“The monks of the Great Recital settled a doctrine contrary (to the true faith). Altering the original redaction, they made another redaction. They transposed Suttas, which belonged to one place (of the collection), to another place; they destroyed the (true) meaning and doctrine (*dhamma*), in the Vinaya and in the five Collections (of Suttas). Those monks who understood neither what had been taught in applied expositions, nor in unapplied expositions, neither the assigned meaning nor the inferable meaning, settled as to a given saying a different meaning. These monks destroyed a great deal of (true) meaning under the shadow of the letter. Rejecting single passages of the Suttas and of the profound Vinaya, they composed another Sutta and another Vinaya, which had (only) the appearance (of the genuine ones). Rejecting the other texts—that is to say, the Parivāra (an abstract of the contents of the Vinaya)—the six sections of the Abhidhamma, the Paṭisambhidā, the Niddesa, and some portions of the

Jātaka, they composed others.¹ They changed their names, their appearance, and forsaking the original.

“Those who held the Great Recital were the first schismatics; in imitation of them many schismatics arose. Afterwards a schism arose in that (new school); the Gokulika and Ekabyohāra bhikkhus were split up as two divisions. Afterwards two schisms took place amongst the Gokulikas; the Bahussutaka and the Paññatti bhikkhus split up as two divisions. And opposing these were the Cetiyas, (another) division of the Mahāsaṅgītikas. All these five sects, originating from the Mahāsaṅgītikas, split the (true) meaning and the doctrine and some portions of the Collection; setting aside some portions of difficult passages, they altered them. They forsaking the original: name, appearance, modification, right modes, made them other.

“In the orthodox school of the Theras, again, a schism occurred; the Mahimsāsaka and Vajjiputtaka monks split up as two sections. In the school of the Vajjiputtakas, four sections arose, to wit, the Dhammuttarikas, Bhaddayānikas, Channagarikas and Saṃmitis. In later times, two divisions arose among the Mahimsāsakas; the Sabhatthivāda and Dhammagutta monks split up as two divisions. From the Sabhatthivādins arose the Kassapikas, from the Kassapikas the Saṅkantiyādins, and subsequently another section, the Suttavādins, from the Saṅkantikas. These eleven schools which split off from the Theravāda, split the (true) meaning and the doctrine and some portions of the Collection; setting aside some portions of difficult passages, they altered them. They forsaking the original: name, appearance, modification, right modes, made them other.

“Seventeen are the schismatic sects, and there is one that is not schismatic; together with that which is not schismatic, they are eighteen in all. That of the Theravādins, which is even like a great hānyan tree, is the most excellent: the complete teaching of the Conqueror, free from omissions or admissions. The other schools arose as thorns grow on the tree. In the first century there were no schisms; in the

¹ Reading, with ‘B.’, *aññānā*.

second century arose the seventeen schismatical schools in the teaching of the Conqueror."¹

Subsequently, six other schools—the Hemavatikas, the Rājagirikas, the Siddhatthikas, the Puhbaseliyas, the Aparaseliyas and the Vājiriyas—arose, one after the other. To them no reference is here made.

Now the Sāsana proceeded with the eighteen early schools. And when Asoka, the righteous ruler, had received faith, he bestowed daily a sum of five hundred thousand, one hundred thousand each on the worship of the Buddha, the Doctrine, the Order, on the maintenance of his own teacher, the Elder Nigrodha, and on the dispensaries at the four gates, and so brought notable honour and patronage to the Sāsana. The teachers of other faiths, being deprived of honour and patronage, so that they had not even enough to eat, sought that honour and patronage by entering the Order, and set forth each his own heresies, saying: 'This is the Doctrine, this is the Discipline, this is the religion of the Teacher.' Some, even without being ordained, themselves cut off their hair, donned the yellow robes and went about among the vihāras, entering the assemblies at the time of the Uposātha ceremony and the like.

These monks, albeit they were confuted by the Order, the Doctrine, the Discipline, and the Sayings of the Teacher, being unable to stand in the right order of the Doctrine and the Discipline, brought in diverse cankers, stains and nuisance to the Sāsana. Some practised fire-worship; some, the five-fold heat-asceticism; some turned the way of the sun; some deliberately strove in one way or another, saying: 'We shall split up the Doctrine and the Discipline.'

Therenpon the Order would not, with such as these, hold the Uposatha or the Pavāraṇā ceremony. For seven years the Uposatha ceremony was suspended in the Asoka monastery. The King strove, thinking: 'By an order I will make it to be held,' but could not. Nay, he was filled with remorse when, through the misunderstanding of a stupid delegate, some monks were slain. He, willing to allay both his regret and

¹ *Dīpavaṃsa*, v. 30-54; pp. 140-2 in Oldenberg's translation.

the canker which had arisen in the Sāsana, asked the Order: 'Who now is competent for this matter?' When he had heard the answer: 'The Elder Tissa, son of Moggali, sire,' he, in the name of the Order, invited the Elder to come from the Ahogaṅga hill. And when he saw the Elder showing a miracle, he was filled with confidence in the Elder's powers, and consulted him on that which distressed him, and procured assuaging of his remorse. The Elder, too, dwelt a period of seven days in the royal gardens teaching the king doctrine.

Thus instructed, the king on the seventh day convened the Order in the Asoka monastery, and seated himself in a pavilion which he had erected. Marshalling the monks into separate groups according to the views they professed, he sent for each group in turn, and asked: 'What was the doctrine¹ of the Enlightened One?' Then the Eternalists replied: 'He was an Eternalist'; others replied that the Buddha taught limited eternalism, immortality of the soul, cel-wriggling, fortuitous origins, consciousness, neither consciousness nor unconsciousness (of soul after death), annihilation of soul.² Those who held with Nibhāna in this life only, claimed him no less.

The king, through having learnt doctrine, discerned that these were not proper monks but heretics, and ejecting them from the Order, he bestowed white lay-garments upon them. And there were 60,000 of them in all. Then he sent for other monks, and asked them: "What was the doctrine of the Buddha?"³ "Sire," they replied, "he was an Analyst."⁴ At this reply the king asked the Elder, saying: "Sir, was the perfectly Enlightened One an Analyst?" "Yes, Sire." Then said the king: "Now, Sir, the Sāsana is purged. Let the Order of monks hold the Uposatha ceremony." And providing a guard, he entered the city. In concord the Order assembled and held the Uposatha ceremony. In that congregation, sixty hundred thousand monks were present.

At that assembly Elder Tissa, Moggali's son, to avert all bases of heresy that had arisen, and that might in the future

¹ *Kiṃ Vādi*: lit. What teacher. . . .

² Cf. *Brahmajāla Suttanta* (*Digha* I).

³ As above.

⁴ See *Majjhima Nikāya*, ii. 197; *Points of Controversy*, p. 7, fn. 1.

arise, analysed in detail the heads of discourse, by the method which had been delivered by the Master, into 500 orthodox statements and 500 heterodox statements, 1,000 in all, uttered and the collection¹ of the *Points of Controversy*, the salient feature of which was the crushing of all dissentient views.

Thereupon, selecting one thousand monks who were learned in the Three Piṭakas and versed in the Four Paṭisambhidās, just as the Elder, Kassapa the Great (at the First Council, had) recited Dhamma and Vinaya, so did he, reciting, after purging the religion of its stains, hold the Third Council. And in reciting the Abhidhamma, he incorporated in the body thereof this collection, even as he uttered it.

As it is said:—“(He—i.e., the Buddha) set forth in outline the Collection of the *Points of Controversy*, giving an account of ‘person’ and such controverted points. By the mere table of contents thus laid down in delectable mansions Moggali’s soul filled out, here on earth, the full detail. Now, inasmuch as the way for the comment is achieved, I will comment on the matter. Listen attentively.”²

¹ -pakaraṇam. It was a little previous to call this ‘book’ (i.e. MS.) in *Points of Controversy* (p. 7).—Ed.

² See Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids’ translation in *Points of Controversy*, pp. 1-7.

CHAPTER I

I

HEREIN "Is the 'person' known in the sense of a real and ultimate object?" is the question. "Yes" is the reply. Now whose is this question, and whose this reply? It cannot (adequately) be said: 'Of any person.'

For a list of contents was laid down by the Exalted One, by way of a text, in order to clear the various kinds of propositions in this collection. Abiding by the method as given by the Teacher, this has been classified by the Elder by way of a text.¹ It was not that the Elder himself disputed all the theories which have been shown here. This being so, in order that the meaning of those controversies may be grasped easily, we shall give the explanation, classifying them thus: question of a Sakavādin² and its corresponding answer of a Paravādin,³ and then question of a Paravādin and answer of a Sakavādin thereto.

"Is the 'person' got at in a real and ultimate sense?" is the question of a Sakavādin. That, by this question, the Puggalavādins who held the view: "'person' exists," could be asked thus, is shown. [8] But who were the Puggalavādins? In the Sāsana,⁴ the Vajjiputtakas and Sammitiyas, and many other teachers not belonging to the Sāsana.

Therein 'person' means self, being, vital principle.⁵ 'Is got at':⁶ means having been approached by the understanding, is cognized. 'In the sense of a real and ultimate object':

¹ *Tanti-vasena*.

² Lit. 'one of ours' = Theravādin.

³ Lit. 'other-speaker.' Henceforth rendered as the opponent.

⁴ Teaching: amounts to 'the Church.'

⁵ *Attā satto jivo*.

⁶ *Upalabbhati*.

here 'real' means that which is not to be apprehended as not fact, like magic, a mirage and the like; actual. 'Ultimate' means that which is not to be accepted as hearsay; highest sense. By the expression 'just as the "person" is known objectively,¹ as both real and ultimate, so also the material form is known' and so forth, a classification of the 57 ultimates of our conscious experience consisting of (5) aggregates, (12) sense-organs and objects, (18) elements and (22) controlling powers, being shown.

It is inquired: "Is your 'person' got at in the same way as a true and real object is got at?" The Opponent assents: "Yes." In some cases, to show affirmation "Yes, sir" has been employed, while in other cases, "Yes." In this connection, "Yes" has been used.

Here the sense is this: There is a Sutta handed down wherein the Exalted One, handling another's point of view, said: "*there is, for instance, the 'person' who is working for his own advantage.*"² Because he (the Opponent) accepted this, and because the Exalted One whose utterances were true and mutually consistent, who preached Dhamma not from a traditional belief and the like, and who himself had universal knowledge and made it known, and because the Opponent said: "*there is, for instance, the 'person' who is working for his own advantage,*" and therefore that 'person' exists in the sense of a real and ultimate object:—accepting this view (the Opponent) assents: "Yes."

Unwilling to give him a chance to make such a sham and fraudulent utterance, the Sakavādin then says: "That which is real," and so forth. Here the sense is this: Just this which, from an objective point of view, is explained as causal or without a cause, conditional or unconditional, eternal or transitory, with or without attributes, a classification of the 57 ultimates of our conscious experience consisting of the material form and the like has been handed down. It is not to be accepted as something conventional or traditional.

¹ Parato, lit. 'as other.'

² See *Digha*, iii, 232; *Majjhima*, i, 341, 411; *Anguttara*, ii, 95; *Points of Controversy*, p. 16, fn. 2 (hereinafter referred to as *P. of C.*).

It is a real object by virtue of its being 'a thing as such.' It is an ultimate object by virtue of its being directly perceived.

With reference to this he asks: "Is the 'person' got at in the same way as a [9] real and ultimate object is got at?" "In the same way"—this is an 'instrumental phrase.' So here it means: "Is the 'person' got at in a real and ultimate sense?" This is to say, "Is the 'person' got at in the same way as a real and ultimate object is got at, because of its having either material form and the like, or because of the relation-categories¹ and the like?"

"That cannot be truly said" is the denial of the Opponent. He denies because he does not mean 'person' of that sort. Here the words are to be analysed thus: "That cannot be truly said" means that it is not right to say "Yes." It means: "That cannot be truly said" with regard to both (statements).

"Acknowledge your refutation," says the Sakavādin. It means: "Because your former proposition is not the same as the latter proposition, and because the latter cannot be reconciled with the former, so you are refuted; acknowledge this refutation, offence, fault. Having enjoined the refutation he then, in order to make it clear through 'positing' (*thapanā*), 'gaining' (*pāpanā*) and assigning² in direct and indirect methods, says: "If the 'person,' " and so on.

Here "If the person," and so on means if the 'person' he known, supposing that the 'person' he known in the sense of a real and ultimate object.

The *positing* in direct method is so called because here the opponent's proposition is conditionally 'established' for the purpose of refutation through 'gaining' and 'assigning.'

Because the expression "then, indeed, good sir," and so on, in direct proposition, is gotten for refutation, it is termed *gaining* in direct method. Here, 'then' is an 'instrumental phrase,' 'indeed' expresses confidence, 'good sir' is a term of address. That is to say, "then indeed, good

¹ *Sappaccaya-bheda*.

² *Āropanā*, lit. lifting on to.

sir, you should also say," etc. It means: indeed, look here, good sir, for that reason you should also say.

Because the expression "what you affirm there," and so on in direct proposition, is placed (on the opponent) for refutation, it is termed *lifting* in direct method. Before the word 'wrong' at the end of it 'this (statement) of yours' is to be brought down. It means: this (statement) of yours is wrong. Later on, this has been used in the text (*pāli*).

"Bnt you ought not to say," and so on, means: You ought not to say *thus*. Because here the contrary proposition is conditionally established for the purpose of refutation through *gaining* and *assigning*, it is termed *positing* in indirect method. Because the expression "and indeed, good sir, you do not," and so on in indirect proposition is gotten for refutation, it is termed *gaining* in indirect method. [10] Because the expression "Again you affirm that," and so on, in indirect proposition, is placed (on the opponent) for refutation, it is termed 'assigning' in indirect method. Here also before the word 'wrong' at the end of it 'this (statement) of yours' is to be adduced. Later on, too, in similar cases, this is the rule. This is the meaning, in short, from the beginning.

If the person he got at in a real and ultimate sense, then indeed you should say, the person is got at in the same way (as any other real and ultimate object is known). That which you say here is wrong—namely, that in the former question we ought to say, 'the person is got at in a real and ultimate sense,' bnt in the latter question we ought not to say, 'the person is got at in the same way as (any other real and ultimate object is known).' In this way, the 'positing,' 'gaining' and 'assigning' in direct method take place. Now in the latter question we ought not to say: "(The person) is got at in the same way (as any other real and ultimate (object) is known)." In the former question, too, we ought not to say so. That which you say here is wrong, namely, that in the former question we ought to say, 'the person is got at in a real and ultimate sense.'

But in the latter question we ought not to say, 'the person is got at in the same way as (any other real and ultimate object is known).' In this way, the 'positing,' 'gaining' and 'assigning' in indirect method take place. Because the refutation and also the fourfold 'gaining' and 'assigning' from direct and indirect methods are thus stated—it is got at as the fivefold affirmative presentation. Here whatever 'gaining' and 'assigning' there are from the direct method are considered as one. The 'gaining' and 'assigning' from the indirect method are also taken to be as one. In this way, the twofold refutation is made out. But here it refers to 'Acknowledge your refutation.' Because the first refutation for the first statement: 'Is (the 'person') got at,' etc., has been set up in two ways, this is only one refutation—i.e., the first refutation.

Then follows the adverse method. Here the question is of the Opponent. As he accepts the statement "there is, for instance, the person who is working for his own advantage," he does not agree, and he asks: "Is (the 'person') not got at?" and so forth. Since it is not to be got at as the properties like *rūpa*, etc., are got at, the Sakavādin answers: "No,¹ it is not got at." Concerning the truth in what he himself meant the other again said, 'that which is real,' and so on.

He says thus, because he treats the popular truth and the ultimate truth as one. The 'person' has got a secondary meaning; so when, after the two kinds of truth are treated as one, he is asked, he denies: 'it is not.' By this, whatever has been said regarding its unget-at-ableness in a real and ultimate sense is first accepted, and then [11] denied as a popular truth, or as a mixed one.

The Opponent, however, in conformity with his words 'is it not got at?' falsely argues, 'that which you accepted first is rejected afterwards,' and, as if quarrelling over the disputed point, while retorting to the refutation of his own

¹ The Pali idiom here uses "Yes: it is not . . ."

statement, says, "Acknowledge the rejoinder." Now as in the fivefold affirmative presentation, the refutation is made clear by the Sakavādin through 'gaining' and 'assigning,' in direct and indirect methods, after the 'positing' of the statement, so as to make the rejoinder clear. He says, namely: 'If the person,' and so forth.

This is to be understood from the meaning as stated above. Because here the 'positing' is from the side of the Opponent, it is merely the 'positing' to show 'this is your fault'; but not to bring out clearly the refutation, or the rejoinder. On the other hand, only its 'gaining' and 'assigning' are manifested.

Therefore inasmuch as this rejoinder is made through the four ways of 'gaining' and 'assigning,' from direct and indirect methods, it is known as 'the fourfold rejoinder,' and should be understood as a set of four.

Having thus made the rejoinder, he then, in order to show, through fallacious argument, that the Sakavādin's refutation in the fivefold affirmative presentation was badly done, says: 'But if you imagine,' and so forth. Here 'But if you imagine' means if you consider.

'We ought to affirm' is said concerning the opponent's affirmation: 'Yes.' But 'we ought not also to affirm' is said concerning the latter's denial: 'It is not.' "Then your (contention) there" means: for that reason you in the very proposition 'is not got at,' etc. (contained in that negative question). 'Thus the affirmation' means "while thus affirming 'Yes.' " 'Thus to be refuted' means, thus to be refuted, while denying 'again it is not so.' 'Let us then refute you' means then let us refute you who deserve refutation thus. 'You are well refuted' means you are *well* refuted because you are refuted *by your own statement*.

Thus having shown that he (the Sakavādin) should be refuted he (the Opponent) then, while refuting him, [12] says, 'If (the person),' and so forth. Here the 'positing,' 'gaining' and 'assigning' are to be understood as stated below. At the end, however, 'this of yours is wrong' means this statement

of yours is wrong. Because this refutation is made in four ways through false argument it is known as the Fourfold Refutation.

Having thus refuted (the Opponent), in order to show that "if my refutation through your argument is a bad refutation, then your refutation in the fivefold affirmative presentation below, based on mine, is also a bad refutation," says: "If this be a bad refutation," and so forth.

Here, 'if this be a bad refutation' means, if this statement of yours is ill-refuted by me, or, if this refutation of mine to yours is a bad refutation. Similarly, 'thus look at therein' means there also, wherein you have refuted me above: look at this and that.

Now he points out, in the refutation made above by the Sakavādin with the words "it can be truly said," etc., and again, while presenting that it was not a refutation, saying: "we (do not consider ourselves to have been refuted) by you," and so forth. This is the sense with regard to 'Therein by this affirmation,' etc. Because your refutation to mine is a bad one, therefore, when I agreed with you by the affirmation 'Yes,' in the fivefold affirmative presentation, and again denied saying "it was not true," we should not be refuted, in 'Acknowledge your refutation.'" Although it should not be refuted thus, you (thus) refuted me. But we are badly refuted by such refutation.

Then, in order to show the refutation, with reference to which it was said "We are badly refuted," he says: "If the 'person' (be so and so) . . . this refutation of yours is wrong." In this way, because this refutation has been reached through the fourfold 'assigning' and 'gaining,' from direct and indirect methods, it is known as the Fourfold Application.

Now follows the Fourfold Conclusion: "Nay, we are not to be refuted thus," and so on. Here "Nay, we are not to be refuted thus" means, it should not be refuted in such way as you are refuting me. I have shown that this refutation has been badly done. "By this" means for that reason;

because this refutation is badly done, therefore "Now you refute me . . ." "If the 'person' . . . this proposition of yours is wrong" means, this refutation of yours is wrong. "Therefore [13] in the refutation," etc., means, for that reason whereby it is wrong, the refutation of yours is badly done. I maintain that my rejoinder was well done, and that my sequel to the argument through the fourfold rejoinder was also well done. It is to be understood, that, in this way, because the Fourfold Rejoinder, the Fourfold Refutation, the Fourfold Application and the Fourfold Conclusion, beginning with "Is the 'person' not known?" etc., follow from the Fivefold Affirmative presentation beginning with "Is the 'person' known?" etc., therefore they are designated as the Affirmative and Negative presentations, each in a set of five. Since the Sakavādin adheres to his former statement the Opponent wins through mere assertion and fallacious argument.

Now inasmuch as the Opponent adheres to his former statement, the Sakavādin wins justly and truly.

Likewise, to show the origin of the controversy, the Negative and Affirmative presentations, each in a set of five, are introduced with "Is the 'person' not got at," etc. In the adverse controversy, the Opponent inquires about the reality and ultimate nature (of the personal entity) in respect of material form and the like. The Opponent affirms, that it is true in respect of a merely conventional belief, or in respect of a conventional belief mixed with ultimate belief.

The Opponent next inquires: "Should you say, the person, as a conventional nsage, is not got at?" Because of the ambiguity of the question through that mixture, he denies: "No, it is not," and thereby rejects what the Sakavādin affirms. Using the identical expressions, the Opponent says: "Acknowledge your refutation," and so on.

It should be understood that, in this way, on account of the second proposition: "Is the 'person' not got at?" etc., there arises the second refutation.

Thus being refuted through that false argument, the Sakavādin now asks in the affirmative method, in order to show

that, in his affirmation, his own statement is just and true. The Opponent agrees with respect to his own proposition. Without giving any chance for a proposition the Sakavādin again inquires about the ultimate nature (of personal entity). Because of the absence of the 'person' in the sense of an ultimate object the Opponent denies. Thereafter, in order to show that he has made his victory justly and truly, all that has been said, beginning with "Acknowledge the rejoinder," and so on, is the word of the Sakavādin.

The meaning of all the fourfold Rejoinder, Refutation, Application and Conclusion should be understood as it has been said above. Thus, because of its fourfold Rejoinder, Refutation, Application and Conclusion beginning with "Is the 'person' known?" etc., this fivefold Adverse Controversy, beginning with "Is the 'person' not got at?" etc., [14] is designated as the fivefold Affirmative presentation. Thus in the first truth, these two presentations, each in a set of five, are explained. In the first fivefold presentation, the Opponent is well-refuted by the Sakavādin. But the self-made victory of the Opponent over the Sakavādin after giving a rejoinder through a pretentious argument is badly won. In the second fivefold presentation, the Sakavādin is wrongly refuted by the Opponent. The self-made victory of the Sakavādin over the Opponent after giving a rejoinder through a just argument is truly won.

The first debate relating to reality is ended.

Herein it is thus said:

In¹ the first fivefold presentation, the refutation of the Opponent is correct, but the victory of his rejoinder therein is not so.

In the second fivefold presentation, the refutation of the Sakavādin is incorrect, but the victory of its rejoinder therein is perfectly done.

Therefore in both places the Sakavādin wins. Victory is possible through a just cause. How can it come through injustice?

¹ These sentences are, in Pali, in metre.

Just as here in (the examination of) the truth adorned with two presentations, each in a set of five, victory and defeat are said to follow only from justice and injustice respectively.

Henceforth, in all the subsequent examinations of the truth, the wise should thus explain both victory and defeat.¹

Having thus explained the controversy relating to reality, now, in order to expand it in respect of place, etc., "Is the 'person' got at?" and so on is now begun again.

Here the question is by the Sakavādin. The rejoinder is by the Opponent. Again, the question: "*everywhere?*" with reference to body, is by the Sakavādin. The Opponent refutes, because he finds errors in holding that the 'person' is in the material qualities, and that the living principle (*jīva*) is different from the body. The rest should be understood here as explained above in the fivefold Adverse Controversy. [15] The text, on the other hand, is concise.

Here when, with reference to the body, it has been said, that the 'person' is not got at, etc., this implies that, even outside the body, it is got at. Hence in the Adverse Controversy, the rejoinder is by the Sakavādin. Through the pretence of having made it first to affirm and then deny, the Opponent gives the rejoinder. The rest is clear.

In the second method, the Sakavādin's question ("Is the 'person' got at) *always?*" etc., refers to both the former and later lives (of a person), to the present remainder of life, and to its final close. The Opponent denies, because he finds in it twofold defect: (1) the wrong in thinking "he is a *kṣatriya*, he is a *brāhmaṇa*," and so forth, and (2) the presence of the differences in the present remainder of life and its final close. The rest are similar to those said in connection with the first method.

In the third method, the Sakavādin's question: "(Is the 'person' got at) *in everything?*" etc.,² refers to the organs

¹ This paragraph is, in Pali, in metre.

² For *khandhesū ti* (P.T.S. ed., p. 15) read *sabbesū ti*. See *P. of C.*, p. 13, fn. 3.

and objects of sense. The Opponent denies, because he fears the defect in thinking: "the 'person' is *in* the material form, the 'person' is *in* the eye," and so forth. The rest is similar.

Thus, after distributing these three facets or aspects, in succession, *affirmatively*, according to the fivefold Affirmative Presentation, again in order to distribute them *negatively*, according to the fivefold Negative Presentation, "Is the 'person' *not* got at?" etc., is brought forth.

Here, on account of the brevity of the text of the fivefold Affirmative Presentation, its meaning should be understood as in the Negative Presentation, and because of the brevity of the text in the Adverse Presentation, its meaning should be understood as in the Affirmative Presentation.

So far it relates to these three controversies merely (relating to the reality of the personal entity). And under each of the four aspects (as under the first), the argument is presented affirmatively and negatively, thus making up the eight-faced view. Since under each aspect one refutation follows, therefore the eightfold refutation has been recorded in the text.

Herein it is said:

Thus in the fourfold controversy, each divided into five, this eight-faced view is explained.

[16] Of the eight refutations there, four are right and four are wrong.

The Sakavādin wins everywhere, but everywhere the Opponent is defeated.¹

The explanation of the controversy relating to the reality is ended.

Now the reality (of the personal entity) is compared with material quality, etc.

Here the Sakavādin's question regarding "And is material quality?" etc., means is the 'person' got at just in the same way as material quality is known in its ultimate sense. Accepting the citation "there is the person who," etc., the Opponent

¹ In Pali, five metrical lines.

assents. The Sakavādin questions: "If the 'person' is in an ultimate sense as material quality is, then is the 'person' also, as is feeling, etc., different from material quality?" The Opponent denies, seeing that it is against the *Samaya-sutta*.¹ The rest is clear in meaning.

In the affirmative and negative presentations, 57 affirmative presentations, each in a set of five, are shown from the Sakavādin's side concerning the 57 real and ultimate facts. The fourfold rejoinder, etc., is in brief. From the Opponent's side also the 57 negative presentations, each in a set of five, are shown in both Negative and Affirmative presentations. The fourfold rejoinder is in brief. By the expression, "Did the Exalted One say?" having shown that there exists the 'person,' and that material quality is knowable in its real and ultimate sense, the Opponent questions "Did the Exalted One say?" in order to make him (Sakavādin) say, that they are both distinct. The Sakavādin rejects because of the oneness and diversity in the question concerning its traditional belief and ultimate sense. The rest here is also clear in meaning.

Comparison (with other realities), simply treated, is ended.

[17] Now follows a comparison of realities with material quality, etc., by way of Analogy. Here (1) "If material quality and feeling are got at (as real and ultimate facts), are they different?" and (2) "Is the 'person' got at also (in the sense of a real and ultimate fact), as material quality is got at?"—these two questions are of the Sakavādin. And both the acknowledgments are of the Opponent. When their identity is admitted by the Opponent, the Sakavādin objects that if material quality and feeling are different, then analogously, material quality and the 'person' are also two different things. The other refutes it. The rest here is also clear in meaning.

In the Doctrine,² according to the nature of material

¹ This can hardly refer to the 20th Sutta of the *Digha*. It may have been (1) a name now lost of a given Sutta (there are parallels), or (2) a technical term for 'sutta tradition.'—Ed. ² *Dhammato*, cf. below.

quality, etc., arising from the organ of sight, and so forth, there have been shown 920 rejoinders, each in a set of five, from the Sakavādin's side. The four aggregates (*khandhas*)¹ arising from material quality are then spoken of in a repeated formula. Likewise, the 20 arising from feeling. As regards the *āyatanas*,² 11 arising in succession from the organ of sight. Likewise, 132 in the remaining. Of the elements,³ 17 arising in succession from the element of sight. Similarly, 306 in the remaining. Of the *indriyas*⁴ (organs of sense), 21 in a repeated formula arising from the organ of sight. Likewise, 462 in the remaining. Thus, in all, there are 920 rejoinders, each in a set of five. In the Opponent's side, also by the affirmative presentation: "Is material quality got at?" etc., the opponent is made to acknowledge that material quality, feeling, etc., are distinct, and then, on the basis of the Sutta "there is the person," etc., showing fallaciously that material quality, etc., of the 'person' can be got at, it is contended that they are different. The rest is to be understood from the meaning given here. Even according to their nature, as has been said on the Sakavādin's side, 920 rejoinders, each in a set of five, are shown.

Comparison with material quality and other realities by way of analogy is ended.

Now inasmuch as what is got at in the sense of a real and ultimate object is to be developed, as different from the 57 realities such as material quality, etc., in their real and ultimate sense, through material quality, etc., or otherwise by its dependence on material quality, or material quality being dependent on it, therefore a comparison of the realities by the fourfold method is begun.

¹ Viz., *vedanā* (feeling), *saññā* (perception), *saṅkhāra* (coefficients) and *viññāṇa* (consciousness).

² There are twelve *āyatanas*, or sense factors, viz., the organ of sight, of hearing, of smell, of taste, and of touch, visible object, sound, odour, taste, tangible object, mind and cognizable object. Cf. *Compendium*, p. 15.

³ They are eighteen in number. See *Compendium*, p. 183 f.

⁴ They are twenty-two in number. See *Compendium*, p. 175 f.

Here the question: "Is material quality the 'person'?" is of the Sakavādin. The Opponent sees he is in danger of admitting himself to be a nihilist, and negates. Refutation is of the Sakavādin. Even when it is asked: [18] "Is not material quality feeling?—is it right to reject it?" (the former replies) "Yes, it is to be rejected." This is because of material quality, feeling being different in nature, and not for want of difference. He does not like to regard the 'person' as different, although it be qualitatively similar to material quality, etc. Therefore it is right.

In the refutation: "Is material quality the 'person,' is feeling the 'person,' . . . is the faculty of one who has perfect knowledge the 'person'?"—all these are started with reference to ultimate truth. It is, however, not possible to answer all at the same time on account of their individual characteristics. It has been set up only as a question according to the text. In this way, the learned explain its meaning. A disputant, on the other hand, after assuming this specific nature, should so answer that his opponent does not get a chance. Thus it is relevant even though it has been set up as a question according to the text.

In the same way, the meaning of all the questions should be understood. There is, however, this difference:

Just as in dependence on one main element there are three main elements,¹ or in dependence on material quality there arises consciousness, similarly it ought to be said "is the person thus also dependent on material quality?" Just as it ought to be said that all things, such as feeling and so forth, when deprived of their nature, or in the formless, the four aggregates, excepting material quality, constitute nirvana, is the 'person' thus also? Or, just as it ought to be said that material quality originates from mind, material quality is in feeling on which it depends . . . material quality is in consciousness, is the 'person' thus also?

In all these questions, however, the opponent sees he is in danger of admitting himself to be a nihilist, and negates. The rest here is clear in meaning.

¹ *Mahābhūta*: earth, water, fire, air.

Here, in the Doctrine, the 57 realities, each by the fourfold method of refutation, have been shown in 228 sets of five. On the opponent's side, too, the rejoinder goes up to that extent only.

In this connection, the Sakavādin acknowledges the statement "there is the person" because, in the Sutta, it has been handed down as a convention. The objection to "Is material quality the 'person'?" and so forth is, only by false argument, the rejoinder of the Paravādin, these going to establish the question of the 'heresy of individuality.'

Comparison by the Fourfold Method is ended.

Here ends also Comparative Inquiry.

[19] Now as regards the associated characteristics. In this connection, inasmuch as anything considered in a real and ultimate sense is, except nirvana, bound up in causal relations, happens only as conditioned by relations, arises, ceases and has no perduring essence, and finally, has the character known as the reason for happening, while nirvana being free from the aforesaid is not bound up in causal relations, is unconditioned, eternal and has no external feature,—and inasmuch as this is the characteristic of what is considered as a real object,—therefore it is asked by the Sakavādin: "Is the person related?" and so forth, because if the person is known in a real and ultimate sense, he must have possessed this characteristic. The rejoinder is of the Opponent.

Here "Acknowledge your refutation," and so forth are, however, in brief. Thus, through affirmative presentation in both the Affirmative and Negative Methods, these eight sets of five should be understood on the Sakavādin's side. Through negative presentation in both the Negative and Affirmative Methods, there are eight also in the Opponent's side.

Here inasmuch as the Opponent, with the help of the Sutta, shows it as a conventional truth,—and convention is free from being bound up in relations and so on,—therefore the Sakavādin's objection is true. "Acknowledge your rejoinder"

and the rest, which must have been said through false argument, are here, too, in brief.

Inquiry into associated characteristics is ended.

Now follows an examination of the terms.

Herein, to clear the meaning of "Is the 'person' got at," the Sakavādin asks: "Is the 'person' got at, (and conversely) is that which is got at the 'person'?"

It means: in the expression "Is the 'person' got at?" the two terms may be identical or different in meaning. If they be different in meaning—just as material quality means one thing, feeling another—then 'person' is one, and that [20] which is got at is another. If they be identical in meaning,—just as that which is thought, is mind,¹—then it follows, that *that* which is 'person' is *that* which is got at. Therefore I say this:—If that which is 'person,' is got at, then it follows that which is got at, is also person. Do you agree to this?

Then the Opponent, inasmuch as he wants the 'got-at-ness' of the 'person,' but not that the nature of the person is that of the got-at material quality, etc., says: "The person is got at," and (conversely) that which is got at, some is 'person,' some is not 'person.'

It means: For me the 'person,' is got at because the Teacher said, "there is the person" but not all that is known (as ultimately real) is 'person.' Some is 'person,' some is not 'person.'

Here the word *ke*² is used in the sense of *ko*, *hi* being merely a particle. So here the expression means: some are 'person,' some are not 'person.' It has been said: 'Person' or anything in material quality, and so forth is got at. 'Person' is 'person,' but in material quality and so forth, 'some' are not 'person.'

Therefore the Sakavādin says: Of that which is got at, some is 'person,' some is not 'person.' It means: If it be granted that the 'person' is got at, because the two terms in "Is the 'person' 'got at'?" are identical in meaning, then of 'thing'

¹ Cf. *Samyutta*, ii, 95.

² Magadhese dialect.

and 'person,' which are also identical, some are 'person,' some are not 'person.' It follows that, even of that which is 'person,' some are got at, some are not got at. Do you agree to this? He denies: "Nay, that cannot be truly said," because he does not want 'person' should thus or thus not be got at. Thereafter "Acknowledge your refutation," and the rest are in brief. But it should be understood in detail.

This is also the sense in regard to "Does 'person' mean a reality?" and so forth. All these are merely synonyms for 'Is got at.'

Moreover, inasmuch as the Opponent acknowledges that "the 'person' is got at in the sense of a real and ultimate object," his proposition is, in fact, "the 'person' is got at." Just in the same way, there arises the question: "Does 'person' mean a reality?" 'Existing' and 'found' are merely synonyms of the proposition, namely, "the 'person' is." Hence the meaning of all these terms is clear.

Here at the end it is asked: "Does the 'person' exist, and (conversely), "is that which exists not-all 'person'?" and so forth. Here the sense is this:—[21] Inasmuch as the statement of the Opponent, namely, "the 'person' exists; of the existent some are person, some are not person," and "Does the 'person' exist, and (conversely), is that which exists not all of the person?" are identical in meaning, therefore the Sakavādin gets the Opponent's assent to this, and then accuses him, saying, "Your proposition, namely, 'the "person" exists,' is based on the mere statement: 'there is the "person" working for his own good.' Just as the Exalted One said so, has he not also said: 'It does not exist' when he remarked: 'Consider, Mogharāja, that the world is empty, and he always mindful,' " and so on.

Hence, just as your proposition: "the 'person' exists, (and conversely), of the existent not all is person," it also follows: "the person 'does not exist' (and conversely), that which does not exist' is all of the person." Do you agree

to this? To this the Opponent does not agree, and negates: "it is not so." The rest should be understood as has been said in the case of the rejoinder and so forth.

Clearing the meaning of terms is ended.

Now follows an inquiry into concept.

The Opponent defines 'person' as 'one who has material quality in the sphere of matter'; and likewise 'has not material quality in the sphere of the immaterial.' In order to refute this opinion of his all the questions are put by the Sakavādin, the affirmation and the negation being by the other. Being asked: "Is one who has material quality in the sphere of matter a 'person'?" he (the Opponent) admits this, because the material body comes to be, and so there is a concept of actuality. Being asked: "Is the person one who experiences desire of sense?" he denies, because he may come to be in a passionless sphere, and so there is not actuality of the concept of material quality. Being asked: "Is the person without material quality (in the sphere of the immaterial)?" he assents, because he may come to be in the sphere of the immaterial, and so there is a concept of actuality. In both cases, 'being' is used as an equivalent for 'person.'

Now, inasmuch as he wants this, that 'body' is one thing, 'person' is another, from the accepted statement: "he contemplates body in the body,"¹ etc., therefore in order to refute this opinion the Sakavādin asks: "Are the terms 'material frame' and 'body' identical?"

Herein "applying the terms 'material frame' and 'body' indiscriminately to our body" means taking (the two terms as applied to) body, not in a separate, but in one and the same sense, without distinguishing: "these are identical,"—[22] means this is only that. "These are these" is also the text, which means this is just that; "the same in meaning" means just one in meaning. "The same (equals) the same in denotation, the same in origin" means the identical, the identical in denotation, the identical in origin. The difference

¹ In the Satipatthāna formula.

here is merely in expressions. In meaning, 'material frame' and 'this (body)' is asked.

The Opponent who does not see any difference, admits: "Yes." This is also the sense of the question: "Are the terms 'person' and 'soul'¹ identical?" and so forth.

Being asked: "Is 'material frame' different (from 'person')?" he assents having made it his opinion from the (saying about) contemplating the body.

But being asked: "Is 'soul' one thing, 'body' another?" he denies, because he cannot deny the Sutta already quoted.

Then follows "Acknowledge the refutation," and so forth, the meaning of which is clear.

When as the Opponent asks: "Is 'material frame' one thing, 'person' another?" the Sakavādin negates, because of the questions already established, the Opponent, through false argument, makes the rejoinder. This is also clear in meaning.

Inquiry into terms or concepts is ended.

Now what follows is about decease and connected result by way of change of hour.²

Here Opponent expresses himself having taken as his opinion: "the person transmigrates," which is based on the Sutta: "*a person transmigrates but seven times at the utmost*,"³ and so forth, therefore, in order to refute that proposition of his, the Sakavādin asks: "Does the person transmigrate?" and so forth. Herein 'transmigrates' means 'moves on continuously,' 'comes and goes.' The Opponent assents according to his own proposition.

[23] Again the Sakavādin asks: "Is it the identical person who transmigrates?" and so forth, which the other denies. "Identical?" means "is it the same?" The Opponent, however, being thus charged, negates, because he sees he is in danger of admitting himself an eternalist. When he is asked: "Is he different?" he fears lest he sides with the annihilationists.

¹ *Jīvo*.

² *Gatī*.

³ *Iti-vuttaka*, § 24; see *P. of C.*, p. 27. 'Transmigrates,' lit. 'runs on.'

Similarly, when he is asked: "Is he both identical and also different?" he fears lest he side with certain eternalists.

Lastly, in the question: "Is he neither identical nor different?" he fears lest he side with the 'eelwrigglers.'¹ Again when after reducing these four questions into one, he is asked, he negates, because he fears lest he sides with the four (afore-said) heresies. He then shows the Suttas on which he bases his opinion, and says: "Then surely the person does transmigrate," and so forth.

Again, the Sakavādin asks: "If, according to your opinion, the person transmigrates from this world, etc., then is he the very same person in both this and another world?" And by this inference he guides him to answer: "Does the identical person so transmigrate?" The other denies for fear of identifying himself with the eternalists. When the Sakavādin repeats the same question with greater emphasis, the Opponent acknowledges, because of the Saying: "He is just person, not a different state, but deceases thence and is reborn hence" and so on. When he is asked: "Is the identical person human?" he denies that the human state is deva-state. When asked again, he admits the identity, because of such Sutta-passages as "*I at that time was Sunetta, a teacher.*"²

The Sakavādin then explains: "You are wrong to admit different existences" and adds the verse: "Having become man," and so forth.

Herein "then there will then be no dying" means this being the case, there will be no dying. After this, as there is diversity of existences as yakkha, peta, etc., so the manifoldness of the question is to be understood. "Is there any one who having been a noble becomes a brahmin?" and so on is asked on account of birth, bodily deformity (etc.).

Being asked by the Opponent: "Is it wrong to say: The identical person transmigrates, etc.?" the Sakavādin admits it is, because, according to the eighth rebirth theory in this world, (after that) there is no rebirth in another world.

¹ Cf. *Dīgha* i, Suttanta 1.

² *Petavatthu*, iv, 7, 3. See *P. of C.*, p. 28, fn. 2.

He admits also the next question, because 'a stream-winner' could not, even in his next existence, give up the state of 'a stream-winner.'¹ "But if," and so forth are the words of the Opponent.

Again, the Sakavādin asks to show that 'a stream-winner,' when reborn in the world of devas, is not mere human.

Then follows: "Is (the transmigrator) not different, still present?" Herein 'not different' means identical in all respects; 'still present' means not disappeared in any way. "Nay, that cannot truly be said" is said, because one born in deva-world is not there human.

Again, when he is asked with greater emphasis, the Opponent admits according to his opinion that an identical person transmigrates.

In order to refute the opinion (that the transmigrator is still present), "one who has lost a hand," and so forth is then said, thereby showing the disappearance of corporeal qualities. Therein "one whose nails are cut off" means one whose thumbs or toes have been cut off. "One who is hamstrung" means one whose great sinew has been cut.

He denies as to "Is he the same as he was before?" and so forth in the first question, because the material frame does not go² with the person. He accepts in the second question, because there is no interval of life as (pure) person only. [24] According to the proposition one enters his mother's womb with material quality, and then his material quality perishes. "A soul³ transmigrates" means it transmigrates with body of material qualities.

"Are soul and body the same?"—is then asked. The Opponent rejects this, inasmuch as, in transmigrating, the body is held to be abandoned; moreover, it is opposed to the Suttas. "Does he transmigrate with feeling?" and so forth, is denied because of possible rebirth in the sphere known as the Unconscious, but is admitted with respect to other spheres. Does he transmigrate with his corporeal body having feeling?

¹ Because of remaining identical.

² Burmese ed. reads *agamanaṃ* for *āgamaṇaṃ*.

³ *Jīva*.

Are soul and body the same ? is asked. "Are soul and body the same, or are they different ?" In this proposition 'body'¹ means all five aggregates. The Opponent rejects, because it is opposed to the Suttas.

In the question: "Does he transmigrate with his material qualities ?" he first denies, because there is no interval of 'person'-life only, and then accepts because of possible rebirth in the sphere known as the unconscious. 'Soul is different' (from body) means that he transmigrates, as an incorporeal, forsaking body of material qualities.

"Is this body different from soul ?" is asked. The other rejects, because it is opposed to the Suttas. "Does he transmigrate without feeling ?" and so forth, is denied, because of possible rebirth in the sphere known as the Unconscious, but is admitted with respect to other spheres. "Soul is different" means he transmigrates without feeling and without consciousness, forsaking the body of feeling, etc. "Is that body of yours different from soul ?" is asked. The other denies, because it is opposed to the Suttas.

"Material quality transmigrates" and so forth means, material qualities and so forth, arising in an aggregate, are designated as 'person.' When that 'person' transmigrates, do the material, etc., qualities also transmigrate ? is asked. The Opponent rejects because of the expression "Just the being transmigrates" in such utterance as "*beings who are hindered by ignorance and fettered by desire, transmigrate, go through the different existences.*"² When asked again, he admits, because he considers that, inasmuch as there can be no 'person' without material quality, etc., therefore, in transmigrating, he must transmigrate with material quality. This is the method with regard to feeling and so forth.

"Does material quality transmigrate ?" and so forth means "because you say that material quality which is not 'person,' also transmigrates, therefore I ask: [25] does not material quality transmigrate ?" The other denies, because he considers that when 'a person' transmigrates, material quality,

¹ *Sarīraṃ.*

² *Samyutta*, iii, 149; *P. of C.*, p. 27.

which is merely his support, cannot so transmigrate. When asked again, he admits because of the utterance "beings alone transmigrate." The rest here is clear.

The meaning of the Gāthās (verses) is: In your opinion, sir, just as the shadow is derived from the tree, and fire from fuel, similarly (the concept is got on the arising of) an aggregate. If material quality, etc., do not transmigrate, and each of the aggregates is dissolved, then if the 'person' also disintegrates, this being so, the view becomes the doctrine of the annihilation, which is the wrong view discarded by the Buddha. "What was said in course of a teaching, namely, that 'Samaṇa Gotama was an annihilationist'¹—we do not say so"—is shown. Moreover, if the person be taken as not disintegrating with the disintegration of the aggregates, he becomes eternal, and hence amounts to nirvana. 'Resemhling' means exceedingly like, or just resemhling on account of likeness, hy the state of resemhlnance. Even as nirvana does neither originate nor decay, just so would the person be.

Examination hy way of rebirth is ended.

Now follows the concept of derivation.

Here the question is of the Sakavādin, while the affirmation and the denial are of the Opponent. He will have it that the concept of person is derived from material and mental qualities, just as the shadow is derived from the tree, and fire from fuel. Therefore he admits, when he is asked: "Is the concept of person derived from material, etc., qualities?"

Again, when he is asked: "Is the person as impermanent, etc., as the material, etc., qualities from which it is derived, just as the shadow is [26] impermanent like the tree, or fire like fuel from which they are respectively derived?" he takes his stand on his opinion and rejects it.

As regards: "Is the concept of blue-green² derived from blue-green material qualities?" and the like, he rejects, because he would not admit the identity of person with blue-green colour and its pluralistic state in the individual organism hy way of variegated colours like blue-green, etc.

¹ Vin. i, *Mhv.* v, 1; 31, 7. *Ang.* iv, 174, 183.

² = *nīla*.

"Is the concept of good derived from good feeling?"—here too he negates, because he would not admit the identity of person with feeling and its pluralistic state in one individual's life-continuum through various kinds of feeling like good, etc.

In the next question: "Is good derived from good way?" and so forth, he assents, taking 'good' in the sense of expertness, proficiency. When asked: "Does person entail fruit of like nature?" and so forth, he rejects, because it is not customary to speak thus of 'person.' As to bad feeling he assents, taking 'bad' analogously to 'good' above. As to indeterminate feeling he assents, because of the indeterminateness (of 'person') with respect to the eternalist and other views. The rest here should be understood as explained below.

In the question: "Is it derived from sight?" and so forth, he assents, because it is customary to say, that a person, as one who has physical and moral vision, avoids what is bad, and so on. He then rejects, because he would not admit that, when sight ceases, the seeing person also ceases.

"Is the concept (of person) derived from material qualities and feeling?"—here other objects conditioning material qualities should be understood as twofold, threefold, fourfold and fivefold. He admits that if the concept of person is derived from the aggregates, it is derived from two, three, four and five objects. He, however, rejects this, because of the absence of two or five persons 'cohering in one individual's life-continuum.' This is the meaning with regard to the organs and objects of sense, etc., also.

Now in order to show that, just as with the impermanence of that from which the concept of something is derived, that something also becomes impermanent, and moreover their difference is proved, even so it is in the case of person, he asks: "Is the concept of person derived from material qualities just as the idea of shadow is derived from a tree?" and so forth. Herein 'is derived' means 'having come (or happened), because of, not without such and such.' But the Opponent, not approving of such thing, rejects, giving his own

opinion. A fetter means an iron chain (or a jail). A fetterer is one who fetters with that chain. "One who has material quality is with material quality" means, inasmuch as one who has material quality becomes possessed of them.

"Is there the notion of person in each moment of consciousness?" [27] this the Opponent admits, because of the realisation of consciousness in respect of its being with passion, etc., according as it is with passion, etc. When he is asked: "Does the person undergo birth?" etc., he, not approving of a momentary state for the person, rejects. Being asked: "Is it the same or something different?" he rejects, because he fears lest he sides with the eternalists or the annihilationists. Again when he is asked: "Is it not also wrong to say: 'It is a boy' or 'It is a girl'?" he assents, saying: "It may be so said," because he fears lest popular usage be annihilated. The rest here is clear.

The Opponent, seeking to establish his opinion by another method, now says: "Why are you so concerned with all this inquiry about derived concept? Tell me this first: May we then *not* say: the person is really and ultimately got at?" etc. Then when the Sakavādin replies: 'Yes,' he says: "Is he not that who sees?" and so on. Therein 'that who' means person. 'Something' is the visible object. 'By what' is the eye. 'He' means person. 'It' is the visible object. 'By that' is the eye. The meaning is: Is it not the case that when someone sees some visible object by means of some eye, a certain he who sees a certain visible object by a certain eye is the person? But the Sakavādin says: it is only eye, depending on visual consciousness, that sees. Similarly it is only ear that hears the sound. It is just consciousness that knows (*a*) *dharmas*. To "has an Arahant eye? Does he see visible object by means of eye?" and so forth, he says: 'Yes' because of conventional usage.

Since from this the Opponent establishes, through false argument, that it may be said that there is a person, the Sakavādin, upsetting that view, asks: "Is the person got at?" and so forth. Herein 'he who does not see' is blind, a being

without consciousness, is reborn in the invisible, has reached ending. Even if he is not blind, he does not see except by insight at due season. This is the meaning in the remaining portions also. The rest should be understood in meaning according to the text.

By the application of the Sutta it has been said, that one sees visible object because of the contact of visible object with deva-eye.¹ In the second portion, by the expression 'I discern beings' he means to say, that he sees 'person.' In the third portion, he says: "He does see both," according to the opinion, "One seeing visible object makes a person become." Since things that are perceptible [28] are apprehended in a fourfold synthesis of 'seeing, hearing, reflecting and understanding,' the Sakavādin hence objects to reckoning visible object as the person, the person as visible object, or both as visible objects. The sense of this has been made clear.

Inquiry about concept of derivation is ended.

Now follows an inquiry about human action.

Here the Opponent asks because of his opinion: "There being an action, there must also necessarily be its cause." The Sakavādin admits because of the existence of such actions. Next, the inquiry about the doer and the instigator is of the Opponent. Therein 'a doer' means he who does those actions, 'an instigator' means he who does 'by commanding, instructing, and other methods.'

Now, inasmuch as the Opponent inquires about the doer with reference to the person, and not merely to a cause, therefore the Sakavādin negates. He then asks: "Are both the doer and the instigator (known to exist)?" Here he means to say: If the doer of that which is known is got at as person, do you assert that the person is got at? Are the doer of action and person-got-at different? The Opponent, not approving of such a thing, rejects 'for fear of the heresy of creation by the Lord.'² Again, when he is asked, he assents,

¹ Clairvoyance.

² *Issara*, a creative Power.

because parents who give birth to 'person,' give him a name, and nourish, are makers of the doer, and those well-wishers and teachers of his who teach him in various branches of knowledge are the inspirers. The idea is that only the former deeds are doers and instigators.

By the expression, "is one the maker of the other" it is asked: does this happen by that? If one be the maker of the doer of actions, is there final maker of any one? If this be so, 'each previous person would be the inevitable maker of his successor.' Even in this way, a person who is the doer of deeds would be the maker of another person in future. So, too, there is no 'other,' and there is no making an end of ill, no annihilating the cycle, [29] no final nirvana without residual stuff of life. As the means cease, ill which is conditioned by means disappears, and there is no such thing as unconditioned nirvana.

Or, 'one is the maker of the other' means if action be not regarded as mere action, then there is its doer, a person, who has his own maker, and in this way, there is a succession of persons. The meaning is that 'if this be so, then that which you say is end of ill, due to the non-continuance of the cycle of actions,¹ does not exist.' The Opponent, not approving of this, rejects.

In the subsequent inquiries, wherein 'maker' has been used identically with 'that who exists,' it has been asked in respect of the person: "Are maker and inspirer identical?" It has no cause, nor is it the cause of the great earth and of others. Being asked: "Are good and bad deeds one thing, and doer of them quite another thing?" he denies for fear of 'the heresy: the person is that who has mental properties or coefficients.'²

To refute the opinion of one who, by experiencing the effect of deeds, shows that the person exists, the question "Is the effect of ethically good and bad deeds got at?" is begun.

Here the question: "Is one who experiences the effect of such deeds got at?" is of the Opponent. As there is not another who experiences owing to the non-continuance of

¹ Karma.

² Saṅkhārā,

the effect, the Sakavādin denies. Again, the Sakavādin asks, while the other assents.

"One who experiences the effect of such deeds" means one who enjoys the experience of the effect of such deeds. Inasmuch as that which would be experienced is the effect, and the person is not so, therefore the Opponent rejects. When he is asked again, he assents, 'reflecting that a mother may kiss and embrace her child, a wife her husband, who has thus experienced.' "If the one and the other he so" means, if effects be not only external phenomena, if one subjectively experiencing, or enjoying them be assumed, this enjoyer, now as himself in turn an effect, would be enjoyed by another experiencer. In this way, there would be an endless series of persons. The meaning is: If this be so, that which has been said as end of ill, owing to the non-continuance of the cycle of effects, does not exist. Henceforth the meaning of the question wherein 'one who experiences' has been identically used for 'that which exists,' should be understood as explained above.

"Is the result of ethically good and bad deeds one thing and he who experiences those results another?"—is the question. [30] This is denied for fear of the heresy: the person is that which is feeling. "Is deva-happiness known to exist?" and so forth—all this which, after classifying the results of good and bad deeds, is introduced from his point of view, should be understood as explained above. It should be understood, that the Sakavādin denies 'one who experiences,' because it involves the idea of individuality, but not because it is not experienced. Having regard to the earth, and so forth as objects, the origin of those enjoying them cannot be proved. The doer, the instigator, the person who experiences the result, and so forth are introduced in the manifold method. Therein "he does" means one whom you call the doer and the experiencer.

"Is he who does (the acts) the same as he who experiences (the effect)?"¹—this is the question of the Sakavādin. The opponent denies, because he fears to contradict the Suttas.

¹ *Samyutta*, ii, 20.

When he is asked again, he assents, because in the Suttas it is said: "he has pleasure both here and hereafter."¹ While refusing to give him a chance to speak, the Sakavādin asks: "Are happiness and misery self-caused?"² Therein "is the doer a different (person)?" has been said by way of inquiring whether the doer and the enjoyer are different. This the opponent denies, because he fears to contradict the Suttas, but when he is asked again, he assents, fancying that as a deva, he surely enjoys the result of his actions when a man. When he says so, he falls into happiness and misery as being caused by another. When he is asked accordingly, he again denies.

"Is he the same and another?"—has been said by way of inquiring whether the doer and the enjoyer are the same or different. Then the opponent denies because he fears to contradict the Suttas, but when he is asked again, he assents, assuming the two foregoing meanings as one. But when he says so, it follows that happiness and misery are both self-caused and produced by another. But again when he is asked accordingly, he denies. "Does neither the same (person) act?"—has been said by way of rejecting the identity and the difference of the doer and the enjoyer. Then the opponent denies because he fears to contradict the Suttas, but again when he is asked, he assents, fancying that, inasmuch as when a man does deeds for the attainment of deva-world, he is neither reborn as a man, nor takes his birth different from that for which he does the deeds, therefore the enjoyer is neither the same as, nor different from the doer. This is only an opinion. But when he says so, it follows that happiness and misery are neither self-caused, nor caused by another; [31] are of spontaneous origin. When he is asked accordingly, he again denies.

Moreover, in this manifold method, the meaning should be understood in this way from the beginning. Since the Opponent wants the doer of deeds to be the enjoyer (of the result), therefore, according to him, the doer should also be the enjoyer. This goes to say that it should not be either a

¹ *Dhammapada*, 16.

² *Samyutta*, ii, 22.

different (person) or both. The Sakavādin, while asking the question thus reached, offers the four other alternatives: "Is he who does," and so forth.

The rest is similar to what has been explained above. At the end, however, the four questions are put together. Therein the negation and the affirmation, as well as the possibility of wrong views regarding self-caused, etc., should be understood as before. Thereafter, without saying 'good and bad deeds,' the questions: "Is there such thing as karma (action taking effect)?" and so forth, are alternately shown, as explained above. Their meaning also should be understood as explained above.

Inquiry about human action is ended. This is also known as the chapter on ethical goodness.

Thereafter the meaning of arahanship is cleared up by way of examination into "higher knowledge,"¹ and so forth. Therein "Yes" is the affirmation of the Sakavādin. Whereas the Opponent thinks that externally there can be no achievement of supernormal power like hyper-efficacy,² and so forth, with respect to such matter as is not bound up with human power of control, albeit inwardly it is so, he, fancying that this efficacy must be produced by a 'man' (or person) capable of it, asks: "Have there not been those who could transform themselves by hyper-efficacy?" and so forth. All this is clear in meaning.

Inquiry about supernormal power is ended.

Now "mother," etc., is said in respect of inquiry about kinship; "khattiya," etc., in respect of inquiry about birth³; "layman, world-forsaker," about status; "deva, human," etc., about rebirth; [32] "a stream-winner," etc., about experience—which is also called inquiry about Ariyssa. All these are clear in meaning. "Are there those who, having been arahans, are no longer arahans?"—this has not, however,

¹ *Abhiññā*—i.e., psychic power or gifts.

² *Iddhi*.

³ Or rank: *jāti*.

been said here on account of erratic conception. "Is there (the accepted term of) the four pairs of men?"¹—this is an inquiry about the Company, and this is also clear.

"Is the person conditioned?"²—this is an inquiry into the nature of 'a real and ultimate fact.' Therein, "is there a third alternative?"—this is the question of the Sakavādin. Accordingly the Opponent denies, because of the absence of reality and ultimacy in material quality. When he is asked again, he assents in respect of the person(al entity). When the Sakavādin asks: "Is the person entirely different?" the Opponent denies, because he would not admit the conditioned and the person as being entirely different. "Are the aggregates conditioned?" and so forth—this is said to inquire, having shown by material shape that the aggregates are conditioned, whether these are entirely different. "Is material shape conditioned?" and so forth:—this is said to inquire, having shown the classification of the aggregates, whether these are entirely different.

"Does the person originate?"³—this is the question of the Sakavādin. The Opponent assents, because in the Suttas it is said: " (there are beings who) are subject to birth, decay and death."⁴ He then rejects, because he would not admit its nature as conditioned. Again, when he is asked: "Is the origin of the person apparent?" and so forth, he assents, because, according to him, by such expressions as "it is just misery that comes to he, endures, and is experienced,"⁵ and so on, the origin of the person, etc. is not meant.

"Does the person exist in the goal?"⁶ The "goal" means nirvana, and "does the person exist therein?"—is asked. If the person exists therein, he falls into the error of 'man as eternal,' and if he does not exist therein, into that of 'man as annihilated.' The Opponent, who would not admit either, then rejects both.

¹ I.e., those who have attained one or other of the four paths and the four fruitions. See *P. of C.*, p. 53, fn. 4.

² In text read *sankhato*.

³ I.e., cause to arise; the causative form.

⁴ E.g., *Anguttara*, i, 142, etc.

⁵ *Samyutta*, i, 135.

⁶ Or aim, or well-being (*attha*).

In the question of dependence, 'coming-to-he'¹ means the state of being unborn.²

As to the question: "Does one who feels pleasurable feeling know that he is feeling it?" (it is contended that) 'the earnest student (*yogāvacara*)³ knows; the foolish average man does not.'

The question about the contemplation of (the concept of) body with respect to the physical frame, and so forth, is clear.

In the verses quoted from the *Pārāyana*, the expression "look upon the world as void"⁴ means contemplate the world of aggregates as void of 'a being.'⁵ "Is it the person here who looks upon?"—this is the question of the Sakavādin. The Opponent is so asked, because he, in the verse containing the expression "look upon the world as void," contends that he who looks upon is a person. [33] "With material form" means not being free from the body-group. He acknowledges this because of the five constituents, but again when he is asked, "Is that soul the body?" he rejects, lest it should contradict the Suttas. "(Does he contemplate) without material form?"—this the Opponent admits, because of the four constituents, but again, when he is asked: "Is that soul quite different from that body?"—he rejects, lest it should contradict the Suttas.

"When he has gone within"⁶ and "when he has gone outside"—these are the expressions implying the specific significance of 'is it with or without the body-group?' as explained above. Therein "when he has gone within" means 'gone into material form,' and not coming out of it or therefrom, persists there, not being freed from material form. "Coming out" means, formerly not freed from, now going beyond the scope of material form.

"Without self"⁷ means deprived of self, of soul, of person. The sense is: even in one and the same quality, there is no

¹ *Bhava*.

² *Upapatti*.

³ For this post-Sutta term see also below, xi, 4.

⁴ Sutta-Nipāta, 1119.

⁵ *Satta*.

⁶ *Abbhantara-gato*.

⁷ Or spirit *an-attā*.

'person.' Thus the meaning should be understood as said in all the Suttas and Commentaries. In this connection, however, we shall say merely so far as it was uttered.

"Did the Exalted One speak of a butter-jar?" and the following are adduced to show that meaning is not always according to the form of what is said. A jar made of gold is called a golden jar, but one made of butter is not in the same way called a butter-jar. What is meant here is this: a butter-jar is only that wherein butter is put. In regard to an oil-jar, and so on, this is the sense. A ('permanent') meal or a congey is not eternal and permanent as is nirvana. 'A meal provided in perpetuity, a constant supply of congey' implies the sense that we are to give in charity every day without any limit of time.

Even in such expressions as 'there is the person who works for his own good'¹ and so on, there is no such person as bodily and mental aggregates, known in their specific and general senses. Given bodily and mental aggregates, it is customary to say such and such a name, a family. Thus, by this popular turn of speech, convention, expression, is meant: "there is the person." This is the sense here. Hereon it was also said [34] by the Exalted One: "*These, Citta, are merely names, expressions, terms of speech, designations in common use in the world.*"² What is meant here is: even without reference to bodily and mental aggregates the term 'person' is used to denote a popular convention in both its specific and its general sense. The Buddhas have two kinds of discourse, the popular and the philosophical. Those relating to a being, a person, a deva, a 'brahmā'³ and so forth, are popular discourses, while those relating to impermanence, ill, soul-less, the aggregates, the elements, the senses, the application of mindfulness, the intent contemplation, and so forth, are discourses on highest meaning. Therein, in the popular discourse, when there is speech of a being, a person,

¹ *Dīgha*, iii, 232; *Majjhima*, i, 341, 411; *Āṅguttara*, ii, 95.

² See *Dialogues*, i, 263.

³ A 'higher' deva, an inhabitant of the brahmā-world, not an ultimate 'heaven.'

a deva or a brahmā, he who is able to understand, comprehend its meaning, or get out (of this world), or attain the victory of an arahān, *him* the Exalted One teaches, at the very outset, about a heing, a person, a man, a deva or a brahmā. He who, on hearing differently in discourse on highest meaning about impermanence, or ill, or the like, is able to understand, comprehend its meaning, or get out (of this world), or attain the victory of an arahān, *him* (the Exalted One) teaches differently about impermanence, and so forth. Thus, he does not teach at first the highest-meaning discourse to anyone, even to one who understands him in popular discourse. Taking his stand on popular discourse he, on the other hand, teaches the highest-meaning discourse afterwards. He does not teach at first popular discourse to one who can understand him in highest-meaning discourse. On the other hand, having enlightened him in highest-meaning discourse, he teaches popular discourse afterwards. Highest-aim discourse is, as a rule, too severe to begin with; therefore the buddhas teach at first by popular discourse, and then highest-meaning discourse. But popular discourse they teach consistently and in conformity with truth according to the method selected. And highest-meaning discourse, too, 'they teach consistently and in conformity with truth according to the method selected.'

Thus it is said:

The Enlightened One, best of speakers, spoke two kinds of truth, namely, the popular and that of highest meaning, a third is not got at.¹

Therein, discourse meeting with agreement is true and is by way of world convention. Highest-meaning discourse expression is also true and, as such, characteristic of things (as they are).²

[35] There is another way of putting it. The teaching of the Exalted One is of two kinds, the highest-meaning teaching consisting of the aggregates, and so forth, and the popular teaching consisting of 'butter-jar,' and so forth. The Exalted One does not, indeed, overrun consistency. Hence, on

¹ *I.e.*, known.

² The three lines are metric.

the mere expression "there is the person who," must not command adherence. The highest meaning has been declared by the Teacher, without transgressing the concept. So, another wise man also should not, in explaining the highest meaning, overrun a concept.

The remaining meanings are clear everywhere.

The controversy on 'person' is ended.

II

Now follows the controversy on Falling away.¹

'Because of such statements in the Suttas as "*liability to fall away, and the opposite,—these two things, monks, are concerned with the falling away of a monk who is training*"²; and "*these five things, monks, are concerned with the falling away of a monk who now and then attains emancipation*"³ certain sects in the Order,' namely, the Sammitiyas, the Vajjiputtīyas, the Sabbatthivādins, and some of the Mahāsaṅghikas incline to the belief that an arahāṇa can fall away. 'Hence, whether it be their view or that of others, the Sakavādin (the Theravādin), in order to break them of it, asks: "Does an arahāṇa fall away from arahāṇaship?"'

Therein, "Falling away" is twofold—(1) from what is won, and (2) from what is not yet won. "*The venerable Godhika fell away twice from that emancipation of will (ceto) which was intermittent only*"⁴ illustrates the former. "*See that the reward of your recluseship falls not away for you who are seeking it*"⁵ illustrates the latter. Of these, the former (i.e., falling away from what is won) is meant here.

With reference to this, the Opponent agrees: "Yes." In the opinion of the Sakavādin, this falling away from what is won is expected only from worldly attainment, and not from the reward of recluseship, such as arahāṇaship, and so forth.

¹ *Parihāṇi*. ² *Anguttara*, i, 96. See *P. of C.*, p. 64.

³ *Anguttara*, iii, 173. See *P. of C.*, p. 64.

⁴ *Samādhikāyā*, cf. *Br. sāmāyikāla. Saṃyutta*, i, 120.

⁵ *Majjhima*, i, 271. See *P. of C.*, p. 64, fn. 3.

According to the Opponent's view, this is expected from all the rewards of recluseship, everywhere, at any time, and with regard to all arahans. This is merely their view (or proposition).

In order to break through the entire net of this view, [36] the discussion is extended by asking again: "everywhere?" and so forth. Here, inasmuch as the Opponent would not admit that an arahāṇa who, having gradually fallen, stands on the fruition of a Stream-winner, can fall away, but admits it with regard to one who stands on the higher fruition; and inasmuch as he would not admit it with regard to one who stands in corporeal and incorporeal existences,¹ but admits it with regard to one who stands on sensuous existence, because his taking pleasure in (worldly) activity, and so on are of the nature of decaying, therefore when he is asked: "everywhere?" he rejects. Again, when this is put with a greater emphasis, he agrees with reference to sensuous existence. His view is that, because, in the whole world of sense-experience there exist sensuous pleasures which bring about a falling away, therefore there is a falling away. In the third question, by the expression "Does he fall away?" those conditions which bring about the falling away are inquired into. So 'falling away' implies things by which one takes pleasure in (worldly) activity, specially lust and ill-will. For him these do not exist in corporeal and incorporeal existences. Therefore the Opponent rejects: "No, it is not."

"At all times?" is asked in respect of time. Therein, in the first question, he rejects, because at the time of proper attention there is no falling away. In the second, he agrees, because owing to a distracted attention there may be falling away at any time, either in day-time or at night. In the third it is stated that, if the conditions bringing about the falling away are combined, there is falling away if only for a moment. This he rejects, because there can be no falling away for one who does not fall away before, but does so afterwards. Of the questions like "Do all arahāṇas fall away?"—the first he rejects in respect to acute faculties. In the second he

¹ Lit. 'becomings.'

agrees in respect to dull faculties. In the third also, acute faculties are meant. His view is that in none of them is there falling away.

In the example of a rich man, the first question is of the Opponent; the second is of the Sakavādin. Here what is meant is this: "Since you ask me whether an arahān, while falling away from arahanship, falls away from all four of the Path-fruitions, I in turn ask you: Does a man who, having riches of four lakhs, loses one lakh out of four lakhs, fall away from the status of a rich man?" Then when, in respect of the loss by a portion, the Sakavādin replies: "Yes," the Opponent asks: "Does he fall away from the status given to him by all the four?" As there is no such falling away, the Sakavādin says: "No, he does not." He then is of opinion that: [37] "So also an arahān does not fall away either from arahanship or from the four Path-fruitions," and asks (his opponent) the second question of possibility. The opponent who does not see any limitation to what is impossible for a rich man, agrees. But when he is asked about the possibility of falling away of an arahān from the four Path-fruitions, he takes the wrong sense of the expression "he is sure to proceed towards enlightenment" and, standing on his own view, considers the impossibility of falling away from the Path-fruition of a Stream-winner, and rejects. But this is merely his opinion.

Here ends the application of the thesis.

There now begins a comparison of the classes of Ariyans. Some admit the falling away of an arahān from arahanship; some even of a never-returner; some of a once-returner. But no one admits that a stream-winner can fall away. They admit the falling away only of those who, having fallen away from arahanship, have got¹ the state of a never-returner or that of a once-returner, and not of other never-returners or once-returners. They do not admit that a stream-winner can fall anywhere. So there is an inquiry at the beginning of each discourse.

¹ *I.e.*, have reverted to.

In this connection, the affirmation and the denial should be understood according to their respective views. "Does a never-returner fall away from his (the third) fruition?"—in this question, the denial is of those who do not admit the falling away of a never-returner, and the affirmation is of those who admit the falling away of one who has become a never-returner through the usual course, or of one who, having fallen away from arahanship, stands as a never-returner. This is by way of the context here.

The meaning of all the discourses should be understood according to this: What has been said here, namely, "Does he realize arahanship 'next after the first fruit?'" is asked in respect of regaining arahanship by one who, having fallen away, again strives for it. The other rejects it, there not being arahanship next after the first fruit. Thereafter, in order to ask whether this 'falling away' might have been due to the ignorance of putting away the corruptions, or to the cultivation of the Way, etc., [38] not in an extreme manner, or in the absence of seeing into the truths, or the like (the questions), "Who does put away more corruptions?" and so forth are said. All these are clear in meaning.

The meaning of the Suttas, however, should be understood as said in the texts and the commentaries. In "Does an Arahant who now-and-then¹ reaches emancipation² fall away from arahanship?" here, their view is: he who has dull faculties reaches emancipation now and then, and he who has acute faculties is at any and all seasons emancipated. In the opinion of the Sakavādin, however, it is definitely concluded that he who has got Jhāna, but has not self-control, is intermittently emancipated, while he who has got both Jhāna and self-control, and also all classes of Ariyans are at any and all seasons emancipated in the Aryan emancipation. But (the debater) holding his own view says: "He who is intermittently emancipated falls away, (but) the other does not." The rest here is clear in meaning.

Here ends the comparison of classes of Ariyans.

¹ *Pts.*, ii, 40.

² *Samaya.*

Now follows proof from the Suttas. Therein 'both high and low' means both high and low from a comparison of highest and lowest. 'The ways' means the ways revealed by a Samana, that is to say, explained by a Buddha-Samana. The high ways are of pleasant progress and of quick intuition, while the low ways are of painful progress and of sluggish intuition. The next two are partly high, and partly low. That which is said first is high, the next three are low. "Those who reach the further shore," means 'do not walk twice along those ways to nirvana, but by one way. How? Because the corruptions which are removed by that Way do not originate again. In this way, the absence of the conditions of falling away is explained. "Nor once is this (goal) thought of" means 'nor even once does he become worthy of attainment of it.' Why? Because of the removal of all corruptions by the one Way. [39] By this one Way, the attainment of arahanship is explained.

By the expression "Is there to be a cutting of what has been cut?" is asked: Is there anything to be cut again from the circle of corruptions which has been cut? The other rejects in respect of acute faculty sense, and when he is asked again, he agrees in respect of dull faculty. The Sakavadin quotes the Suttas, and shows the absence of it. Therein, 'the flood and the snare' means the flood of corruptions and the snare of corruptions. "Accumulation of what has been accumulated" means again the Way-culture¹ which has been cultivated.¹ In this connection also, denial and assent should be understood as before.

In the Sutta which has the expression 'conduce to the falling away,' quoted by the Opponent, there are five things which conduce to the falling away from what is not won, and from worldly attainment. But he who thinks over the falling away of one who has won the highest fruition, asks: "Does not the arahant delight in (worldly) activity?" The other rejects with reference to one who is at any and all seasons emancipated, but assents with reference to the other. He rejects in respect of being affected and bound by the passion

¹ Lit. 'making-become,' and made-to-become.

of (worldly) desires, but assents in respect of being affected and hounded by the other. When he is asked: "Is he assailed by lust?" and so forth, he, however, cannot assent. "Is he assailed?" means by which he is assailed, taken up, or overcome.

In the question about latent bias,¹ too, denial and assent should be understood in respect of acute faculties and dull faculties respectively. Or, he assents merely by the expression: "he has good latent bias."

"Does he accumulate lust?"—is asked because of falling away in the making become. In the next, regarding hate and error, this is the meaning. He, however, does not admit any accumulation, because, according to the implication of his own view, etc., there is the falling away. The rest is clear everywhere.

The controversy on falling away is ended.

III

Now follows a controversy on the holy life (*brahmacariya*).

[40] The holy life 'is of twofold import: Way-culture and renunciation of the world. No *deva* practises the latter, but the former is not inhibited,² except to those of the unconscious plane. But some, for instance the Sammitiyas, do not believe in any Way-culture among the higher devas³ as the Paranimmitavasavatti devas, and those beyond them. Referring to them the Sakavādin asks: "Is there no (holy life) among devas?"

"In three respects, monks, do the people of Jambudīpa (i.e., India) excel both those of North Kuru and the world of the Thirty Devas. What are these three? In courage, in mindfulness and in the holy life?"⁴ Because of this Sutta the Opponent holds the view, that there cannot be two sorts of holy life, and therefore he assents. Again, with respect to

¹ *Anusaya*.

² Reading *appaṭisiddhā*.

³ *P. of C.*, p. 71.

⁴ *Aṅguttara*, iv, 396. See *P. of C.*, p. 73.

things which cause an obstacle even were there two sorts of holy life, the Sakavādin asks: "Are all devas stupid?" etc. Here "Communicating by signs made by the hands" means like dumb speakers by signs made by hands.

In the next question: "Is there (holy life) among devas?"—the Sakavādin assents because of Way-culture. Without examining the sense of the assent the Opponent asks with respect to renunciation of the world. With regard to the question: "Where there is no renunciation from the world," etc., the other denies because of the attainment of the Way by laymen, and by some devas. When he is asked again, he agrees with reference to the inhabitants of the border countries and the devas of the unconscious sphere. "Is he who renounces the world?" and so forth—in these questions, too, this is the sense. Again, in the question: "Is it practised among devas?"—the Sakavādin agrees because of Way-culture. When he is asked: "Among all devas?" he denies with reference to devas of the unconscious sphere. In both questions: "Among men?"—it should be understood that the assent is with reference to those in Jambhūḍīpa, and the denial is with reference to the inhabitants of the border countries. "There are spheres where it exists" means there are deva-worlds or countries where it exists. Thus by way of a division of beings and countries the Sakavādin makes reply. In this way, all alternative questions should be understood.

In applying the Suttas, by the expression "where does the fruit (of his works) arise?" the Sakavādin asks: where, for the never-returner, does the fruit of arahanship arise? "There and only there" means in (the worlds called) 'Pure Abodes.' "Well then" [41] is a particle used in the instrumental sense. What is meant is this: Inasmuch as the never-returner realizes fruit in the 'Pure Abodes,' by the Way developed¹ in this world, and does not there develop¹ another Way, therefore "among devas there is no holy life." "Now if one realizes fruit at one place by the Way developed¹ elsewhere, then the Stream-winner, etc., may, similarly, realize

¹ Lit. made-, and make-become.

it"—in order to express this sense the Sakavādin again asks by comparison: "Does the never-returner," and so forth. Here the Opponent assents with respect to the realization of fruit by the never-returner, but as regards the realization of fruit by others he denies. A never-returner, who consummates after leaving this life, develops the Way here. After developing the Way of a never-returner here, he takes spontaneous¹ rebirth. From the expression 'completing existence there' he (the Opponent) believes, that without having Way-culture again, he realizes the fruit of arahanship by his rebirth alone. The stream-winner and the once-returner, however, develop the Way there and are rehorn there. They do not return to this world. Thus, when he is asked about the realization of the never-returner's fruit, he assents. Of others he denies. In the question which has the expression "a never-returning person by the Way developed there," he rejects, because he believes that the never-returner has no Way-culture there. The Sakavādin asks: "Does he develop the Way without putting away the corruptions?" The other denies with regard to the Way in Brahmā world² existence. By the Way in the Brahmā world he consummates after leaving this life. In the question which has the expression "a never-returner who has done that which was to be done," to (is) 'spontaneously reborn,' he agrees, because the expression 'completing existence there' implies, that he is rehorn and has 'done that which was to be done,'³ and so forth. In the question which has the expression 'the arahān,' he rejects with respect to the arahān who has final nirvāṇa; when he is asked again, he assents with respect to final nirvāṇa there. In the question: "Is the arahān rehorn?" and so forth, the sense should be understood as 'does he get final nirvāṇa there, after getting the same here?' When he is asked: "Does (the arahān) get final nirvāṇa there, without penetration of the unchanging?"⁴ he rejects, because he believes that the arahān

¹ *I.e.*, without parents.

² *Rūp'dvācāra*, lit. sphere of the Seen, or of deva-vision.

³ A term in the arahān formula.

⁴ *Ap[p]añivedh'ākuppo*.

is steady and wins by the Way developed here. The simile, namely, "just as a deer" is drawn first [42] by the Opponent, and secondly by the Sakavādin.

Controversy on holy life is ended.

IV

Now follows a controversy on Purification piecemeal.¹

Here, in order 'to break down the opinion, now held, for instance, by the Sammitiyas and others, that when stream-winners and those in the other Ways, through the higher comprehension gained in Jhāna or musing, attain insight into the nature of Ill and so on, the putting away of corruptions (or vices) goes on piecemeal, that is, by one portion at a time,'² the Sakavādin inquires: "Does (the converted man) give up the corruptions piecemeal?" The Opponent agrees. The next question is of the Sakavādin. The Opponent denies, because there is no possibility of being in one part as stream-winner, and the like. In this way, the meaning should be understood on all occasions.

The controversy on purification piecemeal is ended.

V

Now follows a controversy on Renouncing Evil.

"Does the average man renounce (sensual passions and ill-will)?"—this question is asked by the Sakavādin 'to break down the opinion, held, for instance, at present by the Sammitiyas, that an average man who achieves Jhāna, understands the Truths, and becomes a never-returner, renounced sensual passions and ill-will while he was as yet only an average man of the world.'³ The Opponent, however, who does not see any bias in them who renounce by Jhāna, assents. Inasmuch as those who renounce by Jhāna, renounce for ever

¹ *Odhisso*.

² *P. of C.*, pp. 76-7.

³ *P. of C.*, p. 81.

by the Way of the never-returner, therefore the Sakavādin again asks: "for ever?" and so forth. The other rejects, because there is no such renouncing. With reference to renouncing for ever the Sakavādin asks: "Does he renounce?" Thereafter a comparison is made between the average man and he who walks along the Path of the never-returner. This is clear.

After this, when he is asked: "Does he become established in the fruition of the never-returner?" he assents with reference to the stage of the never-returner in Jhāna. When he is asked: "Does he become established in arahanship?" [43] he denies, because there is no renouncing of fetters belonging to the upper part by the Path of insight.

Being asked: "Did he (develop) anything new in the three Ways?" he denies, because of the absence of such culture. When he is asked again, he assents with reference to the undertaking of work of the three Ways. This is also the sense in the questions about the fruit of Samāpaship.

Being asked: "By which Way?" he says: "By the Way of the never-returner with reference to the stage of the never-returner in Jhāna."

Again, when he is asked about renouncing the fetters, he denies, because there is no renouncing (all) of those corruptions by the Way of the never-returner. Being asked for a second time, he assents with reference to the going in the first Way being towards the Way of the never-returner in Jhāna. The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy on renouncing evil is ended.

VI

Now follows a controversy on "Everything exists."

"Does everything exist?"—this question was asked by the Sakavādin 'in order to break down an opinion, held, for instance, at present by the Sabb'atthivādins (lit. 'everything-exists-believers') that, judging by the Suttanta passage: "*Whatever is material form, past, present, future,*" etc.,¹ all

¹ *Majjhima*, iii. 16 f.; *Saṃyutta*, iii. 47; cf. *P. of C.*, p. 95.

phenomena, past, present, future,' 'persist in that state, and that therefore all go on existing.' Taking his stand on the opinion, as explained, the other assents.

In the question: "everywhere?" it is asked: Does all exist in the whole body? In the question: "always?" it is asked: Does all exist at all times? In the question: "in all respects?" it is asked: Does all exist in every way? In the question: "in all?" it is asked: Does all exist in all things? "Not connected" means not in a combined state. A combination takes place of the different states, not of one state. Thus, in this question, by using material form and feeling, or feeling and material form, as identical, not different, it is asked: "Does everything exist?" The non-existent also exists. The non-existent is accomplished such as a sixth personal aggregate,¹ or horns in a hare, etc. "Does it exist in you?" is asked. [44] In the question: "Does everything exist?" it is asked: Does the right view which looks upon your wrong view as wrong exist? Your view, namely, "Everything exists," is wrong, because there is no truth in it. But you would not admit, that this view of ours which has truth in it, is right. The other rejects, because there is no such existence, as is said in all these methods.

Now in all these methods, the entire division of the account, beginning with "Acknowledge your refutation," etc., should be understood in detail.

In this connection, this much is the controversy.

Now with reference to time there follows: "Does the past exist?" Therein "Does the past exist?" and so forth is concerned with hare (time-ideas).

In the expression "Does past material form exist?" and so forth, the time-reference is now connected with the aggregates. "If (the two terms) presenting material-aggregate be taken as identical" means: leaving aside past and future, if (the two terms) presenting material aggregate being taken

¹ I.e., 'one more than the orthodox five constituents, mental and bodily' (*khandhas*). See *P. of C.*, p. 85, fn. 5.

as identical, no distinction is made between them. To the question: "Does (material-aggregate) abandon its materiality?" (the opponent) denies, because material form on ceasing includes the material-aggregate. To the negative question: "Does it not abandon its materiality?" he assents, because it is included in the material-aggregate.

In the expression "if no distinction is made between (the two terms) 'white' and 'cloth,' he does not say whether all cloths are white, or only this is white; he simply says: if no distinction is made between (the two terms) 'white' and 'cloth'; hence the Sakavādin admits their identity in meaning. In the question: "Does it abandon its whiteness?" the Sakavādin admits with reference to the disappearance of colour. In the expression "Does it abandon its cloth-ness?" he denies that the concept is got here. This, too, is the method in the reverse order.

Being asked: "Does not the past abandon its pastness?" he assents, because he thinks that, if the past abandons its pastness, it would become either future or present. But being asked: "Does not the future abandon its futurity?" he rejects, because he thinks that, if the future does not abandon its futurity, it would not attain its present pastness. With regard to the question about present, too, he rejects, because he thinks, that it would be wrong not to have its pastness. In this way, the meaning should be understood in the affirmative questions also.

Having said thus about bare method [45] (the questions), "Is that which is past material form?" and so forth, have been said again, in order to show by way of the aggregates. One will be able to understand all these according to the text.

Now follows the bare (handling of) terms beginning with "Does the past exist?" Therein "suppose the past does not exist" means, if the past does not exist. "It is wrong to say that there exists a past" means it is wrong to say that a past exists. Similarly, when he is asked: "Is a future thing present?" he denies through time-distinction, because the future was then not yet present. Being asked again, he assents, because a future thing, when it has happened, becomes

present. The expression "Does anything which having been, become once more?" means 'when you say, that that which having been future becomes present, (it follows that) that which is future becomes present and, according to this view, that which having been either future or present, becomes present.' This also, "when it has become present?"—this the opponent rejects, saying: "It is not," because, having become present, it does not become future and then again (become) present. Being asked again, he assents, because he thinks he can speak of a future thing when realized as 'having been, is.'

Then the Sakavādin asks him: "If you can speak of a future thing when it has become, as 'present,' and again if you can speak of that which has become as present and when not become as not present—'a chimæra like the horn of a hare'—is not that, when it has become, again present?" In this way he asks: "Is a thing when it has become present?" The other says: "Just as a thing is not on account of its absence, similarly a future thing, when it has not become, does not become present." "Is not a thing, when it has not become, not present?" "Be it so." Again, being asked: "Is not a thing, when it has not become, not present?" he rejects, because he thinks of the absence of its existence.

[46] To the question: "Is an anticipated thing the same as the present and the past?" he rejects time-distinction, because the present was then not yet past. Being asked again, he thinks that it was present before it became past, and assents, because it was past. The expression "Does the present having been, become past, and the past having been, become present?" means when you say, that that which having been present becomes past, (it follows that) that which is present becomes past, and according to this view the present when it has become past. Is this also, when it has become, present? The other rejects, saying: "It is not," because having become past it does not become present, and then again past. Being asked again, he assents because he thinks he can speak of the present, when become, as past.

Then the Sakavādin asks him: "If you can speak of the

present, when become, as past, and again if you can speak of that which has become as past, and when not become as not past—'a chimæra like the horn of a hare'—is not that again, when it has become, past?" And in this way he asks: "Does not a thing, when not become, become past?" The other says: "Just as a thing does not exist on account of its non-existence, similarly the present, when it has not become, does not become past." "Does not the present, when it has not become, become past?" "It may be so." Again being asked: "Does not a thing, when it has become, become past?" he denies because he thinks whence can it exist? Considering the two questions as identical, a connection should be established thus also with the help of both in the third question that follows.

There is another argument. If a future thing becomes present, if a future thing can be spoken of as present, then it follows that the present was spoken of as in the future. This being so, the future also having been, becomes present. Therefore we ask: "Does each of these having been the one, become the other?" The other rejects, as it has been rejected, in the question: "Does that which is future, become present?" Being asked again, he assents, as it has been assented, in the next question.

Then the Sakavādin, in order to ask him by repeating the question: "Does that which is future, become present?" which he (the opponent) has rejected before, and to make him assent that each of these having been the one, becomes the other, asks: "Does not that being the one, become the other?" The meaning is: Have you not said that that which is future becomes present? By rejecting the first question, [47] both that the future becomes present and that the present has become have been rejected. Therefore there exists no future and the present has not become. In the second question, too, you admit that that which is future becomes present. This being so, the future, too, when not become, does not exist; the present, too, when not become, does not exist. Therefore we ask: "Does not each of these, not having been the one, become the other?"

The opponent who is as if covered with darkness from all sides, does not see that these, when not become, do not come to exist, and rejects, saying: "No, it is not."

Secondly, too, if that which is present becomes the past, then it follows that the present is said to be in the past, and the past is said to be in the present. This being so, the present having been exists, and the past having been also exists. Therefore we ask you: "Does each of these, having been the one, become the other?" The other first rejects, as it has been rejected in the question: "Does the future become the present, and the present, the past?" and then again when he is asked, he assents, as it has been assented in the next question.

Then the Sakavādin, in order to ask him by repeating the question: "Does the future become the present, and that (present) again the past?" which was already rejected, and in order to make him (the opponent) assent that each of these, being the one, becomes the other, asks: "Does not that not being the one, become the other?" Its meaning is: Have you not said that that which is present becomes the past? By rejecting the first question, both that the present exists and that the future has become, have been rejected. Therefore the present does not exist, and the past has not become. In the second question, too, you admit that that which is present becomes past. This being so, the present, too, when not become, does not exist; the past, too, when not become, does not exist. We, therefore, ask you: "Does not each of these, not having been the one, become the other?" The opponent who is as if covered with darkness from all sides, does not see that these, when not become, do not happen, and rejects, saying: "No, it is not."

Thirdly, too, if a future thing becomes the present, and that (present) becomes the past, then it follows from these that the future and the present are said to be in the present and the past respectively and similarly that the present and the past are said to be in the future [48] and the present respectively. This being so, a future thing also, when become, exists. We, therefore, ask you: "Does each of these having been the

one, become the other?" The other first rejects, as it has been rejected in the question: "Does the future become the present, and that (present) the past?" and then again when he is asked he assents, as it has been assented in the second question.

Then the Sakavādin, in order to ask him (the opponent) by repeating the question: "Does the future become the present, and that (present) the past?"—which was already rejected—and in order to make him (the opponent) assent, that each of these having been the one, becomes the other, asks: "Does not that not being the one, become the other?" Its meaning is: Have you not said that that which is future becomes the present, and that that (present) the past?" By rejecting the first question, both that the future and the present exist, and that the present and the past have become, have been rejected. Therefore that which is future does not become the present, and the present and the past have not become.

In the second question, too, you admit that that which is future becomes the present, and that that (present) the past. This being so, the future, too, when not become, does not exist; the present and the past, too, when not become, do not exist. Therefore we ask you: "Does not each of these, not having been the one, become the other?"

The opponent who is as if covered with darkness from all sides, does not see that these, when not become, do not happen, and rejects, saying: "No, it is not so."

Purging of terms is ended.

Now here refutation, etc., should be connected as explained above. To the questions: "Does an eye, when past, exist?"¹ and so forth, he assents, because it exists even when visual perception, etc., is given up. Being asked: "Does one see?" and so on, he, however, rejects, because of the function and nature of those objects of consciousness. To the question: "Is the function of knowing done by that (past) coming-to-know?" he rejects, because, owing to the ceasing of that

¹ In Pali 'eye,' 'ear' may stand for either 'organ,' or sense-experience, seeing, hearing.—Ed.

process of knowledge, [49] he does not see its function. Being asked again, he makes the present coming-to-know as the past through the pretext, that the present coming-to-know of the past object is the past coming-to-know because of the knowledge of the past objects, and assents because there is the necessity of functioning with that (past) coming-to-know.

Then the Sakavādin, without giving a chance for pretext,¹ asked: "By that same (past) coming-to-know does one understand ill?" and so on. The other rejects, because there is the absence of this fourfold function through the cognition of the past object.

The same argument applies to the question about future knowing. The questions about present knowing and comparisons are clear in meaning.

To the question: "Does lust, etc., of (his) past exist for the arahant?" he assents because of the destruction of lust, etc. To the question: "Is he (now) lustful?" etc., he rejects because he fears it would contradict the Suttas and the arguments. Thus one should understand all according to the text.

Subsequently, the meaning of the expression "if (that just) exists" should be understood as "if that past, yet existing (lust exists)." The past which exists is past. The present and the future which exist are not past. So the past may be not-past, or that which is not-past may be the past. Therefore the past may not be the past, not-past may be the past. Similar is the argument in the case of the future and the present.

In proving by the Suttas, the opponent asks: "Is it wrong to say 'the past exists,' 'the future exists'?" while the Sakavādin assents. Again, the opponent, for the sake of his own view, asks: "*Whatsoever material quality, monks,*"² etc. In the second argument, the question is of the Sakavādin, while the other assents. Thus, in all places, the question and the affirmation should be understood. In order to prove that 'the future exists,' the Suttas, quoted by the opponent, viz.: "Was it not said by the Exalted One, 'If, monks (there be

¹ *Les'okāsa*.

² *Majjhima*, iii, 16 f.; *Saṃyutta*, iii, 47. See *P. of C.*, p. 95.

lust after, pleasure in, craving for, edible food,"¹ etc., and the expression at the end of the Sutta pointed out by him, viz., "*there doth exist in the future re-becoming,*"² etc., 'do not amount to a "state of existing," but refer to certainty of result, given the consummation of the conditions.' This is the sense of the Suttas. The rest is everywhere clear.

The controversy on "everything exists" is ended.

VII

[50] Now follows the controversy concerning 'Of what does one's past, etc., consist?'

Therein "Does one's past consist in (bodily and mental) aggregates? is asked by the Opponent, who regards that the past and the future both exist, because the aggregates and other factors (of our experience) retain their state (as a sort of complex self). The Sakavādin's assent 'Yes' summarizes the past as aggregates.

Again, the Opponent asks: "Does the past exist?" The Sakavādin rejects, because according to the Niruttipatha-Sutta³ its existence is denied. In this way, should the meaning be understood in the questions relating to the organs and objects of sense, to the elements, in those relating to the future, and in those which follow both in the affirmative and negative methods, from a comparison with the present, and in those which begin with "Does the past consist in material form?"

In proving by the Suttas, however, the Sakavādin asks: "Is it then wrong to say," etc. Therein "These⁴ do not exist" means these (mental) properties do not exist. The Opponent assents: "Yes," because he regards that these in the state of aggregates, and the rest, do exist. Then the Sakavādin quotes the Suttas in order to prove that these do not exist. The second question, too, is of the Opponent. The Sakavādin assents. The Opponent then quotes the Suttas,

¹ *Āṅguttara*, i, 197; see *P. of C.*, pp. 96 f.

² *Saṃyutta*, iii, 71; see *P. of C.*, p. 100.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Read in text *c'etc.*

whereby he proves that (one's past and future) consist in aggregates, and so forth. The statement "these exist," although carried, is as if not obtained.

The controversy on "Does one's past consist in aggregates?" etc., is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy on "Some (of the Past and Future) as still existing."

Therein the Sakavādin asks: "Does the past exist?" in order to break down the opinion held, for instance, by the Kassapikas,¹ 'that the past survives, as presently existing, in part.' The Opponent answers: "Some of it exists." This is the sense of it.

Because the Opponent holds the view that things of which the results are not yet matured exist, and things of which the results are matured do not exist, therefore the Sakavādin asks: "Have some (things of the past) ceased?"² Its meaning is: you think that some (things) of the past exist, some do not. If so, it follows that some (things) of the past [51] have ceased, some have not ceased, but are existent. In the expression "departed"³ and so forth also, this is the argument. Since by the expression "of things which are with incomplete result, some exist" he (the opponent) would judge, that things which are with incomplete result exist, and since these things are past, therefore, in order to question him, the Sakavādin asks: "Is it a fact that of things which are with incomplete results, some exist, some do not?"—just as in the case of such past things some exist.

"Things of which the results are matured" has been said in order to question him with reference to things which, according to him, do not exist. "Things which are without result" has been said in order to question him with reference to the indeterminate. Thus with respect to these three groups

¹ These had branched off from the Sabbatthivādins.

² *Niruddha* (ended)

³ *Vigata* (gone-away).

the affirmation and the negation in all the direct and indirect methods should be understood.

Of past things, some are with complete results, and some are with incomplete results. Those with complete results are so called because, 'of the act producing rebirth, life and decease are its results, and the maturing of that result accordingly lasts from birth to death.' This has been said with regard to such past things. Granting that such past things will become mature as to their effect, the Sakavādin asks: "Can they be said to exist?" Just as the highly effective virtues of a virtuous person are said to exist even while he is asleep. Similarly because of the common usage the opponent assents. Granting that they will (in this respect) mature, when he is asked next: "Can they be said to present?" the opponent, who holds the view that since actions are known to be imperishable, therefore there is an accumulation of actions, assents.

To the question: "Does the future exist?" and so forth, he replies that some of it exists because of things that are arisen. The rest is clear everywhere as said above.

The controversy on "some of the past and future as still existing" is ended.

IX

[52] Now follows the controversy on 'Applications in Mindfulness.'¹

'The groups holding special views which arose later, to wit, the Andhakas, comprising the sub-groups of the Pubbaseliyas, Aparaseliyas, Rājagirikas and Siddhatthikas, held the opinion, that the *objects* of mindfulness, namely, the body and the rest, were themselves [the conscious *subject*]: mindfulness.' This they deduced from the passage in the 'Satipaṭṭhāna-Samyutta': '*I will show you, monks, the induction and the cessation of applications in mindfulness.*'² To break

¹ A formulated code of practice highly esteemed in the Order.

² *Samyutta*, v, 184; *P. of C.*, p. 104.

down this opinion, the Theravādin puts the question. The opponent assents.

Inasmuch as *paṭṭhānās* (lit. applications) mean those things to which one applies: Applies what? Mindfulness. Mindfulness-applications mean the objects which form the basis of mindfulness; thus such mindfulness has *paṭṭhānās* as its field. But who apply? They who are mindful (*satiyo*). Thus mindfulness-applications also mean those who apply mindfulness. So also the two views oppose each other in succession.

The Sakavādin's question is with regard to those who do not follow this order and emphatically assert, that *all cognizable-things*¹ constitute applications in mindfulness. The opponent assents, because of objects² (of mindfulness). Being asked: "Do all cognizable-things constitute mindfulness?" he, however, rejects, because all cognizable-things do not constitute mindfulness.

Herein the expressions 'leading to extinction,' and so forth, are attributes of the Way. "Leading to extinction" means, that the Way leading to the same goal attains nirvana which puts an end to corruptions. "Leading to enlightenment" means, it leads to awakening knowledge of the Fourfold Truth. "Leading to disintegration" means, it leads to the making for an undoing of the cycle (of existences). Thus applying these terms he asks: "Do all cognizable-things constitute such a Way as leads to the same goal?" "Not akin to the fetters, ties," etc., has been said in order to question about its transcendental state. "Recollection of the Buddha" and so forth have been said by way of questioning about its divisions. "Does the eye-organ constitute an application in mindfulness?" and so forth have been asked by way of questioning about the division of all cognizable things.

Herein also negation is because of mindfulness, and affirmation is because of the object. In all these questions, the meaning should be understood thus. Proving by the Suttas is quite clear.

The controversy on applications in mindfulness is ended.

¹ *Sabbe dhammā*.

² *Ārammaṇa*.

X

[53] Now follows the controversy on 'Existence in Immutable Modes.'

"All things exist," in time, by way of material form and the rest, as past, present, or future, but that there is no past that is at once future and present, nor any future and present that are also past, and therefore all things exist only as thus, and not as thus¹—this is the opinion held now, for instance, by the Andbakas and others, such as the Pubbaseliyas, etc., named above. Of them the Sakavādin asks: "Does the past exist?" The opponent answers: "It exists on this wise, it does not exist on that wise."

Herein 'on this wise' means only 'as thus.'

Then, says the Sakavādin: "Does the past exist on this wise, does it not exist on that wise? And if this same past does not exist as thus, then is also existence non-existence? The opponent denies, because it cannot, in its character as past, be both existent and non-existent. Being asked for the second time, he affirms, because it can exist in its own state only, it does not exist as anything else.

Thereafter (the Sakavādin) asks: "Is the state of being a state of non-being?" which means 'is it(s) character) as existent (a character as) non-existent?' In this way, the meaning should be understood on all occasions. At the end, however, the opponent, saying that material form exists on this wise, it does not exist on that wise, and so forth, establishes anyway his view that the past exists on this wise, not on that wise. But as it has been improperly established, it is not established at all.

The controversy on "It is thus" is ended.

Here ends the Great Chapter.

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 108.

CHAPTER II

I

[54] Now follows the controversy on 'Conveyance by another.'

Whether there can be impure discharge from an arahant ? is asked by the Sakavādin concerning a notion now entertained by some, for instance, by the Puhhaseliyas and Aparaseliyas. These have noted seminal discharge among those who profess arahantship, in the belief that they have won that which is not won, or among those who profess arahantship, yet are over-confident and deceitful. And they wrongly attribute to devas of the Māra group the conveyance hereof, to such.¹ The opponent affirms it. Now the question: "Has an arahant lust?" is asked, because seminal discharge is caused by lust, and its meaning is clear. Inasmuch as the devas of the Māra group have not seminal discharge, and inasmuch as they, taking that physical impurity of others, convey it to the arahant who has not got it, therefore, with respect to the question: "Have then these devas themselves," etc. ? he denies: "No, in them it is non-existent." But to the question: "Have not then these devas themselves," etc., he assents, because he holds the view that they produce and convey it. The question: "(Do they convey it) through the pores of the body?" he denies, because he sees, that its conveyance would have to be effected through the pores of the body like that of ghee and oil. "Well then" is a particle used in the sense of a resolution. The meaning is: They think: "We shall cause doubt as to his attainment to be laid hold of," and thus endeavouring they convey it.

Being asked: "Is there doubt in an arahant?" he denies with respect to doubts about the eight points stated. Being asked again, he affirms, because (as to certain other matters)

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 111.

there can be no definite conclusion, namely, about the name, family, etc., of a given woman or man, and the like. By the expression "Is there any specific repository in him?" it is asked: is there any specific repository for that impurity, like those for stool and urine, in him?

The expression "Of one who is proficient in his own field¹" has been said concerning the freedom by reason of an arahant who is proficient in his own field of arahanship. The expression "of one who is proficient in other things" has been said concerning the freedom from both ways of one who is proficient [55] both in his own field and in other eight attainments.

The rest here should be understood according to the text.

The controversy on conveyance by another is ended.

II

Now follow the three controversies, namely, (1) that an arahant is liable to be ignorant, (2) that he is liable to get perplexed, and (3) that he is liable to be surpassed by others.

Because an arahant who has no knowledge of such things as the name, family, etc., of a given woman or man, and the like, is therefore liable to be ignorant. (2) He is liable to get perplexed about facts concerning everyday life. (3) He is also liable to be surpassed in such knowledge by others, because it comes to him, is explained and disclosed by others. These views are held, for instance, now by the Pubbaseliyas. In order to refute these, their views the Sakavādin puts queries in this and the next two discourses. The affirmation and negation are of the opponent. In all the questions and answers, the meaning should be understood following the text.

The controversy on ignorance, perplexity and inferiority of an arahant is ended.

¹ *Saddhamma-kusalā*.

III

Now follows the controversy of articulate utterance (of one who has entered into Jhāna).

Some, for instance, at present the Pubhaseliyas and others, hold that anyone who has entered into First Jhāna, at the moment of attaining the (first or) stream-winner's Way, utters the truth: 'Sorrow!'¹ Referring to this, the Sakavādin asks: "Is there articulate utterance on the part of one who has entered into Jhāna?" Standing on his own view the opponent assents. Being asked again: 'everywhere?' with reference to the three worlds of life, he rejects in respect of the incorporeal. Being asked: 'always?' in respect of time, he rejects regarding the time for all other attainments, excepting the time when one enters into the First Jhāna, at the moment of attaining the first Way. To the question: "for all persons who have entered into Jhāna?" he denies with regard to those who have attained worldly attainments. Being asked: "for all such attainments?" he rejects with regard to the supramundane [beginning with the second Jhāna] and all mundane attainments.

[56] 'Bodily expression' means bodily intimation produced by (spiritual) advance.² The thoughts which give rise to vocal intimation are also called bodily intimations. This being so, the Sakavādin asks in order to urge: why is there no bodily expression too (in such a person)? The opponent both rejects and affirms, because of his own view. Now, if anyone, at the moment of attaining the Way, utters the word Sorrow, he should also utter the word 'Origin (of sorrow)'³ and so forth. If he does not utter this, he should not utter the other. To press this, the questions beginning with "Does he utter the word 'Sorrow,' knowing the fact of Ill?" have been put. The opponent however both rejects and affirms because of his own view.

¹ I.e., the first of the 'four truths.'

² The alternative reading (text p. 56, fn. 1) *abhikkama* seems more plausible than *patikkama*.—Ed.

³ I.e., slogans for the other three truths.—Ed.

By his view he understands that one who has attained the first supramundane Jhāna has got insight into 'Sorrow,' knowing the fact of Ill, and that, by the hearing hereof the supramundane knowledge of the fourfold truth is meant the 'ear' whereby one hears the sound of two contacts, namely, the contact of ear and that of mind. "Is it wrong to say," etc., means if anyhow there is no articulate utterance on the part of one who has attained (the first Way), then it should not be said without discrimination, that there is articulate utterance in such a person. The rest here is clear in meaning.

In the Sutta, namely, '*O Ānanda, Abhibhu, disciple of Sikkhī, the Exalted One*,'¹ etc., which has been quoted at the end along with the testing with other Suttas, the consciousness of attaining the Way, which gives rise to articulate utterance, also produces the bodily expression. And because this is the consciousness of the First supramundane Jhāna, therefore (the proposition) is not proved.

The controversy on 'articulate utterance (during
ecstasy)' is ended.

IV

Now follows the controversy on 'inducing (insight) by the word "Sorrow."'

Inducing (insight) by the word 'Sorrow' means, by repeating the word 'Sorrow' one induces insight² into sorrow. It is thus a factor and part of the Way. This is the view of some, for instance, at present of the Pubbaseliyas. With reference to them the Sakavādin asks: "Is induction (of insight) by the word 'Sorrow' a factor?" etc. The opponent affirms.

In the first question: "Do all (who utter that word, develop [57] the Way)?" he denies with regard to those who are not contemplating. To the second question, he assents with regard to those who are contemplating. This is merely his view.

¹ *Anguttara*, v, 133 f.; see *P. of C.*, p. 123.

² Or knowledge (*ñāṇam*).

Therefore, to refute the word 'all,' 'the average foolish person,' and so forth is said. This is quite clear in meaning.

The controversy on 'inducing (insight) by saying
"sorrow"' is ended.

V

Now follows the controversy on 'duration of consciousness.'

Some, for instance, now the Andhakas, whose secession is narrated above, hold that, judging by the apparent continuity both of overt consciousness in Jhāna and of sub-consciousness,¹ a single state of consciousness lasted for a length of time.² In order to correct this view, the Sakavādin asks: "Does a single (unit of) consciousness last even for a day?" The opponent assents. "Does one-half of the day belong to the moment of arising?" is asked, not considering the duration of a moment, but because of the expression 'origin and decay' at the end of the teaching: 'all conditioned things are impermanent and subject to origin and decay.'

Being asked: "Do these things come and go more quickly than mind?" he rejects, because he does not see any things which come and go more quickly than mind. Being asked again, he assents in respect of that state of consciousness which he considers to have lasted for a length of time. With regard to the question: "Does any unit of consciousness last one's whole lifetime?" he denies it in all places excepting the Arūpa plane, because of the expression "the devas of air³ last up to 80,000 æons in life," but he assents in the case of those who are in the Arūpa plane.

"Does then the mind of the devas who have reached the Arūpa plane arise and cease moment by moment?" is asked by the opponent. (The Sakavādin) assents, because he fears lest it would contradict the Suttas: "*Subject to origin and*

¹ *Bhavaṅga-citta*, lit. thought (regarded as) becoming.—Ed.

² *P. of C.*, p. 124.

³ *Marū*, or Maruts; cf. *S. Nipāta*, 688.

decay," and so forth. He however maintains its duration through his own view.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy about the duration of consciousness
is ended.

VI

Now follows the controversy on ' (the world as only a) cinderheap.'

By thoughtlessly grasping the teaching of such Suttas as ' *All is on fire, monks !*'¹ ' *All conditioned things (involve) Ill,*'² some, [58] for instance the Gokulikas, now hold ' that all conditioned things are without qualification no better than a welter of embers whence the flames have died out, like an inferno of ashes. To correct this view by indicating various forms of happiness, the Sakavādin puts the question.'³ The opponent assents to it.

Therein the word "entirely" means not having made a limit, boundary, division, all without distinction.

All the rest should be understood according to the text together with the proving by the Suttas.

The controversy on ' (the world as only a) cinderheap '
is ended.

VII

Now follows the controversy on ' the gradual attainment of realization.'

By thoughtlessly considering such Suttas as:—

*" Little by little, one by one, as pass
The moments, gradually let the wise,
Like smith the blemishes of silver, blow
The specks that mar his purity away,"*⁴

¹ *Vinaya Texts* i, 134. ² *Dialogues* ii, 175. ³ *P. of C.*, p. 127.

⁴ *Sutta-Nipāta*, verse 962; *Dhammapada*, verse 239; translated in *P. of C.*, pp. 130, 133.

various views as to the realization (of the truth) are formed, for instance, now by the Andhakas, Sabbatthivādins, Sammitiyas and Bhadrāyānikas, namely, that, in realizing the fruit of a stream-winner, some put away corruptions by insight into Ill, some by insight into Origin, Ending or Way,¹ and similarly with respect to the remaining Ways. In order to correct their views the Sakavādin asks: "Is realization (of the truth) gradually acquired?" The opponent assents. But being asked: "Is the Path of a stream-winner gradually developed?" he denies, because he fears lest he would be guilty of admitting many states in one Way. Being asked for the second time, he assents because of the insight into Ill, and so on. He agrees that the Four Truths amount to one Way of a stream-winner. But inasmuch as he considers that there is only one fruit, therefore he rejects.

This is also the method with respect to the Way of a once-returner, and the rest.

To the question: "If one comes to see the (first) Way," etc., he agrees, because one's insight is not perfect by insight into Ill, and so forth; it becomes perfect by insight into the Way, and when he is known to have reached Path-fruit.

The opponent puts the question: "Are the Four Truths seen, when once (the first Truth, viz., the fact and nature of) Ill is seen?" The Sakavādin assents because of grasping the 'one.' [59] Again, in the question "Does the Truth of Ill amount to the Four Truths?" he rejects, because of the various states in the Four.

The Sakavādin puts the question: "If the material aggregate is seen to be impermanent," etc. The opponent assents, because he holds the view that, just as the presence of the sea may be known by the taste of one drop of sea-water, similarly if one object is known to be impermanent, etc., all the rest are known to be so.

"By the Four Insights" means by insight into Sorrow, etc., (of the Four Truths)." "By the Eight Insights" means by the ordinary insight of the disciples into Truths, and insight into analytic knowledge. "By the Twelve Insights" means

¹ Keywords of the Four Truths.

by insight into the Causal Genesis of 12 constituenta. "By the Forty-four Insights" means insight into birth and decay, origin of birth and decay, etc., and when similarly explained (each of the remaining 10 items of) the causal Genesis. "By the Seventy-seven Insights"¹ means insight into "*birth and decay, monks, are impermanent, conditioned, causally arisen, subject to perish, to pass away, to lose passion, to cease,*"² and when similarly explained (each of the remaining 10 items of) the Causal Genesis.

The rest here should be understood according to the text along with the proving by the Snttas.

The controversy on 'a gradual progress in realization' is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy on 'a Buddha's everyday usage.'

Here some now, for instance, the Andhakas, hold the view that the Exalted Buddha's daily usages were supramundane usages. With reference to them the Sakavādin puts the question, and the opponent assents. 'Supramundane hearing,' and so forth is said to show that the latter's argument is wrong. This indeed is the method here. Is the organ of hearing alone supramundane, or the ear, etc., too? In the expression "If the Exalted Buddha's speech struck on the mundane hearing of men" should not be understood in the sense that, if it struck on supramundane objects, it should also be supramundane, the sense here is: when it struck on mundane objects, it cannot be called supramundane. In the expression 'by mundane intelligence' also, [60] the mundaneness (of a Buddha's speech) is meant. There may be various meanings on account of other objects. Supramundane object is also known by mundane knowledge. Thus all should accordingly be understood.

¹ For the import of this term, see *P. of C.*, p. 133, fn. 1.

² *Samyutta*, ii, 26; see *P. of C.*, p. 133, fn. 1.

To the questions: "Do they all develop the Ways?" and so on, he denies with respect to those who do not attain the Ways, and he assents regarding those who attain them. The expression 'with one golden wand' means with one wand made of gold. This is the simile used by the opponent. " (The Exalted Buddha's) customary speech was mundane, when he spoke of mundane objects"—this is also an opinion, now held by some of the Andhakas.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy on 'a Buddha's everyday usage' is ended.

IX

Now follows the controversy on 'stopping.'¹

Some, for instance, at present the Mahimsāsakas and the Andhakas, hold the view, that the stopping (of Ill), though constructed as one, relates to two stoppings, according as sorrow is stopped through reasoned or unreasoned reflections about things.² With reference to them the Sakavādin asks: "Are there two kinds of stopping?" The opponent assents.

In the questions: "Are there two kinds of stopping of Ill?" and so forth, he denies, because he does not admit two kinds of Truth about Ill; he assents, because he admits that the stopping of Ill takes place in two ways.

In the questions: "Are there two kinds of Truth about the stopping of Ill?" and so forth, he denies, because he does not admit the stopping of two kinds of Ill; he assents, because the stopping of Ill takes place in two ways. This is the method with respect to 'Are there two kinds of desire?' and so forth.

In the questions: "Are there two nirvanas?" and so forth, he denies, because he does not see the difference of

¹ *Nirodha* we have hitherto, in Buddhism, not rightly rendered by cessation. It is a strong causative noun—making an end of—cf. below "destroy." "Ending" can be used causatively, but is weaker. We need the form 'put an end to,' 'make an end of.'—Ed.

² *P. of C.*, p. 136.

high, low, etc., in it. The expression 'things which have been stopped through unreasoned reflection' means that all deep reflection of spiritual insight, through its purity and the absence of statements and questionings,—is said to make worldly things stop. The expression "those things may also be made to stop by deep reflection" means by spiritual knowledge they may be made to stop, to undergo the state of not being reborn.

The opponent asks: [61] "Are those things which have stopped without, and those that have stopped by, deep reflection both annihilated for ever?" The Sakavādin assents to the asserted annihilation, partly because there is no need to destroy what has been destroyed, and partly because the things that have been stopped without deep reflection continue as non-existent when the Ariyan Way is developed.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy on 'stopping' is ended.

Here ends the Second Chapter.

CHAPTER III

I

[62] Now follows the controversy on 'Powers.'

By thoughtlessly considering the ten Suttas in the Anuraddha Saṃyutta, beginning with "*I, brethren, from practice and development of the Four Applications of Mindfulness, understand even as it really is the causal occasion as such, and what is not the causal occasion,*"¹ etc., some, for instance, at present the Andhakas, hold the view that the powers of a Tathāgata are common to disciples. With reference to them the Sakavādin puts the question, and the opponent who holds the view, assents.

Now of a Tathāgata's powers some are wholly in common with his disciples, some not, and some are partly common to both. All, for instance, can share insight² into extinction of cankers (*āsava*). A Tathāgata alone discerns the degrees of development in the controlling faculties (*indriyāṇi*). The rest are partly common to both. The causal occasion of anything and the like the disciple knows only within a certain range, but a Tathāgata knows them without limit. The former can affirm them; the latter can explain them. But (the Andhakas) say that the whole of his power was held in common with his (leading) disciples. To correct them (the Sakavādin) again puts the question: "Are the powers of a Tathāgata common to disciples?"

In the first question, he (the opponent) denies with respect to all kinds of objects which a Tathāgata alone can explain. In the second question, he agrees, because a disciple knows from its source the causal occasion of anything, and can affirm

¹ *Saṃyutta*, v, 304 f., Suttas 15-24; see *P. of C.*, p. 139.

² *Nāṇan*, lit. knowledge.

them. In the questions beginning with "Is this or that," he denies because of the absence of uniformity in all respects. The two terms 'previous application' and 'previous line of conduct' are synonyms. Likewise, the terms 'instruction in doctrine' and 'teaching of doctrine.' In the question about the knowledge of the degrees of development in the controlling powers,¹ he agrees that so far as the scope of a disciple is concerned it is partly held in common.

Now inasmuch as a disciple can distinguish a causal occasion from an occasion that is not caused, and can affirm this, therefore, [63] having explained the knowledge of a disciple therein, the opponent puts the question beginning with "Can a disciple distinguish a causal occasion from an occasion that is not causal?"—just to establish this, that the powers named are common to disciples just in so far as they know. This is not accepted, because he thinks that the knowledge of the different degrees of development in the controlling powers is one of the six kinds of supreme knowledge.

The expression "Or, is there any difference between the extinction of cankers for both?" means that having compared the extinction of cankers for a Tathāgata with their extinction for a disciple, it should be said, that there is no difference between them. In the expression 'is there any difference between the (ensuing) emancipation for a Tathāgata and that for a disciple?' this is the method. The rest here is clear in meaning.

Now the Sakavādin admits, that a Tathāgata shares the power of insight into the extinction of cankers in common with the disciple. Connecting with this, the opponent puts the question: "If the extinction of cankers," and so forth, in order to inquire if the remainder is not shared by both. In answering them the Sakavādin admits, that the power of extinction of cankers is held in common, because there is no distinction in insight. As there is no distinction in others, too, they are rejected as common.

Again, connecting a causal occasion and an occasion that is not causal, and the like with the extinction of cankers,

¹ Or faculties (*indriya*).

the opponent asks if they are not shared by both. The Sakavādin rejects with respect to insight into the extinction of cankers, and affirms with respect to the rest. Then connecting this with the different degrees of development in the controlling powers, the opponent asks if it is not shared by both. This has been shown in brief. Therein also the Sakavādin affirms with respect to the different degrees of development in the controlling powers, and rejects with respect to the rest.

Then connecting this with the occasions that are both caused and not caused, the opponent asks whether the different degrees of development in the controlling powers are shared by both. This, too, has been shown in brief. Here the Sakavādin rejects with respect to the different degrees of development in the controlling powers, and assents with respect to the rest.

The controversy on powers is ended.

II

Now follows the controversy on ' (the Quality called) "Ariyan." ' ¹

That, of the ten powers of (discernment or) insight, not only the insight into extinction of cankers, but the other nine powers are also Ariyan, is the view held at present by such as the Andhakas. With reference to them the Sakavādin asks: "Is the power of a Tathāgata, viz., insight into the extinction of cankers, Ariyan?" The opponent assents.

Thinking that if it be Ariyan, it should be developed as one of the Ways, etc., ² the Sakavādin again puts the question with respect to Ways, etc. The other rejects.

[64] The Sakavādin again asks with respect to 'emptiness,' etc. Now there are two kinds of 'emptiness': of a self (or spirit), and of conditioned things. Emptiness of self means emptiness in the five aggregates of a self which might be got

¹ See Rhys Davids, *Early Buddhism*, 49; Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism* (1st ed. only), 69.

² Viz., four Ways and four Fruitions.

through heresy. Emptiness¹ in conditioned things means nirvana, namely, detachment from all conditioned things. The opponent denies because of the latter, assents because of the former. Being asked: "Does one apply the mind?" etc., he rejects with respect to nirvana, assents with respect to conditioned things. Mental application on occasions caused and not caused has as object conditioned things; that on emptiness has as its object nirvana, etc.

Following this method, the Sakavādin asks: "Is there a combination of two (mental) contacts, two consciousnesses? The opponent, not getting a chance, denies. This is also the method in the cases of the 'Signless' and the 'Not-hankered-after.'"¹

The aggregates are the signless because of the absence of sign of a being. They are nirvana because of the absence of sign of conditioned things. The aggregates are the 'Not-hankered-after,' because they, being put on one thing, are reckoned as being established, and because of the resolve about a being, which is reckoned as being such. Nirvana is the 'Not-hankered-after' by the resolve about all conditioned things which have the canker of craving as their object through resolve by craving. Therefore, in this connection also, denial and affirmation should be understood as before.

Just as the Applications in Mindfulness, the Supreme Efforts and the rest are Ariyan, and have as their object the concepts of 'Emptiness,' and 'Signless' and the 'Not-hankered-after,' so "Is the knowledge of a causal occasion of anything such?" is then asked both in the affirmative and negative methods. There all the affirmations and denials are of the opponent. In this way, the questions and answers to the remaining Insights are to be understood.

In the text however the rest has been briefly stated, and at the end a division has been made out between decease and rebirth of beings. Thereafter, connecting the thought as to what in the Sakyan view is 'Ariyan,' with the insight into the extinction of all cankers, the questions are

¹ *Dhammasaṅgani*, §§ 346-53.

put, both in the affirmative and negative methods, so as to know whether the remaining insights are Ariyan. All these are by the opponent; affirmation and denial are by the [65] Sakavādin. They are clear in meaning. Here in the text, however, having shown the first nine insights, insight into being is shown in brief.

The controversy on ' (the Quality called) Ariyan ' is ended.

III

Now follows the controversy on ' Emancipation. '

' Whereas it is true that, in minds devoid of, *e.g.*, lust, there is no need to get emancipated, the opinion, held, at present, by such as the Andhakas, is that, just as a soiled garment is freed from its stains on being washed, so emancipation means that a mind beset with lust is emancipated from lust.'¹

With reference to these the Sakavādin asks: " Has ' becoming emancipated ' reference to the mind being (at the time) in touch with lust ? " etc. The opponent assents. Then again, being asked: " Does ' becoming emancipated ' refer to a mind which is accompanied by lust ? " and so forth, he rejects, because he thinks that the mind is emancipated in a ' Way-moment,'² but there is then no such mind. Being asked, " If the mind which is in touch with lust "—and so forth, he rejects, because he does not see that, just as both contact and mind are emancipated from lust, so lust is emancipated.³ In this way, the meaning should be understood in the case of mind beset with hate, and the like.⁴

The controversy on emancipation is ended.

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 144.

² *Khana* has the force in its meaning of ' opportunity. '—Ed.

³ *Evam rūpassa vimuttiṃ*. . . . Possibly a defect here in the text.—Ed.

⁴ The trinity ' lust, hate, dullness. '

IV

Now follows the controversy on 'Being Emancipated.'¹

This is the opinion, held by those who think that the mind, partially liberated by emancipation, from obstacles in Jhāna, is in a (gradual) process of being emancipated by complete severance experienced in a 'Way-moment.' With reference to them the Sakavādin asks: "Is (spiritual) emancipation a partial becoming free?" The opponent assents.

Again, the Sakavādin asks: "Partially?" The term 'partially' refers to 'making-become' in the masculine. "Is such a mind in part emancipated, in part not?" just as one is partially emancipated, emancipated by part, or in part. Why is this asked? Because the expression 'that spiritual emancipation is a being partially emancipated' has been wrongly stated. Just as mats and the like, while being prepared, are left unfinished and they then in part are made, in part not, similarly it follows that this mind is in part freed, in part not. Then the opponent [66] rejects, in the first question, that the nature of mind is to be in part like mats and the like. In the second, he assents, because emancipation which is a being partially emancipated is not yet completed. Or, he rejects with respect to a worldly Jhāna-'moment.' He assents because it is not then emancipated by complete severance experienced in a supramundane Jhāna-'moment.' His view is that while it is a being *then* freed by complete severance, it is a being partially freed.

Then the Sakavādin, in order to convince him says: "If you admit that a mind is in part freed, in part not, then it follows that a person who with one mind² becomes a stream-winner, is in part stream-winner, in part not"; and puts

¹ It is tempting in this section to use the term 'process,' but the only Pali term for this, *paravatti*, is not once used. There is a feeling after it, as there is in the Milinda (cf. Mrs. Rhys Davids' *The Milinda Questions*, pp. 52, 55), but the Indian atomistic outlook dominates language in the term *eka-desam*, in one part (only). It is interesting to see the 'becoming' between 'is' and 'is not' fighting for recognition.—Ed.

² Mind (*citta*) means equally 'a thought.'

the question: "Is he in part stream-winner?" and so on. The opponent who does not see such a rule, rejects. In the remaining questions, this is the method.

In the question about the moment of its genesis, the sense is: If a mind is regarded as both emancipated and as being partially emancipated, then it follows, that it is emancipated at one moment, and is being partially emancipated at another. Do you mean such a mind?

In proving by the Suttas, the first Sutta is quoted by the opponent. Its sense is this: The expression 'is set free' is stated in an incomplete sense. Therefore the expression 'for him who thus knows, thus sees, the mind is set free from these cankers,'¹ means that that mind is being emancipated.

The second Sutta² is quoted by the Sakavādin. Its sense is this: If the expression 'is set free' means the emancipated mind is being emancipated, then here, in the absence of the expression 'is set free,' 'is emancipated' should be meant, not 'being emancipated.'³

In order to press on him thus: 'Now, just as you think that because of the incomplete emancipation the mind is being emancipated, so is it being attached, etc., to lust and the like which are not completely enjoyed'—again, the question: "Is the mind?" etc., is begun. The opponent, too, rejects all this, because he does not see such a mind. Then the Sakavādin, in order to convince him that there can be only two alternatives, no room for a third one, says: "Is the mind lustful or not?" and so forth. It means: Good Sir, is it not that these are the two alternatives, viz., a mind which is attached to lust is lustful and an unattached mind is not so, there being no room for a third alternative, namely, for a mind which is 'being attached.' This is the method also in regard to the term 'corrupted,' and the like. When the opponent assents to this, saying 'yes,' [67] the Sakavādin, in order to show him that, in the case of emancipation also, there are only two alternatives, says: "If it be lustful," and

¹ *Dīgha*, i, 84.

² *Ibid.*, 83.

³ In Pali one verb only for the two in English is used.

so forth. It means: If you assent to these two alternatives, then you also assent to these, namely, emancipated and not emancipated. A mind attached to lust is not emancipated, whereas that which is unattached, is emancipated, being emancipated, there being no room in the highest sense for a third alternative.

The controversy on 'being emancipated' is ended.

V

Now follows the controversy regarding 'a person of the Eighth Stage.'¹

The view, held at present by such as the Andhakas and Sammitiyas is that, at the moment of entering on the Way, after qualification and adoption, two of the (ten) corruptions (i.e., wrong views and doubt) no longer break out in a person of the eighth stage—that is, the person who has entered on the stream.² With reference to one of them the Sakavādin puts the question. The opponent assents, because from the moment of entering the Way there is no outburst of wrong views.

Inasmuch as wrong views are put away in a stream-winner, not in a person on the eighth stage, therefore the Sakavādin again asks: "Is a person on the eighth stage a stream-winner?" This is also the method in the question concerning doubt. In the question about latent bias, they (the opponents) deny: "No, it is not so," because they believe that there is in such a person a latent bias of corruptions.

In the question concerning belief in mere rule and ritual, he denies, because he does not see the so-called infection of mere rule and ritual. His view is that the outburst of corruptions is put away.

In the question: "Has such a person developed the Way?" he denies, because such a person has not already developed the Way, but is developing it at the very moment.

¹ Lit. of 'an Eighth-er.'

² *P. of C.*, pp. 146-7.

In the question beginning with "hy means that are not the Way," and so forth, he denies, because they are got rid of by the first Way. "If they are got rid of by means that are not Way, then one who has reached the stage after adoption, has also put them away":—thus holding the opponent asks: "Will these (*i.e.*, wrong views and doubt) arise any more in him?" The Sakavādin gives the reply.

The rest is clear in meaning everywhere.

The controversy regarding 'a person of the eighth stage' is ended.

VI

Now follows the controversy on the 'Controlling Powers' of a person of the Eighth Stage.

The view, held at present by such as the Andhakas, is that, at the moment of entering the (first stage of the) Way, the person of the Eighth Stage is in process of acquiring, [68] but has not yet attained to, the (five) controlling powers.¹ With reference to them the Sakavādin asks: "Has not such a person the controlling power of faith?" The opponent assents. But being asked: "Has he got faith?" he rejects, observing that faith is different from the controlling power of faith. This is also the method in regard to the rest.

Then the questions: "Has he mind, who has the controlling power of mind?" and the like are begun with a view to explain that, just as whoso has mind, has also the controlling power of mind, so whoso has faith, etc., has also the controlling power of faith, etc. All these along with the comparison by the Suttas are clear in meaning.

The controversy on the 'controlling powers of a person of the eighth stage' is ended.

¹ The five controlling powers or sense-faculties are: faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom or understanding. See *P. of U.*, p. 148, fn. 2.

VII

Now follows the controversy on the 'Deva-Eye.'

The view, held at present by such as the Andhakas and Sammitiyas, is that the fleshly eye, when it is the 'medium' (or hasis) of things¹ in Fourth Jhāna, becomes the deva-eye. With reference to them the Sakavādin asks: "Is the fleshly eye?" etc. The opponent assents. Again, being asked: "Is the fleshly eye the deva-eye, and conversely?" he rejects, because he thinks, it is only like that, is not that.

In the questions, too: "Like to which?" and so on, he rejects because of the absence of the identical nature of both. In the questions beginning with "Are the two the same in rango?"—the sphere of the organ of sight is the range of both. The fleshly eye, however, sees visible objects. The sphere of the deva-eye includes objects which are invisible, very subtle, and lie beyond the mountains, etc. It is not such in the case of the other. Thus their spheres of activities are not identical.

Being asked: "Does it not, being the medium of a (sensuous) idea, become also the medium of a (spiritual) idea?" he rejects, because he would not admit that the fleshly eye is the deva-eye, the support of the former being not the support of the latter. Being asked again, he assents, because he would admit that the deva-eye is produced by means of the fleshly eye, for there is the expression: 'The genesis of the fleshly eye is the way of the deva-eye,' [69] and that the deva-eye makes visible the four great elements to those of the universe of Rūpa.

Being asked, "Are things included in sensuous existence?" etc., he rejects, because he would not admit that the fleshly eye and the deva-eye are identical. Being asked again, he assents, because he thinks that, inasmuch as it is produced by means of Jhāna in the sphere of Rūpa, therefore it may be called 'belonging to the sphere of Rūpa.'

Being asked: "Are things included in the sphere of Rūpa

¹ *-dhamm'upatthaddam*. 'Support' is a more literal rendering, as below.

also included in the sphere of Arūpa?" he rejects, because thereafter in developing, at the moment of attaining the sphere of Arūpa, consciousness of the sphere of Rūpa does not exist. Being asked again, he assents, because he holds the view that in arising it makes visible the four great elements to him who is in the sphere of Arūpa. He rejects, because he would not admit that things included in these spheres are the 'Un-included.'¹

The deva-eye means the medium (or basis or support) of things. It is the medium of supramundane things in the sense that, being supported by a sensuous thing, it again becomes the medium of a supramundane thing.

Being asked: "Are there two kinds of vision (or 'eye')?" he rejects, because although he does not hold that the eye of understanding is present in one who has the deva-eye as the medium of a thing, the eye of understanding does exist. Being asked again, he assents, because he holds the view that the fleshly eye, as the medium of a thing, becomes the deva-eye.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy on the 'deva-eye' is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy on the 'Deva-Ear.'

Being asked: "Is there only one (kind of) ear?" he (the opponent) rejects, because there are the two. Again being asked, he (the opponent) assents, because that (fleshly) ear, when it is the medium of a thing, becomes what is called the deva-ear.

The rest is as explained above.

The controversy on deva-hearing is ended.

Cf. Dhammasaṅgī, §§ 583, 992; below, XIV, 7, 9.

IX

[70] Now follows the controversy on 'Insight into Destiny according to Deeds.'

By thoughtlessly considering the Sutta-passage: '*With purified celestial eye surpassing that of men he sees beings as deceasing and being reborn . . . he knows their destiny as being according to their deeds,*'¹ some hold the view that the celestial eye amounts to insight into destiny according to deeds. With reference to them the Sakavādin puts the question, the opponent assents. Being asked again: "Is attention also paid to the sequence of Karma (deeds)?" he rejects, because there cannot be two objects of one thought. Being asked again, he assents because of various kinds of thoughts.

Again, when he is asked, without being given a chance for evasion, "Is there a combination of two contacts?" etc., he rejects. Thus, the meaning in the constructions beginning with the expression "these good beings," etc., should be understood according to the expression of one who has insight into destiny as being according to deeds.

The Sakavādin puts the question: "Had the venerable Sāriputta insight into destiny as being according to deeds?"² to his opponent, who considers that this Thera was a denier of deva-sight, because some, in regard to Sāriputta, who did not exercise insight into higher knowledges on account of his contentment, not only reject those powers, but also think that he had none of them. On the other hand, being asked: "Had the venerable Sāriputta deva-sight for that reason?" he rejects. Being asked again, he assents, because he thinks that this Thera had obtained all that is to be obtained by a disciple. Now to refute him the Sakavādin asks: "Did the venerable Sāriputta not?" etc.

The Thera uttered this verse owing to the absence of his resolve to strive, not for want of his insight into higher

¹ *Dīgha* i, 82; *Dialogues* i, 91; *P. of C.*, p. 151. 'Destiny'=*upaga*, lit. 'approach.'

² *Theragāthā*, ver. 996 f.

knowledges. The opponent, however, understood it in the latter sense, and therefore, according to his view, the Thera had only insight into destiny according to deeds, but had not deva-sight. Therefore it is said: "Hence it should not be said that deva-sight amounts to insight into destiny according to deeds."

The controversy on 'insight into destiny according to deeds' is ended.

X

[71] Now follows the controversy on 'Moral Restraint.'

The Sakavādin puts the question 'concerning the view of those who hold that among the devas, beginning with the Thrice Thirty, inasmuch as there is no committing of the five vices, there is self-control.'¹ The opponent assents, because he does not see there any committing of vices.

Then, since self-restraint implies that over which self-restraint ought to be used, the Sakavādin puts the question concerning the absence of self-restraint. The opponent denies, because there is no taking life, etc., among devas. "Are they among humans?" etc., has been said in order to show that, if there is self-restraint, there is also the absence of it, and conversely.

In the questions beginning with "Do they abstain from taking life?" he assents, because taking life, etc., is not practised by them; he rejects, because there is absence of taking life, etc.

The questions in the negative method are clear in meaning.

In the conclusion, the Sakavādin assents to the question: "Is moral restraint absent among devas?" because after taking life, etc., they do not restrain themselves again therefrom. Thereafter the opponent, by a trick, asks, if there is no self-restraint, then "are *all* devas takers of life?" etc. The Sakavādin rejects, because there is no committing of vice

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 152.

among the devas. The opponent taking the mere expression 'hence, they are not,' establishes his proposition. The proposition thus established, they hold a view which is not established.

The controversy on 'moral restraint' is ended.

XI

Now follows the controversy on Unconscious Life.

Here the Sakavādin puts the question concerning the view, held at present by such as the Andhakas who, partly from the expression: '*mind* [at rebirth] *is conditioned by previous actions*,'¹ and partly from this other expression: '*those devas de cease from that group as soon as consciousness arises in them*,'² believe that 'there is no living rebirth without mind' (consciousness). The opponent assents.

Then the Sakavādin, in order to correct him thus: "Is there consciousness on that occasion?" [72] and so forth, asks: "Has such a person conscious life, does he fare onward with conscious continuity from birth to birth?" etc.

All these should be understood according to the text that follows.

The controversy on unconscious life is ended.

XII

Now follows the controversy on [the plane] wherein consciousness neither is nor is not.

Here the Sakavādin puts the question concerning those who, like the Andhakas at present, hold, from such an expression as '*the sphere of neither consciousness nor unconsciousness*,'³

¹ *Samyutta* ii, 2; *Vibhanga* 135 f.; *P. of C.*, p. 153.

² *Digha* iii, 33; "Mind (*viññāṇa*) and consciousness (*saññā*) are here used in a synonymous and very general sense."—*P. of C.*, p. 153, fn. 4.

³ *Vibhanga*, p. 421.

that it is not right to say that, in that existence¹ there is consciousness.² The opponent assents.

All the rest here should be understood according to the text.

The controversy on ' [the plane] wherein consciousness
neither is nor is not ' is ended.

Here ends the Third Chapter.

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 155.

² *Bhave.*

CHAPTER IV

I

[73] Now follows the controversy as to whether a layman may be an arahān.

Here the Sakavādin puts the question concerning the opinion of those who, like the Uttarāpathakas at present, seeing that Yasa, the clansman's son, and others attained arahanship while living amid the circumstances of lay life, hold that a layman might be an arahān. Now, the Sakavādin's question: "Can a layman be an arahān?" means: Can a layman bound with the layman's fetters be arahān?

The opponent, however, not understanding his intention, assents, because he sees only the circumstances of lay life. Now a layman is such by the layman's fetter, and not merely by the [outward] circumstances, even as the Exalted One said:

*' Though he be finely clad, if he fare rightly,
At peace and tamed, by right law nobly living,
Refrain from scathe and harm to every creature ;—
He is (true) brahman, he recluse, he monk !'*¹

To show this method "Has the arahān?" and so forth are begun. All these are clear in meaning.

The controversy as to whether a layman may be an arahān is ended.

II

Now follows the controversy on ' [arahanship as conferred by] rebirth [alone].'

¹ *Dhammapada*, ver. 142; *P. of C.*, p. 157.

By thoughtlessly considering the expression: "*one becomes born without parentage in the higher heavens and there wanes utterly*,"¹ or, converting the meaning of utter waning *during the second half of the term*,² into utter waning on *being reborn*, some, for instance, the Uttarāpathakas, at present hold that at the very outset of reborn consciousness, one might be an arahān. With reference to them the Sakavādin puts the question, [74] the opponent assents.

Now because reborn consciousness is worldly, and one does not become with it even a stream-winner, etc., let alone arahān, therefore in order to show this method, "Does one become at the very outset of reborn consciousness a stream-winner?" etc., is begun.

The expression "Was Sāriputta?" and so forth, has been said with a view to question as to whether even one of these great theras became an arahān at the very outset of reborn consciousness. 'One who seeks rebirth' means one who by a rebirth-seeking consciousness seeks, strives after rebirth, hence one who desires rebirth.

The rest here is quite clear in meaning.

The controversy on rebirth is ended.

III

Now follows the controversy as to being without cankers.

Here the Sakavādin asks: "Is everything in an arahān?" etc., with reference to those who, like the Uttarāpathakas at present, hold this about the arahān.³ The opponent assents. Now to convince⁴ him that the things devoid of cankers are the Ways, etc., the questions 'Do these arise in an arahān?'—"Is it the Way, the Fruit," etc., are begun.

Being asked: "Is the eye free from cankers?" he rejects because of its being the opposite. Being asked again, he

¹ *Dīgha* iii, 132, etc.

² *Saṃyutta* v, 201, etc.; *Anguttara* i, 233 f., etc. See *P. of C.*, p. 159, also fn. 1.

³ *P. of C.*, p. 160.

⁴ Or urge, or reprove: *codana*.

assents, thinking that it is one who is devoid of cankers. In the question concerning robes he is asked: "Has it in only one attribute in which he becomes devoid of cankers or not?" He rejects, because he fears lest it would be contradictory to the characteristics (of an arahān). Being asked again, he assents, because he thinks that it, being of one without cankers, may become in another who has them. This is the method in the two questions: "Is it without cankers?" Then the Sakavādin questions the opponent with "Is the Way without cankers?" etc., the latter acknowledging: "It is." In this way, the meaning should be understood everywhere.

The controversy as to being without cankers is ended.

IV

Now follows the controversy on '[the retaining of distinctive] endowments.'

There are two kinds of (spiritual) acquisitions, namely, actual acquisition and acquisition accruing at rebirth in some other existence: Rūpa, and the like, the latter kind being retained [75] as long as achievement has not spent its force. But some, like the Uttarāpathakas at present, leaving aside these two kinds of spiritual acquisitions, hold that another endowment is possible by past acquirements as a permanent acquisition. To convince them that there is no such permanent acquisition the Sakavādin asks: "Is an arahān endowed with all the Four Fruits?" The opponent assents in respect of the acquisition.

Now in order to convince him thus: 'If according to you an arahān is endowed with the Four Fruits as with four aggregates, then it amounts to saying that in Four Fruits an arahān is endowed with four sorts of contents,' etc., the questions "Is an arahān endowed with four contacts?" and so forth are begun. All this the opponent rejects because of the absence of four contacts, etc., in a single moment. This is the method also in the questions regarding the never-

returner and so forth. By the expression: "Does an arahān evolve¹ past the fruit of the First Path?" is asked: "Does he who has entered into the Second Jhāna not evolve past that which he has not yet won?", in order to show that one is not endowed with that from which he has already evolved, the questions, "Does he evolve past the First Way?" and so forth are begun. To the question: "Does an arahān fall away from them?" the Sakavādin answers, "Yes," because like things of mundane Jhāna which fall away by the reverse process, the corruptions, removed by the supra-mundane Way and brought to rest by its Fruit, are not similarly removed or brought to rest. Hence this meaning has been explained later on in "Is an arahān endowed with the Four Fruits?" and so forth.

The rest is clear in meaning.

The controversy on 'the retaining of distinctive endowments' is ended.

V

In the controversy, "Is an arahān endowed with a sixfold indifference?" the meaning should be understood in just this way. The arahān is said to be gifted with indifference with respect to each of the six doors of sense-knowledge.² [76] 'But he is not capable of calling up indifference with respect to all six at the same moment.'³

The controversy of indifference in sense-cognition is ended.

VI

Now follows the controversy, viz., that through Enlightenment one becomes 'The Enlightened.'

Herein 'Bodhi' is an equivalent for (1) insight into the Fourfold Way; (2) insight of an omniscient Buddha. 'And

¹ *Vitivatto* = turned beyond, away from.

² *The Expositor*, Pt. I, ch. 3. For enumeration of the six, see *Digha* iii, 245; *Majjhima* iii, 219.

³ See *P. of C.*, p. 163.

some, like the Uttarāpathakas at present, (do not distinguish, but) hold that, as a thing is called white by white-coloured surface, black by black-coloured surface, so a 'Bodhi-being' has this or that characteristic mark of Bodhi.¹ With reference to them, the Sakavādin asks and objects. The assent and the denial are of the other.

To the question: "Is (one The Enlightened only) in virtue of *past* enlightenment?" he denies because of the absence now of that past moment (of enlightenment). Being asked for the second time, he assents with reference to the attainment of enlightenment. Again, when he is asked by way of 'what is yet to be done'² he rejects, because of the absence of such functioning in such an one. Being asked for the second time he assents, because one who is The Enlightened does his duties through enlightenment, and in doing them there is no illusion. But, without being given a chance, when he is asked: "Does he understand Ill?" and the like, he rejects, because of the absence of the exercise of such duties in him.

To the question about *future* (enlightenment), he denies because of the absence at this moment of insight into the Way. Being asked again, he assents, because, from the expression "the Enlightened One went to Rājagaha" he thinks that he is in a state of enlightenment through future enlightenment. Being asked: "Does he exercise enlightenment?" he denies, because of the absence at this moment of such works. Being asked next, he thinks: "If he does not exercise, he can not be said to be The Enlightened. Because he must have done so, therefore he does," and therefore assents. Again when, no chance being given, he is asked, he rejects.

In the question as to present enlightenment, the meaning of which is clear together with the context, when he is asked, considering the three kinds of enlightenment as one, and with reference to omniscience: "Is one The Enlightened through three enlightenments?" he assents,—this being the proper

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 164.

² The technical term here alluded to is *kata-karaṇiya*: done what was to be done, said of the arahant.—Ed.

thing to say. Again, being asked: " (Is one The Enlightened) through three ?" he denies because of the absence of all at the same moment. [77] Being asked next, he assents in virtue of past, future and present omniscience. Being given no chance, when he is asked: " continually ? constantly ?" etc., he rejects.

" But surely is not one who has acquired enlightenment The Enlightened ?"—this is asked by the opponent. The Sakavādin assents, because it would be wrong to call one The Enlightened in the absence of enlightenment. But to the question: " Is not enlightenment the same as the acquiring of enlightenment ?" at the continuity of which insight into the Way, by which enlightenment is meant, arises, he assents, as a mere convention, (replying) " He is The Enlightened." Not knowing his intention, the opponent holds the view: " If then," etc.

Now to make the examination clear the Sakavādin asks: If one is called The Enlightened from having acquired enlightenment, then " is it in virtue of enlightenment that one becomes The Enlightened ?" The meaning is: Because you assume that one is called The Enlightened from having acquired enlightenment, therefore it is in virtue of enlightenment that one becomes The Enlightened.

' The acquiring of enlightenment ' means the state that arises in the continuity of the rise and fall of enlightenment, while ' enlightenment ' means insight into the Way. The opponent, not noticing this distinction, again assents. Thereafter, being asked by the Sakavādin: " Is enlightenment the same as the acquiring of enlightenment ?" he, given no chance to speak,¹ rejects.

The controversy ' Is one the enlightened through enlightenment ? ' is ended.

VII

This and the two following discourses are about the views of the Uttarāpathakas (Northerners). Now follows the

¹ *Varanokāsam alabhanto*;—a suggestive clause.—Ed.

controversy regarding the characteristic marks (mentioned above). From a careless interpretation of the Sutta passage: 'for one endowed as a superman there are two careers,¹' some, for instance, now the Uttarāpathakas, hold the view that one who is gifted with the characteristic marks is a Bodhisattva. With reference to them the Sakavādin asks, while the opponent assents.

Inasmuch as a universal emperor² may be either a Bodhisattva or not a Bodhisattva, therefore to the questions: "Is a universal emperor a Bodhisattva?" etc., he rejects with reference to one who is not a Bodhisattva, but assents with regard to one who is a Bodhisattva. [78] The Sutta containing 'to one endowed with the thirty-two characteristic marks,' and the like, is spoken of regarding a Bodhisattva. He verily in his last rebirth becomes a Buddha, in other rebirths a universal emperor. Hence even what is arrived at is as if not arrived at.

The controversy about the characteristic marks is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy about entering on assurance.³

'With reference to the account in the Ghaṭikāra Sutta of Jotipāla joining the Order'⁴ some, for instance, now the Andhakas, formed a notion that (our) Bodhisattva 'had entered on the Path of Assurance and conformed to the life therein during the dispensation⁵ of Kassapa Buddha. With reference to them the Sakavādin asks: "Did the Bodhisattva enter?" etc., while the other, taking his stand on his own proposition, assents.

¹ *Digha* iii, 145, cf. *Dialogues* ii, 13; *P. of C.*, p. 166.

² Lit. wheel-turner.

³ *Niyām'okkanti*.

⁴ *Majjhima* ii, 46 f.; "Jotipāla was a brahman youth who, against his will, was brought by Ghaṭikāra, the potter, to hear Kassapa Buddha, and became a monk. Gotama Buddha affirmed that Jotipāla was a former impersonation of himself."—*P. of C.*, p. 167, fn. 6.

⁵ Lit. teaching or doctrine. Kassapa preceded Gotama Buddha.

'Now assurance (*niyāma*) and the 'higher life therein' (*brahmacariya*) are equivalents for the Ariyan (Fourfold) Way. And there is no other entering upon that Way for Bodhisattvas, save when they are fulfilling the Perfections; otherwise the Bodhisattva would have been a disciple when stream-winner,"¹ and this is not entirely low.

Buddhas prophesy: "he will become a Buddha" simply by the might of their own insight.² Hence, the Sakavādin again inquires: "Did the Bodhisattva?" etc. With reference to future existence the other rejects, but to the next question he assents, referring to the life as Jotipāla. This indeed is the method also in respect of "Having become a disciple," and the like.

As to "Do you learn from hearsay?" he rejects things connected with hearsay concerning (the Bodhisattva's) last life,³ and assents in regard to hearsay during (the Bodhisattva's) life as Jotipāla. The expression "To others as his teachers" has been said with reference to Ālāra and Rāmaputta.

To show that 'the venerable Ānanda,' and so forth, who entered into assurance, were disciples, and that others who did so enter, were not such, the expression "Can a disciple evolve past one birth?" has been said, asking thereby: Can a disciple who has evolved past one birth, become a non-disciple in a different existence (afterwards)? The other rejects on the ground that the stream-winners, and so forth are disciples.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy about entering on assurance is ended.

IX

[79] Now follows another controversy about endowment.⁴

Some, for instance the Andhakas, at present hold that a person who is practising in the Fourth Way possesses the three Fruitions as an acquired quality. With reference to them the Sakavādin asks, while the other assents.

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 168.

² *Majjhima* i, p. 80, 245.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Cf.* above, IV, iv.

The rest here should be understood as has been said above in the controversy regarding one endowed with all the Four Fruitions.

The controversy about endowment is ended.

X

Now follows the controversy about putting (off) the Fetters.

Some, for instance the Andhakas, hold that arahanship means the (simultaneous), unlimited putting off of all the fetters.¹ With reference to them the Sakavādin asks, while the other assents.

Again, when he is asked: "Are all fetters put off?" he denies in respect of the putting off by the three aforesaid Ways. Being asked a second time, he assents, because of the absence of the putting off of just that Way. He rejects, because there is the repeated putting off (of all Fetters), as in the case of the theory of individuality, and the rest, by the First Way. He assents, because there is the putting off without remainder by the Fourth Way.

Everywhere this is the method.

The controversy about the putting off of the fetters is ended.

Here ends the Fourth Chapter.

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 172.

CHAPTER V

I

[80] Now follows the controversy on Emancipation.¹

"Here four sorts of knowledge (or insight, *ñāṇa*) are grouped under knowledge of emancipation, to wit, insight² (or intuition), Way, Fruition, Reflection."³ Of these, knowledge by insight means knowledge of emancipation being considered as "freedom from perceiving things as permanent or persisting, or through perceiving the opposite"⁴; Way-knowledge, as the severance and renunciation effected by the Ways; Fruition-knowledge, as the peace of fruition; reflective knowledge, as the peace of fruition; reflective knowledge, as contemplation of emancipation as such. Of these four sorts of knowledge, 'only the peace of fruition is unqualified⁵ emancipation.'⁶ The rest cannot be called emancipated things.

But some, for instance the Andhakas do not admit, that only this sort of knowledge of emancipation has the quality of emancipation, and they hold the view, that indiscriminately any knowledge of emancipation has itself the quality of emancipation. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, while the other assents. Again, when he is asked: "Has any such knowledge that quality?" etc., he rejects in respect of reflective knowledge, and so forth. Being asked: "Does the knowledge of one who has attained to the Way, possess that quality?"—he assents, because Way-knowledge is free from cankers (*anāsava*).

Now inasmuch as knowledge of emancipation is not the knowledge of one who is practising in order to realize the Fruit of the Stream-winner, therefore it cannot be called

¹ *Vimutti*.

² *P. of C.*, p. 173.

³ *Nippariyāyena*.

⁴ *Vipassanā*.

⁵ *Ibid*.

⁶ *P. of C.*, p. 173.

emancipated. To reprove him thus the Sakavādin again says: " (The knowledge) of one who is in the First Way," and so on. In this way, the meaning should be understood everywhere.

The controversy about emancipation is ended.

II

Now follows the controversy about (the knowledge of) an adept.¹

Some, for instance the Uttarāpathakas, hold the view that learners, as was Ānanda, knew the sublimity of the Exalted One, and likewise they knew who were adepts. [81] Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, while the other assents.

'Knows, sees'—this is expressed in regard to those who arrive at their knowledge by themselves. "One who is adopted,"² and so forth has been said in order to show, that a person in a lower stage of the Way has not the insight as yet of the next higher stage.

By the expression: "How is it that a learner, as was Ānanda, knew the sublimity of the Exalted One?" the opponent maintains, that the knowledge as to who are adepts is the resultant of the expression: 'the Exalted One was an adept.' But this is not the insight of an adept. Therefore, the proposition too, which has been established thus, is not founded.

The controversy about the knowledge of an adept is ended.

III

Now follows the controversy about perverted (perception) or hallucination (in Jhāna).

Some, for instance the Andhakas, hold the view, that in one who has attained Jhāna by the process of gazing on (a

¹ *Asekha*.

² *Gotrabhū*.

portion of) earth and being conscious of earth, his knowledge (of what is seen) might be called perverted.¹ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, while the other assents.

The latter says: The object of thought which arises by means of earth, is not earth itself. Here one becomes conscious of the percept (or concept) of earth, therefore his cognition may be called perverted. This is what he aimed at.

Thereafter the expression: "the permanent in the impermanent," and so forth, is said by the Sakavādin with a view to urge as follows: The term 'earth' 'may mean the ultimate quality of extension, physical (lit. structural) earth, a percept (or concept), a (nature-) deva.'² Of these, cognition of the percept (or concept) of earth cannot be called perverted. The only real perversion of cognition is to see permanence in the impermanent, etc.³ What can there be more than these? The other denies because there is no sign of 'perversion,' but assents in respect of the percept (or concept) of earth.

The expression "well accomplished" has been said in respect of knowledge of those persons who are still learners.

To the questions: "Has an arahant?" etc. too he denies, only because there is no sign of perversion; he assents in respect of earth-cognition. "Does everything become earth to him?" is asked to mean, does everything which has the mark of earth-artifice, [82] become earth to him? As it is not such, the Sakavādin denies.

The Sakavādin then asks: "Does not the earth exist? Is there not one who may enter into Jhāna by regarding earth as such?" He means: "Does not the percept (or concept) of earth exist? Is there one who may enter into Jhāna by regarding the earth neither as air, nor as fire, but as earth? "The earth is actually there," and so forth means, if it (i.e., earth) is actually there, then, in entering into Jhāna by consciousness of it, as it really is, perception is perverted.

To show that, in entering into nirvāna too, the reversal

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 175.

² *Ibid.*, p. 176.

³ *Ibid.*

and removal of the entire perception of the Way is also perverted, it has been said that nirvana exists.

The controversy about perverted perception is ended.

IV

Now follows the controversy about Assurance.

Some, for instance the Uttarāpathakas, hold the view, that inasmuch as 'The Exalted One judged that anyone who will enter the right Way of Assurance is capable of penetrating the Truths,'¹ therefore only the average worldlying who has not made sure has the religious insight requisite for entering. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Has one who has not made sure?" etc.

Herein 'Assurance' is a synonym of the Way [to arahantship]. So the expression 'for entering Assurance' means for entering the Way, for approaching the Way. The opponent assents in respect of one's insight after discerning which the Exalted One judged him to be capable.

In order to make clear that his opponent's statement is wrong the Sakavādin then asks the contrary: "Has one who has made sure?" etc. Here as to the first question (the opponent) denies, because one who has made sure by (practising) the Way, has not the insight for entering the Way. As to the second, he admits, because one (who has made sure) no longer needs the insight. In the third, he denies the inquiry: "Has not one who has not made sure?" etc. because it contradicts his own proposition.

Again, in the first question, a fourth point being considered, the three points of inquiry follow by way of "has one who has not made sure (of the insight) for entering the Way of Assurance?" etc. Of these, he rejects the first 'inasmuch as for the initial purpose of the Way [83] he no longer needs the requisite insight.'² He admits the second, because (one who has made sure) has not (the insight for entering). He rejects the third, because it contradicts his own proposition.

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 177.

² *Ibid.*, p. 177, fn. 4.

Again, after dividing the first question into eight sections, there are the three points of inquiry by way of "has one who has not made sure the insight for not going to Assurance, etc.?" Their meaning should be understood as it has been said before.

Again, after dividing the first question into ten sections, there are based on it ten points of inquiry, namely, "Is there Assurance?" and so forth.

Therein inasmuch as 'the insight for going to Assurance' means the insight of the Way, therefore "Is there Assurance?" has been said with reference to it. The opponent, however, denies, when it has been said: 'there is Assurance.' But he assents, when it has been said: 'there is the insight.'

This is also the method in respect of applications of mindfulness, and the rest. The sense of the reverse method is quite clear.

"Has one who is only in the prior stage of adoption (*gotrabhūno*) [the insight of the First Way?]" and so forth:—this has been said in order to show, that one cannot have that which he has not yet reached. "The Exalted One knows" means the Exalted One knows through the power of his own insight, and, in fact, not through his insight for going to Assurance. So his proposition, though established for this reason, is just not proved.

The controversy about assurance is ended.

V

Now follows the controversy about analytic insight.

Some, for instance the Andhakas, who consider that in an Ariyan all knowledge whatsoever is supramundane, hold the view that all knowledge is analytic.¹ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, while the opponent assents.

As to the inquiries about popular knowledge, (the opponent) denies with respect to knowledge of one's attainments in Jhāna by the conventional earth-artifice. He, however,

¹ (= *pañisambhidā*). See *P. of C.*, Appendix, 4 f.

assents with respect to dialectical¹ knowledge. As to the question: "Havo all who have popular knowledge, etc.?" he denies with respect to average worldlings. As to the inquiries about knowledge in discerning another's thought, he denies with respect to knowledge of average worldlings. He, however, assents with respect to knowledge of an Ariyan. As to the inquiries about all concepts, he denies with respect to the question of one's attainment in Jhāna by earth-artifice. He, however, assents with respect to the supramundane.

"One's attainment in Jhāna by earth-artifice," and so forth is said to inquire: Is all discernment which takes place in these connections analytic? [84] Inasmuch as all supramundane discernment is analytic, therefore he, by the pretext of the identity of the word 'all,' establishes that all knowledge [is analytic].

The controversy about analytic insight is ended.

VI

Now follows the controversy about popular knowledge.²

Truth is of two kinds, namely, popular and of highest meaning. But there are some, for instance the Andhakas, who do not admit such distinction, and hold, through the identity of the word 'truth,' that popular knowledge has only truth as its object. Considering them to be wrong in saying so, this controversy is begun to purge the (incorrect) tenet.

Herein the opponent asks: "Should it not be said?" etc. The Sakavādin admits with respect to highest-meaning-truth.

"Under popular truth" is a phrase in the locative, and means 'comes into convention,' or 'separate from truth,' that is to say, popular truth.

The Sakavādin asks: "Has popular knowledge only truth as its object?" The opponent admits. The Sakavādin then asks: "Is it the object of popular knowledge?" and so forth, in order to urge on him as follows: If popular knowledge

¹ *Nirutti-*.

² *Sammuti*.

has only truth as its object, then is it the object of popular knowledge to understand the fact and nature of Ill? and so forth.

The controversy about popular knowledge is ended.

VII

Now follows the controversy about mental object.

Some, for instance the Andhakas hold the view, that insight into the thoughts of another has the bare thought as its sole object. This they deduce from just the [technical] expression "insight into a limited portion of the course of thought [in others]."¹ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, while the opponent assents.

Now one who discerns a "lust-ridden consciousness," and so on, has lust, etc., as his object. Therefore, to urge that it should not be said that such insight has the bare thought as its sole object, the expression 'Is there not one,' and so forth is begun.

"Contact as an object" means an object known as a contact. This is also the method in "feeling as an object," and the rest.

Again, being asked: "Should it not be said [85] that insight having contact as its object, [comes into thought-discerning?" the opponent] assents, because, when one ponders over the characteristic of contact as contact, he has just contact as his mental object.² But being asked: "But does not thought-discerning insight include discerning the course of contact?" he denies, because there is no Sutta-passage about it. This is also the method regarding feeling, etc.

Now to establish the view after having shown the reasons on which the propositions are respectively based, he (i.e., the opponent) asks: "Is not this thought-discerning insight

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 181.

² That is to say, 'one cannot make a mental object of more than one factor [at once].' See *P. of C.* fn. 3.

limited to a portion of the course of thought [in others]?" and so on. But this (view), though established by the expression which tends to it, is just not proved.

The controversy about mental object is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy about (Insight into) the Futuro.

'The Future includes both what will happen approximately and what is not just approximate. Concerning the former there is no knowledge absolutely, any more than there is of what is included in a single track or moment of cognition.'¹ But some, for instance the Andhakas consider that insight into any part of the future is possible. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, while the opponent assents.

To urge on his opponent that "if, according to you, there is insight into (any part of the) future, can we know about the immediate future through knowing its root?"² (the Sakavādin) asks: "Can we know about the future through knowing its root?" and so forth.

Herein 'through the root,' and all the rest are synonyms of cause.³ A 'cause' is that which produces an effect. It is the 'root' in the sense that there it acts as the source, as the basis. Similarly, it is the 'condition,'⁴ because it sends forth, keeps up. The same is called the 'reason'⁵ in the sense that it gives, assigns, as if with the words: 'Now take charge of it.' It is the 'source,'⁶ because it is produced therefrom. It is the 'origin,'⁷ because it originates. It is the 'npspringing,'⁸ because it rises up, or is raised. The same is called the 'support,'⁹ because one takes it up. It is the 'basis'¹⁰ in the sense that it is not to be given up. The same

¹ See, for translation, *P. of C.*, p. 182.

² For the 'root' (*mūla*) and its nine other synonyms, see *Yamaka*, i, p. 13.

³ *Kāraṇaṃ.*

⁴ *Hetu.*

⁵ *Nidānaṃ.*

⁶ *Sambhavo.*

⁷ *Paṭhavo.*

⁸ *Samuṭṭhānaṃ.*

⁹ *Ahāro.*

¹⁰ *Araṃmaṇaṃ.*

is called 'correlation'¹ in the sense of 'on these grounds it happens.' It is called the 'genesis,'² because it arises therefrom.

[86] Since one cannot know immediate consciousness through these ways, therefore (the opponent) denies: "It is not." The expression: 'Then one must know how the future will be correlated by condition, cause, and immediate contiguity in consciousness' means, one knows the basic things through the causal relation. This is the method also in the remaining places.

To show analogously that part of the future which is not known, "Has one who is in the stage of adoption?" and so forth is said. The Sutta-passage: "To Pāṭaliputta,"³ etc., has been brought in to show that part of the future which is known. But since this is not the proof of insight into all parts of the future, therefore it is indeed not adduced as proof.

The controversy about insight into the future is ended.

IX

Now follows the controversy about knowledge of the present.

"Because of opinions that:—'*When all phenomena are seen to be impermanent, insight itself, as a phenomenon, is also seen to be impermanent.*' some, as the Andhakas, have the opinion that there is knowledge of the entire present, without distinction."⁴ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Is there knowledge of the present?" The opponent admits.

Now if there is knowledge of the (entire) present, without distinction, it [as present] must take place at the present instant through itself. This being so, it (*i.e.*, knowledge of the present) will have to be known by the same act of knowledge, because two knowledges cannot be simultaneous [in the one self-conscious subject].

¹ *Paccayo*.

² *Samudayo*.

³ = Patna. *Digha* ii, 87-88; *Dialogues* ii, 92.

⁴ See *P. of C.*, p. 183.

To admonish:¹ "Is it known?" the Sakavādin asks: "By the same act of knowledge?" In the first question, the opponent denies. It cannot be known by the same act of knowledge. To the second question, however, he assents, because there is continuity. The expression 'while seeing the disruption in succession' means, does one see the knowledge of the insight into disruption *by* that knowledge of insight into disruption? This is indeed the method in "Does one know the object of the knowledge by the conscious act of knowing?" and the rest. To hinder him (*i.e.*, the opponent) from seeking a chance for pretext, "then one touches contact by the contact," and so forth, is said.

To establish his proposition, however, the opponent asks: [87] "Are not all phenomena?" and so on. The Sakavādin assents in the sense that *that* knowledge is seen neither by the conscious act of knowing, nor by the object of knowledge. Hence the opponent's proposition, though established thus, cannot stand.

The controversy about knowledge of the present is ended.

X

Now follows the controversy about insight into (others') fruition.

Some, like the Andhakas, hold that, since it was said that 'both the Buddhas and their disciples teach beings the doctrine of the attainment of Ariyan fruition,' disciples can, like the Buddhas, state that this or that being has won fruit.² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Can a disciple have?" The opponent assents.

Now if a disciple can, like the Buddhas, have knowledge concerning fruition, he can also, by his own insight into the fruition of a stream-winner, make known the property of each fruit, namely, that 'such an one will be once reborn, such an one will go from family to family in the worlds, such an one will not be reborn more than seven times.' To urge

¹ *Codana-*.

² See *P. of C.*, p. 184.

"Is a disciple also such?" the Sakavādin asks: "Can a disciple make known the property of each fruit?" The opponent denies.

Because a disciple can have knowledge concerning fruition, therefore "Does a disciple possess proficiency in (the knowledge of) others' fruitions?" and so forth is asked to inquire about its causes. Here the sense is this: The Buddhas are proficient in others' fruitions, and they have knowledge of the different degrees of development in fruitions, by which they can state, that this relates to this world, or that to the world hereafter. So also the persons who have acquired proficiency in (knowledge concerning) others' thoughts, can know, that this or that being has won this or that fruit on account of this or that thought. Does a disciple, too, possess such proficiency in (knowledge concerning) others' thoughts?

"Does a disciple possess a conception of aggregates?" and so forth means that, if a disciple can, like the Buddhas, have knowledge concerning fruition, he could also possess a knowledge of these concepts. This is said to urge: "Does he possess such knowledge? Can he understand or make known these conceptions by his own power?" [88] "Is a disciple a Conqueror?" and so forth is said to urge: If a disciple can, like the Buddhas, have knowledge concerning fruition, then he must be a Conqueror. This is indeed the method also regarding the questions: "Is he one who causes a Way to spring up where no Way was?" and so forth.

As to the question: "Does a disciple lack insight?" (the opponent) denies that a disciple who is ignorant, who has no insight, can give details (concerning others' attainment). Moreover he cannot, like the Buddhas, have knowledge concerning fruition. Hence the opponent's view is not established.

The controversy about insight into others' fruition is ended.

Here ends the Fifth Chapter together with The Great Chapter of Fifty.

CHAPTER VI

I

[89] Now follows the controversy about assurance.¹

In the Word: 'Capable of entering into assurance, the culmination in things that are good,'² the Ariyan Way is meant. But inasmuch as a person who has attained it would not become unassured, even if that Way which [for him] had arisen were to end, therefore there is an opinion, among the Andhakas for instance, that this assurance is unconditioned in the sense of being eternal.³ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, while the opponent assents.

Herenpon "Is assurance nirvana?" and so forth is asked, in order to make clear that, if this [assurance] is unconditioned, it must be so as being of that kind. The meaning of the question by way of comparison is quite clear.

"Is there anyone?" and so forth is said in order to explain that assurance is unconditioned. Regarding the question: "Is the Way (the Fourfold) unconditioned?" he denies, 'since it is something that has a genesis and an ending.'⁴ As to the question: "Is assurance conditioned?" he denies, because assurance exists, even were the Way stopped. In the questions: "Is assurance that of stream-winning?" etc., too, the meaning should be understood in this way, both in the regular and reverse order. Being asked: "Are there five kinds of the unconditioned?" (the opponent) rejects, not seeing any authorized passage for⁵ five kinds of the unconditioned. Being asked again, he assents, because the four stages of accomplished assurance are called assurance, and because nirvana is unconditioned.

¹ Cf. above V, iv.

² *Āṅguttara* i, 122. Cf. *Saṃyutta* iii, 225.

³ For translation, see *P. of C.*, p. 185. ⁴ See *P. of C.*, p. 186, fn. 1.

⁵ *Āgatatthānam*, or *anāgatatthānam*. Cf. *S. Nipāta*, ver. 318.

The question of false assurance¹ is asked to explain how, by the mere word 'assurance,' it would be wrong to call that unconditionedness.

The controversy about assurance is ended.

II

Now follows the controversy about causal genesis.

"Because of the Word in the chapter on causation—'whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise, this elemental datum remains fixed,'² etc., [90] some, for instance the Pubbaseliyas and the Mahimsāsakas,³ hold the view that (the law of) causal genesis is unconditional.⁴ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, while the opponent assents.

The questions, namely, "Is ignorance unconditioned?" and the rest are asked in order to show whether ignorance and the like refer to something unconditioned. 'The sense in which each term (*aṅga*) is called the law of causal genesis is stated in the *Vibhaṅga* on the Paṭiccasamuppāda.'⁵ "Because of ignorance come coefficients" and so forth is said in order to break through the opinion which is held because of such Sutta passage: "that which stands as the establishing of things as effects,"⁶ etc., by an examination of its meaning. This is the meaning here. That which has been said above, namely, "this element stands as the establishing of things as effects, as the marking out of things as effects," does not occur alone elsewhere apart from 'ignorance,' etc. Moreover, this is (another) name of ignorance and the remaining causal relations. Whether Tathāgata arises or not, because of ignorance come coefficients, and because of coefficients and so on, consciousness and the rest. Therefore in the clause

¹ I.C., 'Assurance in the wrong direction.'

² *Samyutta* ii, 25.

³ See, for translation, *P. of C.*, p. 188.

⁴ "In the sense of being eternally, constantly, not occasionally, true," *P. of C.*, p. 189, fn. 5.

⁵ *Vibhaṅga*, Paṭiccasamuppāda-vibhaṅga, pp. 135-192. See, for translation, *P. of C.*, p. 187, fn. 2.

⁶ *Samyutta* ii, 25; cf. *P. of C.*, p. 187.

'Because of ignorance come coefficients (or karma),' the establishing of things as effects means that which, as the cause, establishes things as effects, and the marking out of things as effects means that which, as the cause, marks out things as effects—that is to say, ignorance.

Is that unconditioned? And is nirvana unconditioned?—(the Sakavādin) asks. The opponent assents, according to his view. Again, when he is asked: "Are there two unconditioned (things)?" he rejects, because it is not supported by the Sutta-passage, although according to his view he assents.

In the remaining clauses, too, this is the method. Now the method explained there is the same as is used above.

The controversy about causal genesis is ended.

III

Now follows the controversy regarding the Four Truths.

Because of the Sutta-passage: "*These four, monks, are stable, constant,*"¹ some, for instance the Puhhaseliyas hold the view that the Four Truths are unconditioned. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, [91] while the opponent assents.

What the Sakavādin means to say is this: "In Ill, Origin of Ill, and the Way to Stopping of Ill, the fact² is conditioned, the truth is unconditioned.³ In the Stopping of Ill, there is no (corresponding) fact. It is just unconditioned." Therefore he says, "Yes." His view, however, is this: One who speaks of Ill considers the fact. Likewise as to the Origin and the Way. Truth is the (abstract) statement of their (corresponding) characteristics, namely, hindrance, cause, and going out. And there cannot be Ill and so forth, the characteristics of which are other than hindrance and the like.

The meaning of "shelter," etc., should be understood as explained above. To the question: "Is Ill?" etc., he (the opponent) assents, because, according to his view, there is its

¹ *Samyutta* v, 430.

² Or, the true thing: *vatthu*.

³ *Lakkhaṇa-saccam* is the statement of the characteristics of a *vatthusaccam* (fact). *P. of C.*, p. 188, fn. 4.

characteristic. Regarding the question: "Is Ill?" etc., he denies, because there is the fact.

Thereafter all the enquiries, simple and comparative, should be understood according to the text. The Sutta-passages, put at the conclusion to establish the view, is as if not carried, because its meaning has been wrongly taken.

The controversy about the four truths is ended.

IV

Now follows the controversy about the (four) immaterial spheres.

'Because of the Word: *'The four immaterials are imperturbable,'*¹ some hold the view that they are all unconditioned.² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Is the sphere of infinite space unconditioned?" The opponent assents.

The rest here is clear in meaning. Since the Sutta-passage to be proved has been put without discerning its significance, it is as if not carried.

The controversy about the immaterial spheres is ended.

V

Now follows the controversy about the attainment of stopping.

By the attainment of stopping is here meant the non-procedure of the four (mental) aggregates (i.e., of conscious procedure in Jhāna). Since it (the attainment) is, being done, done, being attained, attained, [92] it is called 'suspended,' but it cannot be spoken of as conditioned or unconditioned, because of the features of one state or the other being absent. But some, as the Andhakas and Uttarāpathakas hold that, because it is not conditioned, it is therefore unconditioned.³

¹ *Anguttara* ii, p. 134. In text read *anejā*.

² For translation, see *P. of C.*, p. 189.

³ For translation, see *P. of C.*, pp. 190-91.

Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Is the attainment of stopping?"—to which the opponent assents.

"Is there anyone who produces?" etc., is said by way of attainment, acquirement. There are persons who produce the material and other qualities which are conditioned. But there are none who similarly attain to the unconditioned. "Purging through, emerging from stopping refers to the attainment of Fruition (after emergence)." This is, however, not conditioned; therefore he rejects.

By the expression: "Then it must be" (the opponent) holds that, because it is not conditioned, it is therefore unconditioned. To say that there is no cause for its being conditioned amounts to saying nothing.

The controversy about the attainment of stopping is ended.

VI

Now follows the controversy about space.

'Space is of three modes: as confined or delimited, as abstracted from object,¹ as open.² Of these the first is conditioned, the other two are mere concepts. But some, like the Uttarāpathakas and Mahimsāsakas hold that the two latter modes also, inasmuch as (being mental fictions) they are not conditioned, must therefore be unconditioned.'³ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Is space?" etc., while the opponent assents.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy about space is ended.

VII

Now follows the controversy, namely, that space is visible. Some, among the Andhakas for instance, hold that because we have cognition of enclosed space, such as keyholes, etc.,

¹ *Kasir'uggahātin*, referring to Jhāna-procedure only.

² *Ajaṇa*. Cf. *Crit. Pali Dictionary*.—Ed.

³ *P. of C.*, p. 192.

therefore all [93] void space is visible.¹ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Is space visible?" The opponent assents.

Then to reprove him thus: "If it is so," "it is visible material," and so forth is said. As regards the question: "Because of eye?" etc., he rejects it, because there is no such Sutta-passage, but assents, because pillar-interstices, etc., are visible.

In 'the interval between two trees,' here, the shape of the trees is seen with the eye, but as to the interval, there being no shape to it, it is space'; that which appears is an act of ideation, not of sense-cognition.²

This is also the method in the rest. (The proposition) is therefore not proved.

The controversy, namely, that space is visible, is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy beginning with "Is earth-element visible?"

Some, the Andhakas for instance hold that earth-element and so forth is visible, because we 'see' oscillations in stones, water, flames, trees, as well as colours of sentient surfaces and the shapes of hands, feet, etc., on occasion of bodily intimations. Regarding them, the first question in all the controversies is asked by the Sakavādin, while the opponent assents.

The rest should be understood according to the text and also as explained above, namely, "Is bodily action visible?" as preceded by "Is earth-element visible?" and so forth.

The controversy about the remaining (factors of knowledge) is ended.

Here ends the Sixth Chapter.

¹ *P. of C.*, 193.

² *Ibid.*, 194 n.

CHAPTER VII

I

[94] Now follows the controversy about the classification of things.¹

Some, for instance, the Rājagirikas and the Siddhatthikas hold that the classification of particular, material qualities under one generic concept of 'matter,' etc., is meaningless, because one cannot group things together with things, as one can rope together bullocks, and so on. Things cannot therefore be grouped together with things.² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks in order to show that things may be grouped together under another aspect. Because of his own view the opponent assents.

Now to show the aspect under which grouping may take place, "Are there not some things?" and so on is begun. This is all clear in meaning, as said above. It is to be understood that the simile, namely, "As by a rope or," and so on, put by the opponent with a view to establish his own opinion, is neither approved nor rejected by the Sakavādin, who refutes the former's view thus: "If by a rope or," etc. The meaning here is this:—'Even as you can not deny the grouping together of bullocks and so on by a rope, etc., so must you admit that some things may be grouped together with other things.'

The controversy about the classification of things is ended.

II

Now follows the controversy about (mental states as) mutually connected.

¹ The Commy. rightly reads *Sangaha-*, not *Sangahita-*, as in the P.T.S. text.

² *Dhammā, dhammehi*. The word stands for both thing-as-sense-experience and mental phenomenon, *P. of C.*, p. 195.—Ed.

Some, for instance the Rājagirikas and Siddhatthikas hold, that the (orthodox) phrase 'associated with knowledge'¹ is meaningless, because feeling or other mental states do not pervade each other, as oil pervades sesamum-seeds.² [95] Regarding them the Sakavādin asks in order to show, that there are some things which are connected with other things under another aspect.³ Because of his own view the opponent assents.

The rest here is also clear in meaning, as said above. In the similes, namely, "just as oil pervades sesamum" and so on, drawn by the opponent into the inquiry, there is no essential difference between sesamum and its oil as there is a difference between feeling and perception. 'Sesamum' is the customary name for something that is kernel, husk, and oil. If its former appearance is changed, we cannot call it sesamum. Hence this is not a proper parallel.

The controversy about mental states as mutually
connected is ended.

III

Now follows the controversy about mental properties.

Some, for instance, the Rājagirikas and the Siddhatthikas hold, that there is no such thing as a property, or concomitant, of mind, because we can no more get 'mentals' (*cetasikā*) from mind, than we can get 'contactals' (*phassikā*) from contact. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, while the opponent assents.

'Co-existent' has been said with reference to what is co-existent as associated. "Contactal?"—is asked by the opponent because he does not find such a name customary:—'What is by custom?' If we call 'mental' that which depends on mind (*cittanissitako*), there would be nothing wrong

¹ E.g., *Dhammasaṅgani*, I, etc.

² P. of C., p. 196.

³ As pointed out in the P. of C., p. 196, fn. 3, the reading should be *aññen' ev' añña* (as in a Br. version); not *aññe va sabbe va*, which is meaningless.

in calling 'contactal' that which depends on contact (*phassa-nissitako*).¹ Thus contending the Sakavādin assents.

The rest is clear in meaning.

The controversy about mental properties is ended.

IV

Now follows the controversy about *Dāna*.¹

'*Dāna* is of three kinds: the will to surrender [something], abstinence, the gift. In the line—

[96] . . . Faith, modesty, and meritorious giving,²

we have purpose to surrender something when opportunity occurs. In the phrase 'he gives security,'³ abstinence, when opportunity occurs, is meant. In the phrase 'he gives food and drink (in charity)'⁴ a thing to be given on a given occasion is meant. The first is *Dāna* [in an active sense], as that which surrenders, or [in the instrumental sense] as that by which something is given. Abstinence is giving in the sense of severing from, cutting off. When it is practised, one severs, cuts off the immoral purpose which we consider to be a fearful and dangerous state. And this is a 'giving.' Finally, *Dāna* implies that an offering is to be given. This triple distinction is in reality considered as two: 'a mental state and an offering (material).'⁵ But some, for instance, the Rājagirikas and the Siddhatthikas hold that *Dāna* is only a mental state, not material. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: 'A mental state?' The opponent assents.

Then to urge on him by way of the material gift the Sakavādin asks: "Is it possible to give?" etc. The opponent denies 'on the ground that anything mental cannot be given as if it were food,' etc. 'When the question is insisted upon,

¹ Means both giving and gift and liberality.

² *Anguttara* iv, 236; *P. of C.*, p. 199.

³ *Ibid.* 246; *P. of C.*, pp. 199-200.

⁴ *Anguttara* iv, 236; cf. *op. cit.* i, 107; ii, 85, 203; *Digha* iii, 259; *P. of C.*, p. 200.

⁵ For translation, see *P. of C.*, p. 198.

he recollects the Sutta-passage '*giving security*,' etc., and assents. And yet he denies, because while giving assent, he has not noticed the phrase '*he gives*,' etc.

"Is giving attended by barren consequences?" and so forth have been said to explain whether the material gift is considered as giving. It is to be understood that a thing like food, etc., which is given has not the direct result in future; it is said to produce only agreeable results. This is the sense here: If *Dāna* means the material gift, like food, etc., one who gives disagreeable, unpleasant medicine, even with good intention, must reap undesirable results, as a nimba-tree, etc., comes out of a nimba-seed, and so on. But inasmuch as *Dāna* here means the will to sacrifice for bringing about the good, therefore the material gift, though disagreeable, does produce desirable results.

When in this way the opponent establishes that *Dāna* means the mental gift, the Sakavādiu, in order to prove in another way that *Dāna* means the material gift, said: "Giving was pronounced by the Exalted One to produce desirable results," etc. The opponent, however, rejects, because he does not find that giving a robe, etc., produces desirable results. The proving of the Sutta-passage is also applicable to the opponent's view. In the opinion of the Sakavādin, too, the material gift again may not produce desirable results in any one sense; [97] that it has only desirable results is denied.

Therefore when the opponent contends: "Surely, it is wrong to say," etc., it is fit that it should not be spoken of as having only desirable results. *Dāna* just means gift as thing to be given. The object of this discourse is to clear up the confusion between the meanings of this dual distinction in *Dāna*.

The controversy about giving and the gift is ended.

V

Now follows the controversy about merit consisting in utility.

By thoughtlessly considering such Sutta-passages as

'merit day and night is always growing,'¹ and 'the robe, monks, which a monk enjoying the use of . . .'² and so on, some, for instance, the Rājagirikas, the Siddhatthikas and the Sammitiyas hold the view, that there is such a thing as merit consisting in utility. Regarding this the Sakavādin asks: "Does merit increase with utility?" and the opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent, namely, that merit is nothing else than a series of good mental experiences like contact, etc.,³ and so by mental experiences, like contact, etc. Is there for them to be a growing?—(the talk) "Can contact keep growing?" and so forth is begun. As these do not keep growing, the opponent denies all of them. "Just as a creeper" and so forth is said in order to urge that, just as a creeper, etc., grows by itself without the help of any deed or thought, can merit so keep growing? As it cannot so keep growing, the opponent denies, saying "It cannot."

In the question, ". . . to one who does not consider it further?" the opponent assents, because in his opinion the former purpose of a giver keeps on growing with the utility to the acceptors, and thus merit accrues to the giver. Being asked: ". . . to one who does not consciously advert to?" etc., he denies, because there is purpose-to-sacrifice of the giver. Therein one who does not consider it further refers to the subconscious becoming⁴ which is kept continuing by pondering over the former course of the purpose-to-give.

'Adverting with that becoming detached,' means one who does not consciously turn to. [98] 'One who does not reflect upon' means one who does not enjoy. 'One who does not consider it further';—the 'adverting,' having arrested the (subconscious) becoming, 'smoothly conducts' the purpose-to-give along its own path.

Does merit accrue to one who does not advert to through such deed and with such thought?—is asked. 'One who

¹ *Samyutta* i. 33; cf. *P. of C.*, p. 202.

² *Anguttara* ii, 54; cf. *P. of C.*, pp. 202-3.

³ *Dhammasaṅgani*, § 1 ff.

⁴ *Bhavaṅga* (=bhavaṅga).—Ed.

does not attend to' means one who does not engage his mind on. 'One attends to' means that when one considers it further, there arises in him a series of mental phenomena upon which he engages his mind. It is the locative case used in the accusative. 'One who does not deliberate' means one who does not give a thought to. 'One who does not aspire to' means one who does not strive after the good quality called aspiration. 'One who does not aim' means one who does not fix his mind through purpose-to-give. In the sentence "Is not one who consciously adverts to," "to one who does not reflect upon" means to one who is not devoted to. Or, it means one who has no enjoyment. It may also mean, that merit accrues to him immediately.

To the question: "Is there a combination of two contacts?" and so forth, the opponent denies, because a giver cannot have a combination of two contacts, etc., at the same moment. He assents, because he includes contacts, etc., of both donor and donee. He assents also, because in his opinion there is a combination of the five modes of consciousness.

Then the Sakavādin, having closed the door to the discussion, and to charge him directly, asks the question on good quality, etc. In this connection also, the opponent denies, because good and bad qualities cannot coexist side by side at the same moment. Yet also he assents, because by his opinion that which is derived from sustained enjoyment is severed from consciousness.¹

Then the Sakavādin restrains him by the Sutta-passages. In proving the Sutta-passages, the expression '*merit is always growing*' is said with reference to the merit that arises immediately after recollecting, removing, etc., the thought of plautation of groves, and so forth. The expression 'to the giver a continual stream of merit' is said because of the requisites given to one who dwells in infinite concentration of mind, and because of his approval, "thus he enjoys the robe given by me." He notices that the acceptor is enjoying it. [99] But inasmuch as merit accrues from the material gift, when the acceptor, having accepted it, has not enjoyed,

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 201, fn. 4.

the Sakavādin's view becomes forceful. Herein the meaning of the expression 'when the acceptor, having accepted' should be understood as (the gift) being accepted by the acceptor.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy about merit consisting in utility is ended.

VI

Now follows the controversy about the Effect of Gifts given in this life.

Because of the Word:

'By what is given here below

They share who, dead, 'mong Petas go,'¹

some, for instance the Rājagirikas and the Siddhatthikas hold the view, that gifts of robes, etc., given in this life, cause life to be sustained there. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Does what is given here sustain there?" The opponent assents. Again when he is asked as to robes, etc., he denies. "One person is the agent for another?" is said meaning that one person is the agent for the consequences of another's actions, one does not do his own work himself. This being asked, the opponent denies for fear of contradicting the Suttas. The expression 'to one who gives a gift' means, seeing that a person is giving a gift. Herein, since by their approval of the gift they obtain benefit there, so it is for this reason that the view which the opponent seeks to establish, is not carried. The material gift itself, given here, cannot nourish them (i.e., the Petas).

This is the method also in testing the remaining Suttas.

The controversy about the effects of gifts given in this life is ended.

¹ *Khuddakapāṭha* (P.T.S.) VI (vii).

VII

Now follows the controversy about the earth and result of action.

Human action is directed to gain dominion and sovereignty. It has been said that the dominion of lords, the sovereignty of rulers is over the earth, and there is human action conducive to the attainment of dominion and sovereignty. Therefore some, [100] for instance, the Andhakas hold the view, that the earth itself is the resultant of such action.

Regarding these the Sakavādin asks: "Is the earth result of action?" The opponent assents. "Does it belong to pleasant feeling?" and so forth is asked by way of showing the nature of the result of action.

By the expression, "Is earth contact?" and so forth, contact in the expressed results of action is divided into pleasant feeling, and so on. This and perception, etc., are associated with pleasant feeling, and so on, while feeling, etc., with perception, and so on, all of them having a cause. They have before them the reflection, called the adverting to, etc. Their feeling, etc., which originates from the correlation of actions, is the pleasant result. A wish for this, manifested through aspiration, is the basic craving. Is then the earth of this nature?—is asked. The opponent denies. The meaning of the indirect inquiries, etc., is clear.

To the question, "Is the result of action shared by everyone else?"—the opponent denies with respect to feeling, etc. He assents, because the forms arising from action and the earth, etc., are shared by everyone else. In the question about not sharing, the *Santisutta*¹ has been drawn from an opponent's doctrine and shown.

To the question, "Do all beings enjoy the use of the earth?" the opponent denies with respect to those who are not dependent on the earth. He assents in regard to those who are dependent on the earth. To the question "Is there anyone who passes utterly away without enjoying the use of the

¹ We cannot trace this Sutta. Is it a name for *Khuddakapāṭha* VIII? —Ed.

earth?" he assents regarding those who pass utterly away in incorporeal existence.

The expression "without exhausting the experienced result of action" has been said according to the opponent's doctrine. There are who hold, that there are beings who pass utterly away¹ without exhausting the experienced result of their actions. According to the doctrine of the Sakavādins, however, one cannot pass utterly away without exhausting the result of his actions, done when opportunity occurred. In their opinion, the earth being a common result of collective action, the result is produced. It is necessary to urge, that, without exhausting that which remains as the result, it is improper to pass utterly away. The opponent, too, denies because of his own opinion.

To the question "Is the earth a result of the action of a being who is a world-monarch?" the opponent denies with respect to the unshared contact, etc. He assents with respect to that which is shared. They hold that the earth, ocean, the moon, and the sun, etc., are the common result of actions of all beings.

[101] In the expression "action to gain dominion," the term 'dominion' means here large possessions. 'Sovereignty' implies the act of placing the rest of the people under one's own control, and of gaining mastery in the sense that he should be honoured by them. Now this kind of action is conducive because of attainment of action, and not as the result of it. Therefore in the nature of the result of actions this is not shared.

The controversy about the earth and karma is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy about decay and death and result of action.

There are some actions which conduce to the worsening, and some which conduce to the curtailing of life. That which

¹ *Parinibbāyanti.*

conduces to the worsening is called decay or old age, and that which conduces to the curtailing of life is called death. Now inasmuch as there is action which conduces to decay and death, some, for instance, the Andhakas hold the view that old age and death are the result of that action. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, while the opponent assents.

In the inverse inquiry, the expression 'being without object' means, if the corporeal states are then without an object, and if the incorporeal, too, are without an object because of the absence of any sign of the relation between decay and death.

To the question, "Do the decay and dying of had states of mind lead to the result of previous had states?" the opponent assents, because he holds that decay and death may be an undesired result. It is for this reason that he denies, that decay and dying of good states of mind are the result of previous good states. On the other hand, he does not assent that it is the result of (previous) had states.

The expression "of both good and had states of mind" has been put together as one question. This cannot take place at the same moment. There may be an occasion for saying, that decay and death are the result of unexplained results of mind. Therefore no question has been put regarding the unexplained.

In the expression 'that which conduces to the worsening,' 'worsening' means here 'having impure colour.' 'The curtailment of life' means 'inability to continue life for long.' Herein morally had action is the cause of action of ugly appearance, of such as is produced by action. This is however not the result of it due to the difference between them. Besides, a cause may take place due to taking up that which is produced by the physical order, etc., or to the destruction [102] of life. So it is in this way that action conduces to (the worsening and the curtailment of life), but not as producing (them) like contact, etc., which are the result of actions. The rest is similar to what has been said above.

The controversy whether decay and death are the result of action is ended.

IX

Now follows the controversy about Ariyan states of mind and their results.

Some, for instance, the Andhakas hold that the fruits of religious life, being merely the putting away of corruptions, are not properly states of mind and mental properties.¹ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Have not Ariyan states of mind (positive) result?"

Therein the opponent assents, because, in his opinion, the expression 'the result of Ariyan state' means the result of the Ariyan state called the Way, and Ariyan Fruit is merely the putting away of corruptions. By 'religious life' is meant the career of a recluse, or a name for the Way, as it is said: 'I will show you the religious life and the fruits thereof.'² This is also the method in regard to the career of a brahman (i.e., a 'religious student'). In the question, "Does not the fruit of a stream-winner entail result?" and so forth, (the opponent) affirms that Ariyan fruits do not entail result with respect to the Way of a stream-winner, etc., which makes for accumulation of rebirth. He denies with respect to fruit of giving, etc.

What is considered as that which makes for accumulation (of rebirth)? By accumulation is meant the result. That which makes this accumulation to be accumulated is called the maker for accumulation (of rebirth). That which makes the result to be decreased is called the maker for undoing (of rebirth). Therefore (the opponent) assents and denies accordingly.

"Does good done in relation to the censuous spheres, entail result, make for undoing (of rebirth)?" and so forth—is asked by the opponent. The affirmation and the denial are of the Sakavādin. That which makes mundane good, entailing result, passing away and rebirth, and the cycle (of existences) to be accumulated, is the maker for accumulation (for rebirth). That which makes supramundane good, passing

¹ *Citta-cetasikā dhammā*.

² *Samyutta* v, 25; see also for translation, *P. of C.*, p. 208.

away and rebirth, and the cycle (of existences) to be decreased is the maker for undoing of rebirth. [103] It is in this way that it entails result. It is not without entailing result merely by the Word: 'it makes for undoing (of rebirth).' The affirmation and the denial of the Sakavādin should be understood in this sense.

The controversy about Ariyan states of mind and
results is ended.

X

Now follows the controversy about results as again causing results.

'Because one result [of karma] stands in relation to another result by way of reciprocity, etc., some, like the Andhakas hold, that the result is itself necessarily the cause of other results.'¹ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, while the opponent assents.

By "Is the result of that?" etc., it has been asked: Does, according to your opinion, the result of that result which entails resultant states, also entail other resultant states? The opponent denies because of the absence of its giving result in future. Being asked again, he assents, because other result may take place on account of it. But this being so, there will be, like good and bad, the result of that result which in its turn will entail other result; thus there is no making an end of it in a given series. Being asked this, the opponent denies for fear of contravening doctrine. As to the question, "Result?" and so forth, he denies, because he thinks that, if, by comparing, the terms 'result' and 'state entailing resultant states' are identical, then good, bad and the unrevealed will also be identical.

In the expression "Are result and state entailing resultant states the same?"—the sense is this: 'The opponent regards any one of the four mental groups² as 'result entailing the other three as its results' in their mutual relation at any given moment.'³ Being asked: "Are 'result' and 'state

¹ See *P. of C.*, p. 209.

² *Khandhas*.

³ See *P. of C.*, p. 210.

entailing resultant states' of same content and origin?" he assents: "Yes." Then to urge him the Sakavādin says thus: inasmuch as you approve of the existence of 'result' and 'states entailing resultant states' in the four mental groups at the same moment, it follows that they are concomitant, etc. [104] The opponent denies with respect to state entailing resultant states, known as good and bad. "Is a given bad mental state its own result?" means if, according to you, 'result' and 'state entailing resultant states' are identical, it follows that the result of a bad state is also bad. Therefore it is identical with 'state entailing resultant states.'

This is the method also in regard to "Is a given good mental state its own result?" and so forth.

The expression 'by way of reciprocity' has been said merely by way of mutual relation. Hence the four 'great elements' (*mahābhūtāni*), too, have been said to be in reciprocal relation, but not those 'results' and 'mental states entailing other mental states.'

The controversy about results as again causing results
is ended.

Hero ends the Seventh Chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

I

[105] Now follows the controversy about (divers) destinies.¹

Some, for instance the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas hold that the Asuras form a sixth plane of rebirth. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, while the opponent assents.

To contradict this in virtue of the Hair-raising Discourse² of the five divisions of destiny: 'There are these five destinies, Sāriputta' . . . the Sakavādin asked: "Are there not five destinies?" The other assents for fear of contradicting the Sutta-passage. But on this account the Sakavādin does not assent that there are six destinies.

Is it not true that a troop of Asuras was freed from the four-fold plane of misery? But this is not to form a separate plane. Why? Because, in the absence of a separate plane, the Kālakañjaka Asuras were taken up among the Petas. And another troop of Asuras—that of Vepacitti—was taken up among the devas. So there is no separate plane.

Now to show this meaning "Did not the Kālakañjakas?" etc., is begun. Therein, 'resembling in shape' means persisting in similar appearance. 'Disgusting' means ugly, dreadful. 'Resembling in enjoyment' means resembling in sex-life. 'Resembling in nutriment' means resembling in mucus of the nose, pus, blood, and so forth. 'Resembling in length of life' means resembling in life-span. 'Intermarriage' means accepting a girl, and giving her away in marriage. 'Resembling in good shape' means resembling in fair, beautiful, pleasant and lustrous appearance. 'Resembling in enjoyment' means resembling in the five kinds of sensual enjoy-

¹ *Gati*, lit. 'a going,' a career. See *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 137.

² *Majjhima* i, 73; the title here given is an alternative to the more usual *Mahāsihanāda Sutta*.—Ed.

ment. 'Resembling in diet' means resembling in pure food, etc. The rest is same as already explained.

"Is there not an Asura-group?"—this has been said to prove the existence of an Asura-group. But since there is no exclusive sphere of destiny for it, a (possible) destiny is established.

The controversy about divers destinies is ended.

II

[106] Now follows the controversy about an intermediate state of becoming.

By carelessly interpreting the Sutta-passages—'*completed existence within the interval*'¹—some, for instance, the Pubba-seliyas and the Saṃmitiyas, hold the view, 'that there is an interim stage where a being who as one who has deva-sight but is lacking it, or as one who has abnormal potency² but is lacking it, persists awaiting parental reconception for a week or more than one week. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Is there?" etc. The opponent, taking his stand on his own view, assents.

Then to urge on him (i.e., the opponent) the Exalted One's dictum, that there are three states of becoming only, the Sakavādan asks: "Is the Kāma-life?"³ and so forth. Here the sense is this: If there be such a state as an intermediate state of becoming, then it must be a 'five-mode becoming,' etc., such as the Kāma-life, and so forth. Let us then ask you: "Do you identify the intermediate state with either the Kāma-life, or Rūpa-life,⁴ or Arūpa-life?"⁴ All these the opponent denies, because he would not admit such things.

The expressions "either of the Kāma-life" and so forth have been brought forth in order to urge that, if there be an intermediate state, it must be between these states of becoming, like an interval between two boundaries. The opponent

¹ *E.g.*, *Digha* iii, 237.

² *Iddhim*.

³ *I.e.*, in the next world.

⁴ *I.e.*, better than the next (Kāma) life, and again better than this.

who would not admit such things, denies all these questions. Thus he refuses the Sakavādin's "indeed" simply for his view, but not in accordance with the doctrine.

Since this (intermediate state) is not included in the states of becoming already stated, the expression "the twenty-five modes of existence" is said in order to urge, that it must be then something more than these. The expression "Is there action leading to it?" has been asked in order to urge that, if it be a state of becoming, there must be action leading to it, as there are actions leading to the Kāma-life, shown by the Teacher after analysing them. But inasmuch as, in the opinion of the opponent, there is no distinct action, and inasmuch as they hold that one is born in an intermediate state of becoming through action, which led him to be reborn in the different becoming, therefore he denies: "It is not so."

Being asked: "Are there beings who are born in an intermediate state of becoming?" [107] the opponent denies because, according to him, they refer to those who approach the Kāma-life and the Rūpa-life. Also being asked: "Do beings get (so) born?" and so forth he rejects, because he would not admit birth, old age, and death in it, or order of decease and re-conception.

Being asked as to material quality, etc., he denies, because he holds that a being who approaches an intermediate state of becoming is without attributes, and his material quality, feeling, and the like are not so gross as those of others. And it is for this reason that his denial regarding 'a five-modes existence' should be understood.

Now with reference to sequence of becoming follows the question: "Is the Kāma-life a destiny?" and so forth. Therein the sense is this: If for you there be an intermediate becoming it must be destiny, as there is a division of becoming, etc., in the Kāma-life, and so forth. Or, if such a division be not there, it cannot either be in such an intermediate destiny. In such, this or that form of becoming being the same, with division in each of them, but not in the intermediate, what is the reason for this difference here? The opponent, how-

ever, merely because of his own view, here and there both assents and denies.

Being asked: "Is there an intermediate existence for all beings?" the opponent denies, because he would not admit an intermediate existence for those beings who approach either hell, or unconscious life, or Arūpa-life. It is for this reason that he assents by the inverse method.

The expressions 'for the intermediate' and so forth have been said to show those beings, after distinguishing them, for whom he would not admit an intermediate becoming. All these should be understood according to the text together with the Sutta-proof.

The controversy about an intermediate state is ended.

III

Now follows the controversy about the pleasures of sense.¹

Therein according to the Sakavādin's view, 'element of desire' may stand for 'objects of sense-desire,' 'corrupt, worldly desire,' or 'the Kāma-world.'¹ "In the first term desire means 'to be desired'; element means [108] both 'to be desired' and 'to desire.' But in the last term Kāma means 'to be desired' or 'desiring,' or 'place where objects of sense happen.' 'Element,' as always, means self-existing ultimate, without entity, non-substantial."²

But because of the Word: '*There are, monks, these five kinds of pleasures of sense,*'³ the opponent's view is, that 'elements of desire' means only the fivefold pleasures of sense.

So, to teach those who, like the Puhbaseliyas at present, hold such a view, the manifoldness of 'elements of desire' the Sakavādin asks: "Only the fivefold?" Because of his own view the opponent assents. "Is not?" and so forth has been said in order to show corrupt, worldly

¹ *Kāmaguṇā*, lit. the qualities of (sensual) desire. (The word *kāma*-desire or will had undergone great depreciation.—Ed.)

² *Dhātu*; see *P. of C.*, p. 214 and fn.

³ *Majjhima-Nikāya* i, 85. See also *Dīgha-Nikāya* iii, 234.

desires. Therein 'bound up with it' means bound up with pleasures of sense as objects. In the expression 'it cannot be said that (the *Kāma*-sphere) is only the fivefold (pleasures of sense)', the fivefold pleasures of sense should not be called the *Kāma*-sphere, there being lust,¹ etc., bound up with it. 'Element of desire' consists of 'element' and 'desire.' The latter is used in the sense that these lusts and so forth are to be desired. 'Element of desire' also means 'desires+element known as desire.' The expression 'human eye,' and so forth is said in order to show objects of desire. Therein the opponent does not reject that the six organs of sense as objects of desire are co-extensive with the *Kāma*-life, but again, being asked: "Or mind?" he recollects the sublimer and spiritual work of mind, and agrees that it is not co-extensive with the *Kāma*-sphere. But since mind in all these planes is co-extensive with *Kāma*-sphere the Sakavādin refutes him by the Sutta-passage.

'The pleasures of sense' and so forth is said in order to show the *Kāma*-sphere of life. But since it is not commonly held that sense-pleasures alone amount to a sphere of life, the opponent denies: "It is not so."

"Is there action leading to a *Kāma*-sphere?" and all the rest is asked in order to show, that merely pleasures of sense do not amount to a life of *kāma*-element. There is action leading to a sphere of life called *Kāma*-element, and there are also beings who approach the *Kāma*-spheres. [109] They get born, grow old, die, de cease, get reborn in *them*, but not in sense-pleasures (as such).

The controversy about pleasures of sense is ended.

IV

Now follows the controversy about sense-desires.

Because merely by the Word: "*Monks, there are these five Kāma-pleasures*"² some, for instance, the Puhhaseliyas hold the view that the five kinds of sense-objects, like visible object, etc., constitute sense-desires. To show that 'corrup-

¹ *Chanda* is nearer 'will' than 'lust.'—Ed. ² See above, VIII, III.

tions ' alone truly constitute sensuality, the Sakavādin asked: " Only the fivefold ?" The opponent assents.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy about sense-desire is ended.

V

Now follows the controversy about the *Rūpa*-element.

Some, for instance, the Andhakas hold, that the ultimate *Rūpa*-datum (or element) consists only of material qualities. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: " Material qualities ?" The opponent assents. Inasmuch as the *Rūpa*-datum includes all the spheres of life known as *Rūpa*-life, therefore to urge him on that ground the Sakavādin asks: " Is *Rūpa* a sphere of life ?" and so forth. All this should be understood as already explained in the controversy about ' Pleasures of Sense.'¹

Being asked: " Is the *Kāma*-datum the same as *Rūpa*-datum ?" the opponent denies, as he considers, that it would contradict the accepted triad of life-spheres. When pushed, he assents because of his view. But this being so, one would attain two spheres of existence at the same moment. So the Sakavādin asks him: " Or, with the *Kāma*-life ?" and so forth. The opponent denies, because one cannot attain two spheres of existence at the same moment.

The controversy about *Rūpa*-element is ended.

VI

In the controversy about the *Arūpa*-element, too, the meaning should be understood by the same method.

As regards immaterial things, however, instruction is given by taking a certain immaterial notion—' feeling '—and asking if that is a sphere of life, etc. Here [110] the meaning should

¹ See above, VIII, III.

he understood thus: Is feeling, etc., cognized as immaterial things, a sphere of life?

The rest should be understood as explained below.

The controversy about the Arūpa-element is ended.

VII

Now follows the controversy about the senses in the Rūpa-sphere.¹

Judging by the Sutta-passages—'*having form made of mind, with all its main and lesser parts complete, not deficient in any organ*'²—some, for instance, the Andhakas and the Saṃmitiyas imagine, that the Brahmā-group and the rest had sensations of smell, taste and touch, and they hold that beings in the Rūpa-sphere have all the six senses. Regarding them the Sakavādin asked: "Have they all the six senses?" The opponent assents, because of his own view.

Then to contradict him in respect of a sense-organ which is not in that sphere, "Does the sense of smell exist there?" and so forth is begun. The opponent assents, because according to him, odours, etc., which are matters of external appearance of the external sense-organs, are the fields of organ and mental object. Being asked as to the existence of external odorous objects, etc., he does not admit the corresponding objects for the sense of smell and the rest, and therefore rejects it, and refuses the field for them.

By this method the meaning should be understood both in the inverse inquiry and in questions with references.

"Does the sense of smell exist? Does odour exist? Is odour cognized by the sense of smell?"—has been asked concerning certain teachers of the opposite view, who, it is said, have it 'that the six external fields of sense are there complete, each organ having its function.' They also con-

¹ 'This includes sixteen grades of devas, the Brahmā-world being the lowest.' *P. of C.*, p. 218, fn. 1; *Compendium*, p. 138.

² *Dialogues* i, 47. 'In the Rūpa-world, where "a subtle residuum of matter is still met with" (*Compendium*, p. 12), only sight, hearing and intellectual co-ordination of these survives' (*P. of C.*, p. 218, fn. 2).

sidered that odour, etc., was to be smelled, tasted and 'touched' by the sense of smell, and so forth. Referring to this view the opponent assents: "Yes." But being asked: "Does the odour of root exist?" and so forth, he, being unable to prove its existence, denies.

[111] "Is there not in that sphere the wherewithal for smelling?" and the rest—is only a matter of external appearance, not of organ and mental object and is therefore a futile reference.

The controversy about the senses in the Rūpa-sphere is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy about matter in the Arūpa-sphere.

Because of the Word—' *Because of consciousness there come mind and body* '¹ some, for instance, the Andhakas hold the view that, even in the Arūpa-sphere of existence, there is 'a subtle, refined matter segregated from grosser matter.' Regarding them the Sakavādin asked: "Is there matter?" etc. The opponent assents.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy about matter in the Arūpa-sphere is ended.

IX

Now follows the controversy about matter as a moral act.

Some, for instance, the Mahimsāsakas and the Saṃmitiyas hold that acts of body and speech 'being, as they are, material qualities, reckoned as bodily and vocal intimation, are morally good if proceeding from what is good, and morally bad if proceeding from what is bad.'² Regarding them the

¹ *Saṃyutta* ii, 1; *Dialogues* ii, 52 f.; *Compendium*, p. 188; *P. of C.*, p. 220.

² See *P. of C.*, p. 221.

Sakavādin asks: "If proceeding from good thoughts?" etc. The opponent assents.

Then "Has it a mental object?" and so forth is begun in order to urge the opponent thus: If it be of morally good import, then it must have a mental object and mental attributes; has it all these characteristics? Therein 'anticipating' and 'aiming' are equivalents of volition.¹ The former is so called, because it implies exertion² with good thoughts; while the latter is regarded as persistent in exertion. But, on the other hand, in feeling, perception, volition, faith and the rest proceeding by good thought, from feeling and the rest, volition, anticipating, aiming are got, but not from volition. Why? It should be understood that one of the two kinds of volition¹ [112] being absent, the other is audible and has been customary. In the expression, "sphere of the visible" and the rest, first, "Is the whole of it morally good?" has been asked in order to show in detail that which is in brief.

In the remaining applications, "Do the ways of vocal actions proceed from bad thought?" and so forth, together with all the supplements, should be understood according to the text. Here "impure matter" means semen.

The proving of the Sutta-passages is indeed clear in meaning.

The controversy about matter as a moral act is ended.

X

Now follows the controversy about vital power.³

'Some, for instance, the Pubbaseliyas and the Sammitiyas hold that, because vital power is an immaterial fact distinct from consciousness,⁴ therefore there is nothing material in it.⁵ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

To the question: "Is there no such thing as 'a term of life' in material phenomena?" the opponent denies, because he

¹ *Cetanā*, lit. 'thinking,' with purpose implied.—Ed.

² *Pakappamāṇā*.

³ *Jivittindriya*.

⁴ *Citta*.

⁵ See *P. of C.*, p. 226.

admits that in material phenomena as resultants, and the rest, as also (*e.g.*) in creepers, fuel, etc., there is, as a continuity, a means of going on, living, subsisting, maintaining, moving, or preserving. It is for this reason that he assents to the question: "Is there?" etc.

To the question: "Is there immaterial vital power?" he assents, because he admits, that there is continuity of vital power distinct from consciousness in immaterial phenomena.

To the question: "Is the life-term of material phenomena the same as immaterial vital power?" he assents, because he admits that, in the continuity of a material substance, mental conditions may be either material or immaterial, and all of them have immaterial vital power distinct from consciousness.

In the questions concerning "one who has fallen into a cataleptic trance,"¹ with respect to immaterial vital power as distinct from consciousness, he both denies and assents. The Sakavādin, [113] not accepting this, says: "If," and so forth, in order to urge that, if there be no existence of the immaterial and its continuity, that which does exist must have material quality.

To the questions regarding the aggregates of (mental) coefficients² the opponent denies with respect to contact and the rest of the aggregate of (mental) coefficients, and assents with respect to bodily actions and the rest of the aggregate of coefficients. He holds that bodily intimation, right speech, and right deed also mean vital power. All such coefficients are included in the aggregate of (mental) coefficients. But the Sakavādin, not accepting this, asks: "Does the aggregate of feeling exist?" and so forth, in order to urge that, if the aggregate of (mental) coefficients be involved in the stopping of the immaterial and its continuity, there would be then only four aggregates. 'The opponent denies with respect to mid-trance, but assents with respect

¹ *Nirodha*: lit. a stopping.—Ed.

² *Sankhārā*. These are defined in the Abhidhamma 'as fifty phases,' more or less of them being present in states of consciousness. See *P. of C.*, p. 227, fn. 2.

to entrance into and emergence from trance.¹ This is the method in the portion concerning beings of the unconscious sphere.

According to the opponent's view, at the moment of rebirth of beings into the unconscious sphere, consciousness having sprung up breaks off. With it an immaterial vital power distinct from consciousness also springs up and subsists for that life-time. Wherefore, he, being asked: "Does it not exist?" regarding their vital power, denies. When he is asked: "Does it exist?" he assents.

He also denies as to the (mental) aggregate of feeling, and the rest, because there is their happening. He assents, because of the decease and rebirth of beings in it. The Sakavādin, not accepting this, asks: "Is it a five-mode existence?" and so forth, in order to urge that, if there be feeling, etc., at the same moment, it would amount to a five-mode existence. The opponent denies for fear of contradicting the Sutta. To the question: "Is it broken off in part?" he assents, because he holds that the associated things are broken off, while the distinct one remains.

"Are there two vital powers?" is asked by the opponent, and the Sakavādin assents. For it has been said: "Vital power is twofold: material and immaterial. A being lives with them, and dies at their dissolution."² At the moment of decease the two vital powers break off together.

The controversy about vital power is ended.

XI

[114] Now follows the controversy about action as a cause.

Some, for instance the Puhbaseliyas and the Sammitiyas hold, that an arahān who, in a former birth, calumniated one who was then arahān, may, because of that action, fall away from arahanship. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Because of the act?" etc. The opponent assents. The rest is similar to what has been explained in the contro-

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 227, fn. 4.

² *Cf. Vibhūṅga*, 123.

versy about Falling Away.¹ The expression, "Well then, an arahāṇa calumniates arahāṇas" is said to make him agree as to the cause of an action whereby an Arahāṇa may fall away. Then the Sakavādin makes him assent to that statement, and asks: "everyone?" and so forth, in order to urge that, if this was so, all those who calumniated arahāṇas might realize arahāṇaship. 'The opponent, not discerning any assurance (*niyāma*) in attaining arahāṇaship with such an action, denies.'²

The controversy about action as a cause is ended.

Here ends the Eighth Chapter.

¹ See above, I, II, p. 35 ff.

² *P. of C.*, p. 229, fn.

CHAPTER IX

I

[115] Now follows the controversy about (release through seeing) the good.¹

Herein the Sakavādin's doctrine, he is convinced that when anyone discerns (a) the 'world' (lit. 'conditioned things') as full of peril, and (b) nirvana as a blessing, the 'fetters' are put off. But some, for instance, the Andhakas take one of these two alternative statements, and hold that it is only by the latter discernment that the Fetters are put off.² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, while the opponent assents.

To point out to the opponent through distinction that his view is partial, and conditioned things are also to be discerned as full of peril, the Sakavādin says: "when conditioned things,"³ etc. In this question, the sense is this: "Can a man both consider the impermanence of such things, and see the blessings in nirvana?" Since the opponent holds that, when anyone discerns nirvana as a blessing, the 'fetters' are put off, therefore when he is asked: "Are not the 'fetters' put off when such things are considered as impermanent?" he assents: "yes." Hence it follows that a man can both consider the impermanence of conditioned things, and see the blessings in nirvana:—do you agree to this? Then the opponent denies because one can have but one thought in one moment. Being asked again, he assents with respect to a plurality of moments. The Sakavādin, however, neglecting his reason, asks: "You admit that a man loses the fetters when he can both consider the im-

¹ 'Anisaṃsa (lit. 'praise,' with two intensive prefixes; commendable, because good; profit, advantage).' See *P. of C.*, p. 230, fn. 1.

² See, for translation, *P. of C.*, p. 230.

³ *Samkhārā*.

permanence, and discern the happy prospect together. But are there simultaneously two mental reactions, two thoughts, etc.?" The opponent does not see that two of them are simultaneous, and therefore rejects. This is the method also in the questions: "As full of Ill?" and so forth.

But what is the conclusion here? Is it for one who considers the impermanence and so on, or is it for one who discerns the profit in nirvana, [116] or is it for one who does both together that the fetters are put off? If there be a putting off for one who considers the impermanence and so on, it would be so also by consciousness of insight. Or, if it be for one who discerns the profit, it would be so by the consciousness of insight of one who sees the blessings in nirvana from hearsay. Or, if it be for one who does both together, there would be two simultaneous mental reactions, and so on. It should be understood that, whereas a man, at the threshold of the Ariyan Way, completes the work of pondering over impermanence and so on, and whereas from his conviction of impermanence and so on, things are put off and he, while considering nirvana, aspires after the blessings in it, the fetters are removed, as he, while completing the work of insight into impermanence and so on, discerns the blessings in nirvana.

The Sutta-passage, namely, '*perceiving the happiness in nirvana*,'¹ makes clear the fact of perceiving, feeling, etc., the happiness in nirvana, but not that the fetters are removed merely by discerning the blessings. Hence it is as if not concluded.

The controversy about (release through seeing) the
good is ended.

II

[117] Now follows the controversy about the immortal as an object of thought.²

¹ *Āṅguttara-Nikāya* iv, 14.

² (=amata) lit. not dead.

By a careless interpretation of such a Sutta-passage as—*'He imagines things about nirvana,'*¹ and so forth, some, for instance, the Pubbaseliyas hold that the immortal as an object of thought is a 'fetter.' Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Then to urge him that, if the immortal as an object of thought be a 'fetter,' he is "bound by fetters," and so forth, the Sakavādin asks: "Is the immortal (as an object of thought) a 'fetter'?" and so on. The opponent denies all of them for fear of contradicting the Suttas. In this way, the meaning should be understood on all occasions. In the Sutta-passage, namely, *'He perceives nirvana as such,'* etc.,² which has been quoted, the nirvana here meant is simply temporal well-being. Hence it is not proved.

The controversy about the immortal as an object of
thought is ended.

III

Now follows the controversy whether matter is mental object. Some, for instance the Uttarāpathakas hold that matter is co-object (*sārammaṇa*), not because it is so in the sense of *making* a mental object [in itself], but inasmuch as it causes mental presentation, and they do not make distinction between object of thought (*ārammaṇa*), and causal relation (*paccaya*). Regarding them the Sakavādin, in order to show the notation of a mental object, asks, and the opponent assents. The rest here should be understood according to the text.

To the question, "Is it not right to say?" the Sakavādin assents with respect to 'contact' as an object. To the second question, too, he assents with respect to 'object' as one of the causal relations.³ Thus it is proved that matter, as correlated, has co-objectivity.

The controversy whether matter is mental object is ended.

¹ *Majjhima-Nikāya* i, 4.

² *Ibid.*

³ Twenty-four of these causal relations are recognized in the last book of Abhidhamma.—Ed.

IV

Now follows the controversy whether latent (immoral) bias¹ is without mental object.

Some, for instance the Andhakas and certain of the Uttarāpatbakas hold that what are called the (seven) latent biases, being something distinct from mind, unconditioned, indeterminate, are thereby without concomitant mental object.² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks about latent bias, and the opponent assents.

Then to urge the opponent that latent bias must be what is known as without material quality the Sakavādin asks: "Are its forms material quality?" and so forth. In the expression "sense-desire?" and so forth, it is shown that sense-desire is not distinct from latent bias. To the question, "Is the aggregate of mental coefficients³ without mental object?" the opponent denies with respect to the aggregate concomitant with mind, but assents with respect to latent bias, vitality, forms of bodily actions, and those included in the mental aggregate. In this way, the meaning should be understood on all occasions.

But in the question: "Is it with latent bias?"—that which has not given up latent bias is described as 'having latent bias,' and not as 'having the possibility of manifesting latent biases.' That which is not given up is neither past, present nor future. This is the lust to be destroyed in the Way. This is said to be present, because it is not given up. Similarly, it cannot be said that this object of material quality is this or that. Therefore not only in this [118] but also in the case of lust, etc., of latent bias, this is rejected. Hence the objectlessness of 'latent bias' is not properly substantiated.

The controversy whether latent bias is without mental object is ended.

¹ *Anusaya*. On this sevenfold bias, see *Compendium*, p. 172, fn. 2. *P. of C.*, p. 234, fn. 2.

² See, for translation, *P. of C.*, p. 234.

³ *I.e.*, the fourth of the five *khandhas*.

V

Now follows the controversy about insight as without mental object. Some, for instance the Andhakas hold that, inasmuch as an arnban, when endowed with visual consciousness, can be said to possess insight, and that insight is at that moment without object, therefore insight is without mental object. Concerning them the Sakavādin asks, while the opponent assents.

The rest here should be understood as explained in the controversy about latent bias.¹

The controversy about insight as without mental object is ended.

VI

Now follows the controversy about past ideas. Some, for instance the Uttarāpathakas hold, that since past and future mental objects are not actually existing, therefore mind recalling a past object is mind without object, there being no such thing as a mental object, the mental object being past. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: Is there such a thing as a mental object that is past? The opponent assents.

The rest here is to be understood according to the text.

The controversy about past ideas is ended.

VII

Now follows the controversy about initial application of mind. Here initial mental application (and its field of operation) may happen in two ways: by way of falling on consciousness as object, and by way of association (as a concomitant of the consciousness in which it operates). In the absence of any rules by which we can say, that such and such a consciousness cannot become an object of initial application, [119] we might say, that initial mental application falls on all conscious-

¹ See above, IX, iv.

ness. But since some consciousness is brought to pass independently of any initial application, this does not fall on (i.e., operate in) all consciousness.¹ Some, for instance the Uttarāpathakas fail to draw this distinction, and hold that initial mental application falls indiscriminately on all consciousness. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest here is to be understood according to the text.

The controversy about initial mental application is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy regarding sound as a diffusion of initial and sustained mental application. Because it was said, 'Applied and discursive thinking is productive of speech,'² therefore some, for instance the Pubbaseliyas hold, that sounds may occur even when cognition is proceeding without work of sense, because they consist merely in 'thrillings'³ (or irradiation) of initial and sustained application of mind.⁴ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Nothing more?" to which the opponent assents.

Then the expression beginning with "Are sounds solely from mental contact?" has been said in order to urge the opponent that, if sound is nothing more than a diffusion of initial and sustained mental application, an irradiation of mental contact, etc., would also send forth its own peculiar sounds. The opponent denies, because he finds no such pretext in a Sutta. By the expression "Is sound that is an irradiation of initial and sustained mental application to be cognized by hearing?" it is asked: Is sound solely an irradiation of mental application?

According to those who are careless about the Suttas sound is not produced by an irradiation of mental application;

¹ See, for translation, *P. of C.*, pp. 238-39.

² *Majjhima-Nik.* i, 301.

³ *Vipphāra*.

⁴ Cf. *Digha-Nik.* iii, 104; *Aṅguttara-Nik.* i, 170. For translation, see *P. of C.*, pp. 239-40.

hence the opponent denies. It is to show his view-point that the question: "Is neither sound nor auditory consciousness an irradiation of mental application?" has been put forward. He holds that sound is purely an irradiation of mental application, not an auditory consciousness. But by the Word: '*Hearing a sound, an irradiation of initial application of mind, he reveals*'¹ the other (i.e., Sakavādin) shows that there is auditory consciousness also.

The controversy about sound as purely mental is ended.

IX

Now follows the controversy that speech does not accord with thought.

"Inasmuch as anyone can decide (to think about one thing and) talk about another, therefore there is no accord, no conformity between thought and speech. Speech can proceed [120] even without thought. Such is the view of some—for instance the Pubbaseliyas."² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

To convince the opponent thus: If there be no thought that produces speech, there can also be at that moment no contact, etc.—the expression "Does it not accord with contact?" and so forth is asked. Because in the expression "what one does not wish to speak" and so forth, the fact that one *speaks* of something different from what he thinks implies that one intends to speak, therefore he denies: "It is not so."

In the expression "Is there not one who will speak something different?" and so forth (take the case of) one intending to say *cīvaraṃ*³ (robe) and saying *cīraṃ*³ (bark). Therein 'the mind intending to speak' is different from 'the mind that speaks.' Thus the latter, being different from the former, is known as one not according with (speech). Hence, 'no blame attaches to the speaker.' There can, however, be no thought producing the word 'hark.' So by this illustration,

¹ *Ibid.*

² See, for translation, *P. of C.*, p. 240.

³ Pron. *chīr-*, *chīr-*.

and with reference to the sense that such speech does not conform to thought, the opponent's view that speech does not accord with thought, though put forward, is not proved.

The controversy, namely, that speech does not accord
with thought is ended.

X

Now follows the controversy that action does not accord with thought. "Inasmuch as anyone, when proposing to go in one direction, can go elsewhere, some, for instance the Pubbaseliyas hold, that action is not in accord or conformity with, or consequent upon thought."¹ Action can proceed without thought. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest here should be understood as explained above (in 9).

The controversy, namely, that action does not accord
with thought is ended.

XI

Now follows the controversy about a past or future experience as actually possessed. Herein the notion of 'being in possession of' and that of 'acquisition' should be understood as two distinct notions. [121] The former is of the present moment. But for a man who has acquired the Eight Attainments in Jhāna,² the possession of them, some being acquired in the past, some in the future, and some in the present, is possessor through persistency. But some, not admitting this distinction, for instance the Andhakas hold that, since there are those who have attained past and future Jhānas, therefore past and future Jhānas are actually and presently possessed by them.³ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

¹ See, for translation, *P. of C.*, p. 241.

² *Digha*, iii, 222 f.

³ See, for translation, *P. of C.*, p. 242.

The expression "muser in the eight (stages of) emancipation," and so forth, however, proves that they are acquired and not actually and presently possessed.

The controversy about a past or future experience as actually and presently possessed is ended.

Here ends the Ninth Chapter.

CHAPTER X

I

[122] Now follows the controversy about ending. "Some, for instance the Andbakas hold that if, before a unit of becoming¹ lapses, another unit of consciousness (*kiriya*)² entailing merit or demerit, with its (operative) fourfold aggregate and the material aggregate sprung from it, has not arisen, then becoming being ended, the living continuum³ must be cut off." Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Does it arise?" to which the opponent assents.

In the four expressions: "If it has arisen," the locative singular has been used in the sense of the locative plural. Here the sense is this: Before five aggregates seeking rebirth are ended, does it arise? The expression "of ten" has been said, because if it has arisen, there is then a congeries of (five) aggregates (*khandhā*) and (five) operative aggregates (*kiriya*).

In the first question, the opponent denies with respect to the five alone which have the characteristics of such. To the second question he assents, because, if they arise as past and future aggregates, they may be manifold as operative aggregates. But when he is asked regarding the two contacts and states of consciousness combined, the opponent denies, because there is no resorting to a Sutta.

In the expression "only four operative aggregates," four aggregates, good or bad, have been taken, excluding the material aggregate. By the expression "operative insight" the opponent understands insight without mental object, assigned to an arahant when his visual consciousness is active.⁴

¹ *Bhavaṅgacittassa*.

² Lit. 'that which induces action, such as bodily movement,' etc. See *P. of C.*, p. 243, fn. 1.

³ *Santati*. *P. of C.*, p. 243.

⁴ Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 230.

"When the five aggregates are ended, does the Way arise?" is asked by the opponent. The Sakavādin assents, because when they are not ended, it does not arise.

"Does one who is dead develop the Way?" is asked by the opponent by sophistry. [123] But inasmuch as he whose mind is cleaving¹ continues (to live) from rebirth till decease, the Sakavādin denies: "No indeed."

The controversy about ending is ended.

II

Now follows the controversy that bodily form (of one who is in the Way) is included in that Way. Some, for instance the Mahīṣāsakas, Sāṃmitīyas, and Mahāsaṅghikas hold that the three factors of the Way—right speech, action, and livelihood—are (a question of) material form.¹ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Is the physical frame of one who is practising the Way included in it?" The opponent assents.

"Has it an object (of mind)?" and so forth is asked in order to urge on the opponent that if the three factors—right speech, and so on—do not lack in matter, the other five factors of the Way—right views, and so on, which have an object of mind—must be also material. In this connection, the affirmation and the denial of the opponent should be understood according to his view.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy that bodily form (of one who is practising the Way) is included in the Way is ended.

III

Now follows the controversy about Way-culture of one while enjoying fivefold sense-cognition. Some, for instance the Mahāsaṅghikas, with reference to the Sutta: '*When he sees an object with the eye, he does not grasp it in idea,*'² hold that one may make the Way become while enjoying fivefold

¹ P. of U., p. 244.

² Vibhāṅga 307.

cognition of sense. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks and the opponent assents.

If such a person makes the Way become, either the Way developed is of the nature of the fivefold cognition of sense, or his sense-experience must be of the nature of the Way. But neither the Way made to become is of the nature of the fivefold cognition of sense, nor is his sense-experience of the nature of the Way, because sense-cognition is worldly, and has not nirvana as its object. So by nature the one cannot include the other. Thus to urge on the opponent, "Have the five kinds of sense-consciousness a seat and an object that have already sprung up?" and so forth is asked.

Here the sense is this: If one may make the Way become while enjoying fivefold sense-cognition, he must have also representative consciousness (i.e., mind-consciousness), with which the Way is concerned. This being so, you must admit that the five kinds of sense-consciousness have a seat and an object that have already sprung up [124] and so forth, and are predictable of the Path. If you do not say so, it must be said of the 'six kinds of sense-consciousness.' But not saying so, you say of the five kinds of sense-consciousness. Therefore you should not say that one may make the Way become while enjoying fivefold sense-cognition. Because in this connection this is the sense, wherefore the Sakavādin, having convinced the opponent regarding this character of the Way, says: "Hence it cannot be said that one may make the Way become while enjoying fivefold sense-consciousness."

There is another method. If the Way be concerned with the five kinds of sense-consciousness which have a seat already sprung up, it has no object. Or, if the Way be concerned with them that have an object, it cannot be said to have any object. Or, if the Way be concerned with them that have their seat as antecedent, it has no object. Or, if the Way is concerned with things that have their object as antecedent, it has no object as its antecedent. Or, if the Way is concerned with things that have their seat as the subject, it has no object. Or, if the Way is concerned with things that have their object in external things, like material quality, etc., it has nirvana

as its object. Or, if the Way be concerned with things that have their seat not yet broken up while operative, it has no object. Or, if the Way be concerned with things that have their object not yet broken up, while operative, it has nirvana as its object. Or, if the Way be concerned with things that have a seat of different varieties, it has either no object, or one object. Or, if the Way be concerned with things that do not enjoy mutually their respective ranges and fields, it does not enjoy as its range and field only the external objects, etc. Or, if the Way be concerned with things that come to pass not without co-ordinated application or attention by the mind advertent to external object, it is without advertent. Or, if the Way is concerned with things that are mixed up with acceptance, etc., there is in the Way no distinction. Or, if the Way is concerned with things that are not without order in time, it has no order in time with them as past and future, for it may arise when, at the moment of acute insight, they do not arise, and even in the incorporeal where they have no scope to arise. Or, if the Way be concerned with things [125] that are without order of contiguity, since there is their distance through acceptance, etc., it has no such distance. Or, if the Way be concerned with things in which, 'leaving aside the automatic fall (incidence in a presented object), there is not even the semblance of *minding* about it (in sense),' its business is to remove the depravities.

Inasmuch as this is the sense here, therefore the Sakavādin, by these methods, having convinced the opponent that the Way is not of the nature of the fivefold sense-consciousness, says: "Hence it cannot be said that one may make the Way become while enjoying fivefold sense-consciousness."

As to the expression "concerning Emptiness": this in the supramundane being a concern of nirvana, while in a general sense it is merely a concern of the bunch of (mental) co-efficients,¹ "does visual consciousness come to pass as such?" is asked. Because of such a Word as "*Because of eye and visible object (visual consciousness arises)*," the opponent denies. Being asked again, he assents with reference to the view that,

¹ *Saṅkhāra-pūñjaṃ.*

because of the Word, "*he does not grasp it in idea,*" that which is Signless,¹ is Emptiness.

This is also the method in both the questions: "Because of the eye?" etc.

In the question: "Does visual consciousness arise concerning the past and the future?" the sense is this: One may make the Way become while enjoying representative cognition, and representative cognition arises concerning the past and the future. Is visual consciousness also such? This is also the method in "concerning mental contact," and so forth.

In the expression "*when he sees an object with the eye, he does not grasp the general characters of it,*"² it has not been said that one grasps at the general characters (of an object) during the enjoyment of apperception or of visual consciousness. Therefore it is not proved with reference to the way of the world also.

The controversy about the Way-culture of one
enjoying fivefold sense-cognition is ended.

IV

Now follows the controversy that the five kinds of sense-consciousness are good and bad. This should be understood in meaning according to the method explained above.

The controversy that five kinds of sense-consciousness
are good and bad is ended.

V

[126] Now follows the controversy on (the five kinds of sense-consciousness as accompanied by) ideation.³

Therein what is known as ideation is by way of good and bad.

By a careless interpretation of the Teacher's words: "*when he sees an object with the eye, he grasps . . . or again, does not grasp, at the general characters,*"⁴ and so forth, some, for

¹ *Anīmitam*. ² *A. i.*, 113. ³ *Sādhogā*. See *P. of C.*, 221, fn. 4.

⁴ *A. i.*, 113.

instance the Mahāsaṅghikas hold them to mean, that the five kinds of sense-consciousness as such are accompanied by ideation. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest here is similar to the preceding discourse.

The controversy, namely, that the five kinds of sense-consciousness as such are accompanied by ideation, is ended.

VI

Now follows the controversy about two codes of morals. "From such passages in the Word as "*when a man is established in virtue he is gifted with wisdom*,"¹ some, for instance the Mahāsaṅghikas hold that, inasmuch as the virtuous person is developing the Way which is not of this world, with a morality that is of this world, he must, at the moment of realization, be possessed simultaneously of both a worldly and an unworldly (supramundane) morality.² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Is one who is possessed of the Way . . . ?"³ The opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent that, if one be possessed simultaneously of both a worldly and an unworldly morality, he must also be possessed of a dual mental contact, and so on, the Sakavādin asks: "With a dual mental contact?" and so forth. The opponent, who does not see such an inference, denies. To the question: "Both a worldly and an unworldly?" he assents with reference to right speech, and so on,⁴ that have been already undertaken, or have arisen at the moment of (realizing) the Way.

"Does the Way come to be when worldly morality has ceased?" is asked by the opponent. The Sakavādin assents with reference to the twofold ending, momentary and complete. The opponent, considering it as transgression, asks: "Can anyone without morals?" and so forth. But by the

¹ *Samyutta-Nik.* i, 13, 165; cf. *Mūlindapañha* 34; *Vism.*, I ff.

² *P. of C.*, p. 248.

³ *Maggasamāgī*.

⁴ *I.e.*, only right speech, right action and right livelihood.

assertion of his view it is only explained, that a person was not without morals in the past, and not that he was possessed of a dual morality. Hence, his view is not substantiated.

The controversy about two codes of morals is ended.

VII

[127] Now follows the controversy about virtue as automatic.¹ Inasmuch as, when there has been moral conduct, even though it has ceased, there is an accretion of virtue caused by the undertaking whereby the doer becomes virtuous; therefore some, for instance the Mahāsaṅghikas hold that virtuous conduct is automatic. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest here should be understood as explained in the controversy about *dāna* (giving), as automatic (and not a mental state).² The assertion of this view also, as being carelessly held, is not substantiated.

The controversy about virtue as automatic is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy about virtue as not proceeding in adaptation³ to thought.

Therein 'not proceeding in adaptation to thought' is merely substituted for 'is automatic.'

The rest is similar to the previous controversy.⁴

The controversy about virtue as not proceeding in adaptation to thought is ended.

IX

Now follows the controversy about merit as growing through observance.

¹ Lit. 'not a property of consciousness' (= *a-cetasikaṃ*). ² See vi, 4.

³ Lit. 'roll along after,' 'in accordance with' (*anuparivattati*). See *P. of C.*, p. 250, fn. 2.

⁴ See above, X, vii.

By a careless interpretation of the verse in the Word, beginning:

*'By planting pleasant parks and woods,'*¹

wherein it is said:

'Merit doth grow continually,'

some, for instance the Mahāsaṅghikas hold that merit grows through (the mere fact of) being undertaken. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, with reference to the accumulation of virtue, independently of the mind's action, the opponent assents.

The rest is similar to a previous controversy.²

The controversy about (merit as) growing through observance is ended.

X

Now follows the controversy about acts of intimation as virtue.

Some, for instance the Mahāsaṅghikas and Saṃmitiyas, thinking that 'bodily intimation is an act of body, vocal intimation an act of speech,'³ hold that such acts of intimation are moral acts. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Are acts of intimation moral acts?" [128] The opponent assents.

Inasmuch as morality (or virtuous conduct) is an act of abstinence, and not a material quality, therefore to urge on the opponent in that sense the expression "Is abstaining from taking life?" and so forth is asked. "Is salutation morality?" and so forth is asked in order to show, by drawing out such thing, that an act of intimation is a physical matter, but the opponent thinks it to be morality. But inasmuch as this is not an act of abstinence, therefore "Is it abstaining from taking life?" and so forth is asked. But as the opponent puts forward his view through pretence, it is inconclusive.

The controversy about acts of intimation as virtue is ended.

¹ *Saṃyutta* i, 33.

² See VII, v.

³ See VIII, ix.

XI

Now follows the controversy about non-intimation as immoral.

Some, for instance the Mahāsaṅghikas hold that acts not intimating (a moral purpose) are immoral, based on the idea of (a possible) accumulation of demerit not conjoined with thought, and on the fact that immoral acts, like taking life, and so on may be accomplished at the dictates of another. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"Is taking life?" and so forth is said in order to urge on (the opponent) whether such immoral acts are different from 'taking life' and so forth.

Being asked: "If anyone doing an immoral deed has resolved on some evil deeds—'we shall kill such and such person,' 'we shall carry away the property of such and such person'—do his merit and demerit both grow thereby?"—the opponent denies with reference to the idea that, at the moment of giving in charity, demerit cannot arise. Being asked again, he assents with reference to a (possible) accumulation of demerit not conjoined with thought.

The rest here should be understood as explained in the controversy about merit as increasing with utility.

By putting forward his view the opponent merely proves that an immoral act had been resolved upon, and not that acts not intimative of a moral purpose are immoral.

The controversy about non-intimation as immoral is ended.

Here ends the Tenth Chapter.

The second Chapter of the Fifty is completed.

CHAPTER XI

I

[129] Now follows the controversy about three facts concerning latent bias,¹ namely, that it is (i) unmoral (indeterminate), (ii) without moral or immoral motive, and (iii) independent of mind.

Inasmuch as 'it is not right to say that the average man, while moral, or unmoral consciousness is going on, has latent bias, since the motive or condition of such consciousness cannot cause latent bias (to manifest itself), nor is such consciousness conjoined with any form of bias,' therefore some, for instance the Mahāsaṅghikas and the Saṃmitiyas hold, that latent bias in its (seven) forms is unmoral, without moral or immoral motive, and independent of thoughts.² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks in all the three discourses, and the opponent assents.

Since by the explanation given above one will be able to understand the rest by following the way laid down in the text, it is not given in detail.

The controversy about three facts concerning latent
bias is ended.

II

Now follows the controversy about insight.

'Some, like the Mahāsaṅghikas hold that one who, having banished spiritual ignorance by Way-insight,³ is experiencing ordinary cognitions' not conjoined with insight, by way of visual consciousness, and so on 'cannot at the time be said

¹ *Anusaya*. (The 'latent' is implicit.) Cf. above IX, iv. From *anu + seti*, to go on sleeping. *Compendium*, p. 172, fn. 2.

² See, for translation, *P. of C.*, p. 253.

³ *Maggāñña*.

to have insight,' since Way-thought is then not active. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Then the expression "when lust and so forth have departed," is said in order to urge on the opponent that if one, whose spiritual want of insight is banished, cannot be said to 'have insight,' then one, though his lust and so forth have departed, cannot also be said to 'have done with' lust and so on, (for) "You are inexpert in the designation of human types!" The opponent denies, because he does not see any reason to say 'he has lust,' and so forth of one who has done with lust and so on.

In conclusion, since it may be right to say 'he has insight' of one who is said to have attained insight, therefore the Sakavādin denies: "It is not so."

The controversy about insight is ended.

III

[130] Now follows the controversy about insight as not conjoined with thoughts.

Inasmuch as an arahant, who is said to have insight on account of that which he has won by the Way, may experience visual consciousness, and so forth not conjoined with that insight, therefore some, for instance the Pubbaseliyas hold that insight is not conjoined with thoughts.¹ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Then "with matter?" and so forth is asked in order to urge on the opponent that if insight be detached from thought, it must be identifiable with matter and so forth which is different from thought. The opponent rejects it.

The rest is according to the explanation given above.

In conclusion, when he is asked: "(Is it identifiable) with wisdom?"² the opponent assents, because he admits that one is said to have insight on account of that which he has won.

The controversy about insight as not conjoined with consciousness is ended.

¹ See, for translation, *P. of C.*, p. 256.

² *Paññā*.

IV

Now follows the controversy about the utterance of the word, 'This is Ill!'

Some, for instance the Andhakas hold, that the devotee,¹ at the moment when he enters on the Way, utters the word: 'This is Ill!' and from the utterance of the word: 'This is Ill!' insight into the nature of Ill is set working.² It is with regard to them that the Sakavādin asks. The opponent assents with reference to both utterance of such word and issuing of insight. But inasmuch as he admits, that the average man utters also the word concerning the remaining (three) Truths, but no such result ensues on the utterance of them, therefore, in the questions: "Does it follow therefrom?" and so forth he denies.

"Is the material shape impermanent?" and so forth have been asked by way of showing the procedure of 'Ill.' But the opponent denies, because he does not see any such mode of speech in his own doctrine.³

"And do you mean that this?" and so forth is asked in order to show the opponent that, if insight issues from Ill, there must be four kinds of insight successively issuing from every syllable of the formula:—'This—is—sor—row?' The opponent, however, denies because he does not wish it (to be taken) thus.

The controversy about the utterance of the word:

'This is Ill!' is ended.

V

[131] Now follows the controversy about psychic power (*iddhi*).⁴

Some, for instance the Mahāsaṅghikas, not thoroughly

¹ *Yogāvacara*: an early use of this term in Pali records.—Ed.

² See above, IX, 1; cf. II, v, vi.

³ If 'own doctrine' refers to an older stratum of Buddhism, this clause is remarkable.—Ed.

⁴ *Iddhi*, lit. effectuating=what we might now call psychic power.—Ed.

grasping 'the real advantage lying in the development of the steps to psychic power,' hold the view that 'one who has the gift of psychic power might live on for a cycle¹ (on earth).' Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Could he who has the gift of psychic power, live on for a cycle (on earth)?"

Therein this interval (*kappa*) is of three kinds: (1) a great cycle, (2) a portion of the cycle, and (3) a life-time. In the expression, "*These are, monks, the four incalculables in a cycle,*"² a great cycle is meant. In the expression, "*A cycle of the Brahmā-devas extends up to their life-time,*"³ a portion of a cycle is meant. In the expression, "*For a cycle he undergoes suffering in hell, for another he rejoices in heaven,*" a life-span is meant. What is meant here is, that the life given in a life-span may be ended either as the result of *karma*, or by counting the years. Of these the Sakavādin asks, with reference to a 'great cycle,' and the opponent assents.

Then the Sakavādin asks him: "Is the life-span a thing of psychic power?" and so forth, in order to urge on the opponent, that if one has (the gift of) psychic power, he might live on for a great cycle or a portion thereof, which is more than the measured duration of human life (according to the passage: "*He who lives for a long time, lives at the most 100 years*";⁴ and thus his life must be a thing of psychic power. The opponent, knowing the vital functioning is but the result of *karma*, denies that vital functioning is determined by psychic power.

"But what is here the distinction of one who has psychic power? Is it not the distinction that even one who has not this power might live on for a cycle?" One who has this power, can, by it, in the duration of his life, avert things that would bring about an untimely death. One without psychic power cannot so avert. This is the distinction between them.

"Is it past or future?" is asked in order to urge on the opponent, who admits that such a person might live on indiscriminately for a cycle. "For two cycles?" and so forth is asked in order to urge that, if one who has psychic power could live on at the end of his life, he could do so not

¹ *Kappa*; *Dialogues* ii, 110 f.

² *Anguttara* ii, 142.

³ *Ibid.*, 126.

⁴ *Samy.* ii, 94.

only for one cycle but also for many cycles. "Contact that had arisen" and so forth is said in order to show, that not all things [132] are attainable by psychic power; there are things not included within the sphere of *iddhi*.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy about the psychic power is ended.

VI

Now follows the controversy about concentration.

Because of the word—'to spend seven days and nights motionless, speechless, in the experience of absolute bliss'¹—some, for instance the Sahhatthivādins and Uttarāpathakas hold, that the continuity of consciousness² itself may constitute concentration. They do not take 'concentration,' as meaning collectedness of thought, even when the coefficient of individualizing intentness³ has arisen in a momentary unit of consciousness.³ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks and the opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent thus: "If the continuity of consciousness is concentration of mind, it must include also past and future states of consciousness. And only a present state cannot constitute concentration. Do all these also constitute concentration?"—"Does it include past?" and so forth is asked. The opponent denies, because he would not like it.

To show that in the continuity of consciousness only the present state can be functioning and there is no use of speaking of the past having ceased and the future being unborn; how can these be called concentration of mind?—"Is not the past ceased?" and so forth is asked.

"Is concentration confined to a momentary conscious unit?" is asked by the opponent. The Sakavādin assents with reference to the statement in his own doctrine, namely,⁴

¹ *Majjhima-Nikāya* i, 94.

² *Ekaggatā*, lit. one-peaked-ness. See, for translation, *P. of G.*, p. 260.

³ *Cittasantati*.

⁴ *Saṃyutta* iii, 13; v, 414.

"Monks, cultivate concentration of mind," and so forth, according to which concentration of mind implies intentness associated with a present state of good consciousness. "On the actual occasion of visual consciousness?" and so forth is asked through pretence taking merely the word 'a momentary unit of consciousness.' This is rejected by the Sakavādin on that very ground.

In the expression—"Did not the Exalted One say?" etc., what has been proved is the uninterruptedness of present concentration by way of past and future, and not the state of concentration by the continuity. Therefore, this is inconclusive.

The controversy about concentration is ended.

VII

Now follows the controversy about the postulate of things.¹

Because of the word: 'There is a postulate, and that is elemental'²: [133] some, for instance the Andhakas hold, that each term in the chain of Causal Genesis is, as a cause, elemental, and is therefore predetermined. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent that, if ignorance³ and the like were predetermined by another cause, this cause would also in turn be predetermined⁴ by yet another, and so on—"By a cause already predetermined?" and so forth is asked. The opponent denies, because there is no such view. Being asked again, he assents, because 'he judges that the correlation may hold by way of contiguity and reciprocity.'⁵

The rest is clear in meaning because of the explanation given above.

The controversy about the postulate of things is ended.

¹ Lit. 'the state of being a cause by which resulting things are established.' See above, VI, 11; *P. of C.*, p. 261, fn. 5, and Appendix.

² *Samyutta Nikāya* ii, 25; *Aṅguttara Nikāya* i, 286.

³ Ignorance is the postulate with which the 'chain' starts in most contexts.—Ed.

⁴ *Pari-ni-pphanna*.

⁵ Cf. here *Dīgha N.* i, where 'consciousness' is made the postulate.—Ed.

VIII

Now follows the controversy about impermanence.

Some, for instance the Andhakas hold, that impermanence itself is no less predetermined than are impermanent things, such as the body, etc.¹ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent that, if impermanence itself were predetermined by impermanent things, such as the body, etc., it would cause to come into being another impermanence equally predetermined—"By impermanence already predetermined?" and so forth is asked. The opponent denies at first, because two manifestations of impermanence do not take place simultaneously. And again he assents, because the impermanence does not become permanent and disappears with just *that* impermanence.

Then to show the opponent that by admitting a second feature of impermanence he is involved in an interminable series of temporal features, each predetermined in its own way, with no prospect of coming to an end of predetermination the Sakavādin, without giving him a chance for evasion, asks: "Are they as such?" and so forth.

In the question: "Is decay predetermined?" and so forth, inasmuch as there is no other feature of impermanence in decay and death which have arisen, therefore 'impermanence' is said by way of connecting the analysis. Here also the assent and the denial of the opponent should be understood according to the aforesaid method.

"Is body predetermined?" and so forth is asked [134] in comparison with whatever is characterized by impermanence. The opponent, judging that body and so on, which are predetermined, are characterized by impermanence, decay or death, but the predetermined impermanence, and the rest do not possess such characteristics, denies absolutely.

The controversy about impermanence is ended.

Here ends the Eleventh Chapter.

¹ See, for translation, *P. of C.*, p. 262.

CHAPTER XII

I

[135] Now follows the controversy about self-restraint¹ as (positive) action.

Because of the Sutta-passage: '*When he sees an object, hears a sound, etc., he grasps, etc., at the general characters thereof,*'² some, for instance the Mahāsaṅghikas hold the view, that both self-restraint and want of self-restraint amount to (positive) action. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent thus: In our doctrine it is volition³ that constitutes (positive) action, and just as volition proceeding by way of deed, word and thought, gets the name of action of body, speech and mind, so, if self-restraint be action, that self-restraint, proceeding by way of visual organ, etc., would get the name of visual actions, etc., hence: "Is ocular self-restraint moral action of the eye?" and so forth is asked. This, as not warranted by the Sutta-passage, the opponent rejects in the four gates of sense-control, and also with reference to 'sentient skin-surface,' when the fifth gate of the body is mentioned. He assents with reference to 'the intimating group.'⁴ He admits that both 'sentient skin-surface' and 'intimation group' are included in sense-control of body. As to the gate of 'mind,' he rejects it as organ of sense, and accepts it as an avenue of action. This is also the method regarding want of self-restraint.

The Sutta: '*when he sees an object with the eye,*' etc., is

¹ Cf. above, III, x.

² *Nimitta-gāhī*, *Aṅguttara Nikāya* ii, 16; also *Dialogues* i, 80, and elsewhere.

³ *Cetanā*, which is not strictly 'volition,' but "wishful thinking." There was no word for 'will.'—Ed.

⁴ Cf. above, VIII, 9.

concerned with the presence and absence of self-restraint in those organs, not with that of *karma*, hence it is inconclusive.

The controversy about self-restraint as (positive) action is ended.

II

Now follows the controversy about action.

Because of the Sutta-passage—‘*I declare, monks, that there can be no annulment of voluntary deeds. . . . without experience of the results thereof*’¹—some, for instance the Mahāsanghikas hold that all action entails moral result (*vipāka*). Now in the passage—‘*I declare, monks, volition to be action*’²—the Master spoke of volition as moral action without qualification. To show that here only good or bad volition entailing moral result was meant, and that volition which is morally indeterminate is without moral result, the Sakavādin asks: “All moral action?” [136] The opponent assents.

Again, in the questions: “Does all volition (entail result)?” it should be understood that (the opponent) denies with reference to volition which is morally indeterminate, and that he assents with reference to good or bad volition.

“Does volition which is indeterminate as to moral result, entail such result?” and so forth is asked in order to show volition of the same form as both entailing moral result and being without moral result.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The Sutta-passage,—‘*I declare, monks, that there can be no,*’ etc., refers to the experience of results in actual life or lives, given the necessary conditions; hence it is inconclusive.

The controversy about action is ended.

III

Now follows the controversy about vocal sound as result (of action).

¹ *Anguttara Nikāya* v, p. 292 ff. Voluntary=*sañ-cetanika*. Cf. preceding; fn. 3.—Ed.

² *Ibid.*, iii, 415.

From a careless interpretation of such passages as, '*He, by the doing, the accumulating, the augmenting, the abundance of that action is gifted with the voice of a Brahmā deva,*'¹ some, for instance the Mahāsaṅghikas hold that sound is a result of action. To show that 'result of action' is a term applying to mental states only which have been transmitted by action, but does not apply to material things,² the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"Is the result a matter of pleasant feeling?" and so forth is asked in order to show that such is the result of action.

The Sutta-passage,—'*He . . . of that action . . .*' has been quoted in order to show, that sound acquires a qualifying attribute. A magnate by the doing of an act, cannot have a retinue, nor is the retinue a specific result of an act; hence this is inconclusive.

The controversy about sound as result (of action) is ended.

IV

Now follows the controversy about the six sense-spheres.³

Some, for instance the Mahāsaṅghikas hold that, inasmuch as the six sense-spheres have arisen through the doing of (past) actions, therefore they are results. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, "Is visual sphere a result?" The opponent assents.

The rest is similar to the method explained above.

"Are the six sense-spheres results?"—here of these the mind-sphere⁴ may (at times) be such a result, but the rest are only transmitted by action, and are not results. Hence it is inconclusive.

The controversy about the six sense-organs is ended.

¹ *Dīgha Nikāya* iii, 144, 173.

² See, for translation, *P. of C.*, p. 266.

³ Where we might say '-organs,' the Indian used the spatial term. 'Ranges' may be preferred.—Ed.

⁴ *Manāyatanaṃ*.

V

[137] Now follows the controversy about a seven-rebirths'-limit.

Inasmuch as there is the statement—'he who is liable to seven more rebirths at most,'¹—therefore some, for instance the Uttarāpathakas hold, that he who is said to be liable to seven more rebirths at most is assured² of (final salvation) only at the end of the seven rebirths' interval.

To show that there is no other fixed order (*niyāma*) except that of the Ariyan Way by which a man of the seven-rebirths'-limit might become assured of final salvation—the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

This is the sense in "murdering mother," and so forth.

There are two fixed orders: the right order and the wrong order. The right order is that of the Ariyan Way which assures a man that he is not liable to be punished in purgatory, and that he is destined to attain the fruits. The wrong order is that of acts that find inevitable retribution in the very next existence. Now the man of the seven-rebirths'-limit is destined by the stream-winner's Way not to undergo punishment in purgatory, and to attain the fruits. But as he does not follow the second order, he is incapable of doing things, which entail inevitable retribution in the very next existence. But you hold that such a person has a fixed order. Therefore I ask you: Is it by the wrong order that he becomes so assured?

In the question: "Is he incapable of [penetrating truth] in the very next [state]?" the opponent denies with reference to the state that follows immediately, and he assents with reference to one who will not be reborn more than seven times.

In the question: "Is there a fixed order of things?"—the opponent denies, because he does not see a fixed order by which the seven-rebirths'-limit man is bound to go through all the seven.

"Do you hold that there are applications of mindfulness?"

¹ *Anguttara*, i, 233; *Puggala-paññāli*, 15 f.

² On this term *niyato* and *niyāma*, cf. *P. of C.*, V. 4.

and so forth is asked in order to show the qualifications of the Way reckoned as the right order. But since these things cannot be found in him who has not reached the First Way, therefore he rejects.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

"Surely such an one is a man of the seven-rebirths'-limit" is inconclusive, because the Exalted One, when he said: '*This person, after going through this number of becomings, will utterly pass away,*' explained 'this number' by his own power of insight, and he did not assign thereby any order of becomings to [138] a man of the seven-rebirths'-limit, either in the next higher rank in the First Way (*kolāṅkola*), or in that of 'one-seeder' (*eka-bījī*).

The controversy about seven-rebirths'-limit is ended.

VI

The controversy concerning one holding the next higher rank in the First Path, and that concerning 'one-seeder' should also be understood in this way.¹

VII

Now follows the controversy about murder.

Some, for instance the Pubbaseliyas hold that, since a person who has attained to sound views has not entirely put away enmity, and since he who takes life has enmity in his heart, therefore one who thinks rightly may yet commit wilful murder.² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "A person who has attained to sound views?" The opponent assents.

But in the questions beginning with "wilful matricide?" the opponent denies for fear of contradicting the Sutta-passage, '*it is neither proper nor possible.*'³

"Does he lack reverence for the Master?" and so forth is asked in order to show, that one who has reverence for the Master, and the like, cannot transgress the precepts. The opponent thinks, that because of evil deeds a person cannot,

¹ See also above, XII, v. ² See, for translation, *P. of C.*, pp. 269-70.

³ *Vinaya Texts* ii, 199; *Anguttara Nikāya* i, p. 26.

therefore, he called lacking in reverence and therefore he denies it. He admits that such a person can yet have reverence. Again, being asked: "Does he lack in reverence?" he assents with reference to those who, while pursuing those [evil] deeds, may not, through perplexity, unmindfulness, or inattentiveness, salute and go around Buddha shrines. Again, being asked: "Does he instruct?" and the like, he rejects, because such a person may not do such things wilfully.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy about murder is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy about evil ways.¹

Some, for instance the Uttarāpathakas, who failed to make proper distinction between evil ways and natural desires concerning objects of sense [139] felt by those who are involved in such ways, hold that, indiscriminately, for a person holding sound views, evil ways are eliminated. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"Could such a person get infatuated with the purgatorial objects of sense?" and so forth is asked to urge, on account of the view held by the opponent, and the evil ways which are not eliminated for one holding sound views.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

In the question: "May he be reborn in purgatory?" the elimination of evil ways means the elimination of desires for purgatory, and not of purgatorial objects of desire.

This also is why it is inconclusive.

The controversy about evil ways is ended.

IX

This is the method also in the controversy concerning 'him who has reached the seventh rebirth.'²

Here ends the Twelfth Chapter.

¹ *Duggati*. See *P. of C.*, p. 270, fn. 4. *Gati*, 'going,' may be rendered by 'ways' or destiny. Cf. above, VIII, 1.—Ed.

² *Sattamabhāvika*, or *Sattamaka*. See XII, v.

CHAPTER XIII

I

[140] Now follows the controversy about age-long penalty.

Some, for instance the Rājagirikas hold the notion, that the phrase, 'one who breaks up the concord of the Order is tormented in purgatory for a cycle'¹ means, that a schismatic is so tormented for an entire cycle.² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Is a schismatic?" etc., and the opponent assents.

The expression, "when a Buddha is born into the world," has been said to show that there is no schismatic without a Buddha arising.

"The cycle may start when the Order is dissolved" and so forth is said to show, that if he lives for the entire cycle, he should be reborn and should live there from its starting, after committing the act incurring the penalty.

In the expression, "a past cycle" and so forth, the sense is the same as is explained above.

As to: "Has he who lives for a cycle, the gift of potency of desire?" and so forth, the opponent denies with reference to the one which is accomplished by culture-practice. But the opponent assents, because, according to their doctrine, such a person is considered to have innate psychic power.

"One [doomed to age-long retribution] has desire for psychic power?" and so forth is said, because the opponent holds that such a person has that innate gift.

The Sutta-passage, "*in purgatory, in hell, he is tormented*," has been said to urge that if such a person has the gift of psychic power, could he not practise the *Steps to Iddhi*? But this is one-eightieth part of a great cycle. And the

¹ *Itivuttaka*, § 18.

² *P. of C.*, p. 272 and fn. 12.

Sutta-passage was uttered with reference to the [normal] life-cycle [in purgatory]. Therefore this is inconclusive.

The controversy about age-long penalty is ended.

II

Now follows the controversy concerning one [doomed for a cycle] as attaining goodness.

[141] Some, for instance the Uttarāpathakas, making no distinction between just that lower goodness of the world of sense-desire, which such a person may acquire, and the snblimer, or snpramundane goodness, by which he would be able to avert his doom,¹ hold indiscriminately, that such a person cannot acquire good consciousness. In order to refute this by showing their distinction the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy concerning attainment of goodness
is ended.

III

Now follows the controversy concerning (an abettor of crimes involving) immediate retribution.

Therein such a person, who at death inherits the immediate (effect of his acts), may have abetted any of the cardinal crimes (matricide, etc.) in one of two ways—by a permanent or standing injunction to commit the crime, or by an occasional injunction. An abettor of the former class is already assured of his doom along the wrong path, through unrighteousness² because of the volition³ to accomplish such a course having arisen. He is incapable of entering upon righteousness.⁴ But the latter class of abettor is not so, because of the volition to accomplish such a course not having arisen. He is capable of entering righteousness. So do we conclude in our doctrine.

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 273.

² *Cetand.*, cf. p. 158, fn. 3.

³ *Micchattāṇ.*

⁴ *P. of C.*, p. 274.

But some, for instance the Uttarāpathakas hold, that the latter class is also incapable of entering upon assurance of righteousness. To refute this view of theirs the Sakavādin contradicts the former statement, and causes the opponent to ask: "a culpable abettor who is involved in immediate retribution?" So, in this connection, the first question is of the opponent. The Sakavādin assents, because of the absence of the volition to accomplish such goodness. Then the opponent thinks, that such a person is assured of his doom through unrighteousness, because of the injunction to commit matricide, etc., and therefore asks: "in assurance of unrighteousness?" The Sakavādin, however, [142] denies: "Surely it is not," because the same person cannot enter on both assurances.

In the question: "Is not the deed?" the term 'deed' implies matricide or the like. In this connection the Sakavādin assents: "Yes" with reference to an occasional injunction. When a person is involved in an occasional injunction, he becomes worried and uneasy, thinking: "A wrong has been committed by me!" "If he," and so forth is said by the opponent to establish his own view, after taking just the fact of worry.

Now the Sakavādin, having taken that very person who had abetted by an occasional injunction, who is involved in immediate retribution, but who has entered on the assurance of righteousness, concludes by asking: "Is a person who is involved in immediate retribution incapable?" the opponent assents, because of his own view.

Then in order to urge on the opponent, that he who actually commits matricide, etc., is to be proved incapable, but has he actually committed those deeds?—the Sakavādin asks: "Has matricide actually been committed?" and so forth. The opponent denies: "Surely not," because he does not see any such deed, those crimes not having been committed.

The expression, "when he has withdrawn his instigation," has been said with reference to a crime through an occasional injunction. When one refuses an injunction, thinking: 'Let me not give the injunction,' he is said to have withdrawn

it. When he has withdrawn his instigation, he is said to have dispelled his worry and remorse. And this being so, the opponent, who thinks that here the former class of injunction is restrained, assents: "Yes." When the opponent admits that the instigation of such a person is withdrawn, the Sakavādin, in course of establishing his own view, asked: "If he" and so forth.

Again, in the concluding question, as in the first, the opponent asking: "Is he who is involved in immediate retribution [incapable]?" the Sakavādin assents. But he denies with reference to the period extending from his withdrawal of the vow till he was previously involved.

The opponent, taking the mere fact of his being previously involved, bolder: [143] "If," etc., because of his view about an occasional injunction. But as this view has been carelessly put, it is as if not established.

The controversy concerning an abettor as involved in
immediate retribution is ended.

IV

Now follows the controversy concerning one whose salvation is morally certain, he having entered upon assurance.

Niyama (assurance) is of two kinds, according as it is in the wrong or the right direction. The former is conduct that finds retribution without delay,¹ the latter is the Ariyan Way. And there is no other (excepting these two). All other mental phenomena happening in the three planes of being are not of the invariably fixed order, and one who enjoys them is himself 'not assured.' Buddhas, by the force of their foresight, used to prophesy: 'Such an one will in future attain to *Bôdhi*' (Buddhahood). This person is a Bodhisat, who may be called assured (*niyata*), by reason of the cumulative growth of merit.² Now some, for instance the Pabbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas, taking the mere term 'assured' (without distinction as to direction), assume that a Bodhisat is capable of pene-

¹ *Anantariyakamma*. See above, VIII, IX-XI.

² *P. of C.*, p. 275; also fn. 3. Cf. IV, VIII.

trating the Truths in his last birth, and therefore hold that such a person has entered the Path of Assurance. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"Does the so-called 'assured' enter upon wrong assurance?" and so forth is asked to show, that there can be no other assurance.

Having first made the Way become, and so forth is said to show the distinction as to direction.

"The applications in mindfulness" and the rest is said to show the distinction between things even in the same assurance.

The expression, "the Bodhisat becomes capable," illustrates only the capability of the Bodhisat. This is inconclusive, not being spoken concerning entrance upon assurance of one who is already assured.

He (the Bodhisat) was certainly not assured before even by a single fixed phenomenon, but entered upon assurance afterwards by realizing the Truths at the foot of the Bo-tree.

The controversy concerning one whose salvation is morally certain as having entered upon assurance is ended.

V

[144] Now follows the controversy concerning one who is hindered (in the hindrances).

Some, for instance the Uttarāpathakas hold that, just as there is no purifying work left for the purified, so it must be one hindered, obstructed, cloaked by the hindrances, who abandons them.¹ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Is he entangled?" The opponent assents.

"Does he who is infatuated cast off lust?" has been asked to show the defect² as to one still in the toils.

"*Made pure, translucent,*" and the rest is said to show insight into the destruction (of the hindrances) by him whose mind, by arresting, has been made pure.

"*He thus knowing, thus seeing,*" and the rest explains the

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 276.

² *Dosa*—; note that the second of the three 'roots' of evil, 'hate,' is also *dosa*.—Ed.

destruction of the cankers by him, knowing, seeing. This is inconclusive, not being spoken concerning riddance of hindrances for one still in the toils.

The controversy concerning one in the toils is ended.

VI

Now follows the controversy concerning one 'in thrall to' the Fetters.¹

Herein 'to be "in thrall to" means to be up against the Fetters, to have reached the state of being possessed by them.'²

The rest here is similar to the controversy about one in the toils.³

The controversy concerning one 'in thrall to' the fetters is ended.

VII

Now follows the controversy concerning one who has attained (to Jhāna) as enjoying it.

Because of the Word: '*He attaining to and abiding in First Jhāna finds enjoyment in it*,'⁴ some, for instance the Andhakas hold that the expert enjoys Jhāna, and the desire for Jhāna has Jhāna as its object. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "An expert?" The opponent assents.

In the questions: "Is a given Jhāna the mental object to that same Jhāna?" the opponent does not see the nature of its being the mental object to that same Jhāna, and denies for fear of not conforming to the Suttas.

To the question: "Does he enjoy that same Jhāna?" (the opponent) [145] assents because of the mere term.

The Sutta-passage, "*he enjoys it*," is inconclusive, inasmuch as one who attains to Jhāna finds enjoyment in and desire for Jhāna after, and not during the exercise of it.

The controversy concerning one who has attained (to Jhāna) as enjoying it is ended.

¹ Lit. 'face to face with.'

² *P. of C.*, p. 277.

³ See above, XIII, v.

⁴ *Āṅguttara Nikāya* ii, 126.

VIII

Now follows the controversy about lust for the unpleasant.

"In the Sutta-passage:—'*whatsoever feeling he feels, pleasant, painful, or neutral, he delights in and commends that feeling*,'¹ the reference is to enjoyment² through (erroneous) opinion. But some, like the Uttarāpathakas, emphasising the 'delights in,' hold that one can delight in painful feeling as enjoyment of passionlessness,"³ and therefore that there is such a thing as lusting for what is disagreeable. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Is there (such a thing as) lust for the unpleasant?" Lust for the unpleasant is defilement, inasmuch as in the unpleasant one feels painful feeling, when he thinks: 'Ah! just this may become my lot.' The opponent assents: "Yes," because of his own view.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

But in the Sutta-passage: '*He delights in and commends that feeling*'—inverting it (it will be shown that) there is no arising of lust over just painful feeling. Painful feeling is a mental phenomenon having the characteristic of being experienced *en masse*. Or, to consider it in meaning,—when one holds a view, he can delight in feeling as what may be called enjoyment of view. But in painful feeling he delights in the opposite. He can also delight in painful feeling even when he, overwhelmed by that feeling, longs for its opposite kind of sense-enjoyment. It is in this way that one can delight in painful feeling. Inasmuch as this is the meaning, therefore this (controversy) about lust for the unpleasant is inconclusive.

The controversy about lust for the unpleasant is ended.

IX

[146] Now follows the controversy about craving for objects of the mind⁴ as unmoral. Inasmuch as, of the six kinds of desire,—to wit, *desires of (the five) senses . . . desire for*

¹ *Majjhima Nikāya* i, 286.

² *P. of C.*, p. 279.

³ *I.e.*, to being subjugated to feeling.

⁴ *Dhammā*.

mental objects,¹ the last-mentioned one is desire for mental objects, therefore, some, for instance the Pubbaseliyas hold that it is indeterminate. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The meaning of the remaining questions is to be understood according to the text.

The six kinds of craving, too, have been shown in brief by their three divisions into 'craving of sense' and the rest. The craving for the six kinds of objects of sight and the rest, resulting as lust for desire, will become craving of (sense) desire. The craving associated with Eternalism according to which "there is the self and there is the world," is the 'desire for rebirth.' The craving associated with Nihilism according to which one will not come to be, is the 'craving not to live again.'

"Is not this (threefold craving) a craving for certain ideas or mental objects?"—this is inconclusive, because the citation shows nothing as to what is indeterminate, but refers to the process of natural desire concerning a mental object?²

The controversy about the indeterminateness of a natural desire for objects of the mind is ended.

X

Now follows the controversy about craving for objects of mind as not the cause of Ill.

Here too, inasmuch as (of the six kinds of desire,—to wit, desires of sense . . . *desire for mental objects*³)—the last-mentioned one is craving for mental objects, therefore some, for instance the Pubbaseliyas hold that it is not the cause of Ill. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest is similar to the preceding controversy.

The controversy about craving for objects of mind as not the cause of Ill is ended.

Here ends the Thirteenth Chapter.

¹ *Saṃyutta Nikāya* iii, 26; *Vinaya Texts* i, 95.

² *P. of C.*, p. 280, fn. 3.

³ See above, XIII, ix.

CHAPTER XIV

I

[147] Now follows the controversy about the mutual consecutiveness of good and bad.

That which is good cannot directly and immediately follow after what is bad, nor conversely. Such reciprocal consecutiveness is anomalous. Some however, like the Mahāsaṅghikas hold that, inasmuch as one can both like and then dislike the same thing, therefore there has been, in such a case, reciprocal consecutiveness.¹ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Both 'adverting' and 'adjusting' are terms for turning (of the mind).² 'Adverting' is the causing the turning (of the mind) to the flux of becoming.³ 'Adjusting' is the aiming, the moving on from objects of the flux becoming to a different mental object.

By "Does good (consciousness) arise without adverting?" is asked: If that good (consciousness) be consecutive to bad thought, it can arise without adverting. But the opponent denies, because he does not see that good (consciousness) can arise without adverting.

"Does what is good arise for wrongly directed attention?"—this has been asked to urge that, if a good thing arise immediately after a bad thing, it should arise, for wrongly directed attention, by adverting the mind to a bad thing.

The rest should be understood according to the text.

The expression, "Is it not . . . with one and the same object?" is inconclusive, inasmuch as it refers to passion and

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 282.

² *Ibid.*, fn. 2.

³ *Bhavaṅga.*

its opposite arising about the same object, not to the consecution of the good and the bad.¹

The controversy about the mutual consecutiveness of good and bad is ended.

II

Now follows the controversy about the arising of the sixfold sense-sphere.

‘Our doctrine teaches that herein at rebirth, one is not rehorn through the conceiving consciousness [148] in conjunction with sense-spheres of other-worlds.² In the human embryo, at the moment of conception, the co-ordinating organ (*manāyatana*) and the sphere of touch alone among the [six] sense-spheres, are rehorn. The remaining four (eye and ear, smell and taste) take seventy-seven days to come to hirth, and this is partly through that karma which brought about conception, and partly through other karma.³ But some, like the Puhhaseliyas and the Aparasehiyas helieve, that the sixfold sense-sphere takes hirth at the moment of conception by the taking effect of one karma only, as though a complete tree were already contained in the bud.’⁴ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: “Is the sixfold sense-sphere?” The opponent assents.

“With all its main and minor parts complete?” and the rest is asked to urge that, if there be the sixfold sense-sphere, it must enter the womh as snch.

“Does one make karma in the mother’s womh?”—is asked by the opponent. “Do in the emhryo hair, down, etc., appear at a subsequent stage?” and the remaining questions are asked by the Sakavādin.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy about the development of the sixfold sense-sphere is ended.

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 283, fn. 1.

² *Apapātikānaṃ*. Cf. *Majjhima* i, 266.

³ See *P. of C.*, p. 284, fn. 1; *Compendium*, p. 143 f. (*A.* i, 2).

⁴ *P. of C.*, pp. 283-4.

III

Now follows the controversy about immediate contiguity in sense.

'In view of the swift alternations of seeing and hearing at performances of dancing and singing, some, like the Uttarāpathakas hold that these sense-cognitions arise in a mutually unbroken succession.'¹ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Of visual consciousness?" The opponent assents.

"Does auditory consciousness occur to the person attending to a visible object?"—this is said to urge that, if auditory consciousness arise immediately after visual consciousness, it must have, as in the case of apprehension of a result, visible object as its object.

To the question: "Because of eye and visible objects does auditory consciousness arise?" (the opponent) denies because there is no such Sutta; and when he considers that visual consciousness and auditory consciousness arise in a mutually unbroken succession, he assents, because of his own view.

By "Is visual consciousness the same as auditory consciousness?" it is asked: Just as through mind-cognition one apperception follows another in an unbroken succession, similarly are these two identical?

In this way, the meaning in all portions should be understood.

[149] The expression beginning with "when there is dancing, singing" is inconclusive, because it only alludes to a mixed state of rapidly alternating grouped objects of mind, not to the succession in a unity?²

The controversy about immediate contiguity in sense is ended.

IV

Now follows the controversy about the outward form³ of an Ariyan.

From such expression (in the Sutta) as "*all material*"

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 285.

² *P. of C.*, p. 286, fn. 2.

³ *Rūpa*.

qualities are the four primary qualities of matter, or are derived from them,"¹ some, for instance the Uttarāpathakas hold, that Ariyan speech and action are material qualities derived, as such, from the four primary elements of matter. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Are the Ariyan forms (of speech and action) derived from the (four) primary qualities of matter?" Here 'Ariyan forms' means either forms² (of speech and action) of the Ariyans, or Ariyan quality. The opponent, who takes his stand on his own view, assents: "Yes." Being asked: "Are they moral?" he assents, because of his own view. This is also the method in the questions about the absence of cankers and the rest.

The Sutta: "*Whatever matter there is*,"³ etc., is inconclusive, inasmuch as, excepting elements of matter, it refers to the derivation of the remaining material qualities, not to the supremely right speech and action. That they are forms has not been even proved, not to speak of them as derivatives.

The controversy about the outward form of an Ariyan
is ended.

V

Now follows the controversy about latent bias as something apart.⁴

Inasmuch as an average worldly person, while his thoughts are ethically good or indeterminate, may be said to have latent bias [for the seven vices], but not to be openly manifesting them, some, for instance the Andhakas hold, that latent bias, in any of the seven forms, is different in kind from an open manifestation of the vice. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Are the lusts of sense different in kind from an open manifestation of them?" The opponent assents.

The rest here should be understood as explained above in the controversy about latent bias.⁴

¹ *Majjhima Nikāya* i, 53.

² I.C., Conduct. See *P. of C.*, p. 287, fn. 1.

³ *Anguttara-Nikāya* v, p. 348.

⁴ See above, IX, IV; XI, I.

But "to have latent bias" and the rest is spoken of because a person may be said to have latent bias which is not given up at that time.

[150] The expression "not to be openly manifesting," because it has not arisen, is inconclusive, inasmuch as it refers to what is not to be said, and not to the difference between latent bias and open manifestation of any of its forms.

The controversy about latent bias as something apart
is ended.

VI

Now follows the controversy about unconscious outbursts of corruptions.

Inasmuch as lust and other wrong states may arise even in one who is attending to impermanence, etc., and moreover, because it has been said: '*Sometimes, Master Bhāradvāja, when he is thinking: "I will attend to the unbeautiful," he attends to it as beautiful*,'¹ therefore some, for instance the Andhakas hold, that outbursts of corruption take place unconsciously. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest here is clear in meaning, because of the explanation given above.²

The controversy about the unconscious outbursts of
corruptions is ended.

VII

Now follows the controversy about desire as 'included.'³

Inasmuch as sensuous lusts are inherent in the world of sense-experience, and are said to be included in it, therefore, some, for instance the Andhakas and the Sammitiyas hold, that the lust for life in the Rūpa heavens and the Arūpa heavens is

¹ *Samyutta-Nikāya* iv, 111. Cf. also *Vinaya Texts* i, 302 f.; iii, 79 f.; 382 f.

² See above, XIV, v.

³ *Pariyāpanna*. Cf. *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, §§ 583, 992.

inherent¹ in those spheres, and is said to be included in them. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Is the lust for life in the Rūpa heavens?" The opponent assents.

Therein 'is inherent' has been spoken of to ask; just as sensuous lust is, by its very origin, inherent in the world of sense-experience, known as a thought concerning sensual pleasure, is the lust for life in the Rūpa heaven similarly inherent in the Rūpa plane? "Is included" has been spoken of to ask: Just as sensuous lusts are included in the three planes of sense-experience, is the lust for life so included in the Rūpa plane? The opponent, who does not consider its sense, assents: "Yes," only because of his own view. Thereupon "if they are concomitant" and the rest is said to make him consider that sense, and to ask him by way of the (three) categories, moral, resultant and inoperative consciousness: "Are all three concomitant?"

The rest here should be understood according to the text.
[151]

The expression "Is not sensuous lust?" and the rest is inconclusive, inasmuch as it refers to sensuous lusts as latent bias and included in conditions of sense-experience, not to others in other conditions.

The controversy about desire as 'included' is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy about the unrevealed.²

As to the term *avyākata*, applied to the four categories: resultant consciousness, inoperative consciousness, matter and nirvana, it means 'cannot be declared (to be either moral or unmoral),' because of the absence of (moral) determination (*avipākattā*). Applied to speculative opinion on unprovable matters (lit. wrong views)—to wit, 'the world is eternal'—it means 'undeclared' (*akathitattā*). But some, for instance the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas, making no such distinction, hold that it is in their result that erroneous views are unmoral.³

¹ *Anuseti*, the verb of the noun 'bias': *anusaya*.—Ed.

² *Avyākata*, rendered above as indeterminate—i.e., morally.—Ed.

³ See *P. of C.*, p. 290.

To show them the distinction the Sakavādin asks: "Are erroneous views 'undetermined'?" The opponent assents.

The rest here should be understood according to the text.

The controversy about the unrevealed is ended.

IX

Now follows the controversy about the unincluded.¹

'Inasmuch as when a man of the world has attained to Jhāna, he may be called passionless as to sense-desires, but not free from erroneous opinions,' therefore some, for instance the Pubbaseliyas hold that erroneous views (may enter into) 'the unincluded.'² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest here should be understood according to the text.

The controversy about the unincluded is ended.

Here ends the Fourteenth Chapter.

¹ Cf. XIV, vii.

² *P. of C.*, p. 291, also fn. 3.

CHAPTER XV

I

[152] Now follows the controversy about correlation¹ (as specifically fixed).

Some, like the Mahāsaṅghikas hold that, if anything be correlated to another as its condition (or cause, *hetu*), it is not correlated to that other by way of [subject] object, or of contiguity, or immediate succession. Or again, if anything be correlated to another as its object, it is not correlated to that other by way of contiguity, or immediate succession.² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest here should be understood according to the text.³

The controversy about correlation (as specifically fixed)
is ended.

II

Now follows the controversy about reciprocal correlation.

Inasmuch as the doctrine teaches that "actions⁴ are conditioned by ignorance," it cannot be said that ignorance is also conditioned by actions. But some, for instance the Mahāsaṅghikas hold, that ignorance is certainly the conditioning correlation of actions, but actions are not so of ignorance. To show that there is a reciprocal conditioning obtaining between ignorance and actions the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"Is not ignorance co-existent with action?"—"Here only non-meritorious activity is meant. The correlation between this and ignorance may be analysed into "related by way

¹ *Paccaya*.

² *P. of C.*, p. 293.

³ *Pālin eva*.

⁴ *Saṅkhārā*. The doctrine (*samaya*) is the *Pāṭicca-samuppāda*, or Causal Genesis.—Ed.

of co-existence, reciprocity, presence, continuance, association!"¹

"Grasping is conditioned by craving"—Here 'grasping' excludes sensuous grasping, and means the three remaining forms of grasping.² Ignorance, like actions, is also conditioned by craving.

The rest here should be understood according to the text.

"Conditioned by decay and death?" is asked by the opponent.

"Are name and body conditioned by (rebirth-)consciousness?" is the question of the Sakavādin.

The controversy about reciprocal correlation is ended.

III

[153] Now follows the controversy about duration of time.

Taking the word duration (*addhā*) in the sense of period of time, they³ who hold duration is predetermined base it on the Sutta: '*There are these three subjects of discourse.*'⁴ To show the distinction that 'no interval whatever is predetermined,⁵ except as mere time-notion; but that object of sight, etc., when meaning the five aggregates (bodily and mental), is predetermined,' the Sakavādin asks: "Is duration of time predetermined?" The opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent it is asked, if duration be predetermined, it must be different from object of sight, etc. The opponent denies.

The rest should be understood according to the text.

The controversy about duration of time is ended.

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 295, fn. 2.

² Namely, *diṭṭhi*, *bhava*, *avijjā*.

³ No adherents are named. Possibly these were the Andhakas. See above, XI, viii.

⁴ *P. of C.*, pp. 295-6.

⁵ *Parinipphanna*.

IV

This¹ is also the method in the controversies about instants, moments, and seconds of time. All these instants, etc., are so much duration of time.

The controversy about instants, moments and seconds of time is ended.

V

Now follows the controversy about the cankers.²

Inasmuch as over and above the four cankers there is no other so-called, with which they can be said to be 'co-canker,' therefore some, for instance the Hctuvādins hold, that the four cankers (must be) non-cankers. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

To urge on him that, if this be so, then must those cankers have attained the features of 'The Way,' etc., it is asked "Is then the Way" and so forth.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy about cankers is ended.

VI

Now follows the controversy about decay and death.

Decay and death are not predetermined, hence as to classing them in the categories 'mundane,' 'supramundane,' [154] they are not to be considered as of either category. But some, for instance the Mahāsaṅghikas, not grasping this salient feature hold, that decay and death of supramundane things are supramundane (or spiritual). Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest here should be understood according to the text.

The controversy about decay and death is ended.

¹ I.e., the foregoing contention.

² This term *daṇḍa*, lit. flowing on to, is a name for certain tendencies reckoned as evil. At first three, the number became four—sensuous desire, opinion, becoming (lust of life) and ignorance.—Ed.

VII

Now follows the controversy about perception and awareness [as supramundane].

Inasmuch as what is called attaining arrest of perception and awareness is not a (positive) mental state, but is the suspension¹ of the mental aggregates, it is neither a mundane nor a supramundane state. Some however, like the Hetuvādins hold that, since it is certainly not mundane, it must be supramundane.²

Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest is similar to the foregoing controversy.³

The controversy about perception and awareness (as supramundane) is ended.

VIII

Some, for instance the Hetuvādins hold, that since it is certainly not supramundane, it must be mundane. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest is similar to the foregoing controversy.

The second controversy about perception and awareness (as mundane) is ended

IX

Inasmuch as there is no uniform quality in dying so that one might say 'someone is dying thus, someone is not,' therefore some, for instance the Rājagirikas hold, that even one who has attained to the stopping of perception and awareness may die (no less than anyone else). [155] To show that there is a time for dying and for not dying the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

¹ Lit. stopping (*nirōdho*).

² *P. of C.*, p. 298.

³ See above, XV, v (1), and vi (2).

Now inasmuch as dying means death¹ and one in that state must be having mental contact, etc., therefore to urge on the opponent for that reason, "Does it exist?" and so forth is asked.

When the opponent is asked: "Does death take place in one who has (no) contactal symptoms?" he denies with reference to beings in general. Being asked: "can effect?" and so forth, he denies, because of the abnormal power in the attainment.² When asked again, he assents, because of the body's natural liabilities. But if this is so, there is no abnormal power in the attainment. Then he is asked: "Is his attainment of trance not genuine?"

The opponent³ asks: "Is one in trance assured of not dying?"

When the opponent asks: "Does such a principle of assurance exist?" the Sakavādin denies, because there is no such principle of assurance.

To show that there is a time for dying, even though there is no uniform 'not-time' for dying, the Sakavādin asks: "Is one with visual consciousness?" and so forth. Here the meaning is this: If there be for any person any assurance in dying, it must *a fortiori* be for one who is enjoying visual consciousness. In that case, it would contradict the Sutta: '*One does not die in, or become reborn by the five kinds of knowledge.*' Just as, on the other hand, one who is enjoying visual consciousness is not dying, so also one who has attained the state of arrest (trance).

The third controversy concerning perception and awareness is ended.

X

Now follows the controversy about reaching the unconscious sphere.

Accomplishing procedure in cessation of perception is of

¹ Lit. 'doing time,' the usual idiom.—Ed.

² Namely, of inducing arrest of consciousness.—Ed.

³ Read *Paravādisu* for *Sakavādisa*. See *P. of C.*, p. 209, fn. 5.

two kinds: the merely mundane, practised by worldly folks, and the supramundane, practised by Ariyans. The former does conduce to rebirth in the sphere of unconscious life, the latter does not¹. [156] But some, for instance the Hctuvādins, who do not make this distinction, indiscriminately hold, that to attain arrest of perception and awareness conduces to rebirth in the unconscious sphere.

Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Now inasmuch as there is absence of greed and the rest² in one who has attained to the unconscious sphere, but not in one who is in trance, therefore to urge on the opponent by way of it—"Does it exist?" and so forth is asked.

Here too, in the question: "Is one unconscious?"—"unconsciousness" is enjoined as that which is attained by way of arrest of consciousness, and so in that sphere one is unconscious. Therefore the opponent, who accepts this acknowledgment, tries to establish his view by a trick.³ Inasmuch as here 'unconsciousness' is enjoined because of one's attaining to a state of trance, and in that sphere, too, a never-returner, after his death in this world, reaches trance, therefore even by this acknowledgment this is established.

The controversy about reaching the unconscious
sphere is ended.

XI

Now follows the controversy about action and its accumulation.

Some, for instance the Andhakas and Saṃmitiyas hold, that karma is one thing, its accumulation is another, and that the accumulating of karma is undetermined, and not a mental object. Regarding them the Sakavādin

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 300.

² Hate and dulness.

³ *Chalena*.

asks: "Is karma a different thing?" The opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent that, if karma is different from its accumulation, mental contact, etc., must also be different from its accumulation—"Is mental contact a different thing?" and so forth is asked. The opponent denies, because there is no such view.

To the questions: "Is it co-existent with karma?" the opponent denies with reference to what is independent of thought, and then assents with reference to what is associated with it.

Also to the questions: the opponent denies with reference to what is independent of thought, and then assents with reference to what is associated with it. On the other hand, as regards the question on good karma, etc.: this is also the method.

But when he is asked: "Has it mental object?" he denies, because he insists it is absolutely without any mental object.

"When consciousness is broken off" means that, when consciousness is broken off, karma is broken off. Or, it is an accusative case in the locative sense. It means consciousness being broken off. This is the reading. He assents, because karma is conjoined with consciousness, and breaks off with it. He denies, because karmic accumulation is automatic and hence does not break off.

To the question: "Is karmic accumulation there where karma is?" he assents, because he holds that where there is karma, or where it is established, [157] "the accumulating" { begins, but the latter lasts till results mature. Just as the seed retains all the plant-energy till it sprouts.¹

"Are karma and its accumulation and its result one and the same thing?"—by this he asks about the oneness of these three, because he holds that, where there is karma, the "accumulating" begins, and the latter lasts till results mature.

"Has result a mental object?"—he asks this in order to urge whether the "accumulating" which produces result, has not a mental object just as result has? The opponent,

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 301, fn. 2.

however, assents in one case, but because of his own view denies the other.

In the indirect presentation, too, this is the method.

The rest here should be understood according to the text.

The controversy about action and its accumulation
is ended.

Here ends the Fifteenth Chapter.

The Third Chapter of the Fifty is ended.

CHAPTER XVI

I

[158] Now follows the controversy about controlling¹ [the mind of another].

Some, for instance the Mahāsaṅghikas hold, that the attainment of power and authority in the world is not genuine, if it fails to control the consciousness of others. But it is only genuine, if it includes power to control the same. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Can one [control the consciousness] of another?" The opponent assents.

Therein 'to control' means to prevent an offence involving corruption.

The rest here should be understood according to the text.

The controversy about controlling (another's mind)
is ended.

II

Similar² is the method also in the controversy about assisting³ another's mind.

III

Now follows the controversy about producing happiness in others.

Because of such Sutta-passages: '*Verily many happy things doth the Exalted One bestow upon us,*'⁴ some, for instance the Hetuvādins hold that one can produce happiness in others.

¹ *Niggaha*, lit. holding down or 'pinning down.' 'Grip' gives its rugged force better than 'control.' Used technically for refuting (logically). Cf. above, p. 11 ff. 'refutation.'—Ed.

² See above XVI, 1.

³ *Paggaha*, contrast to 1.

⁴ *Majjhima Nikāya* i, p. 447.

Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

But when asked: "Can one cause misery in others?" the opponent denies, because he does not see that there is such a Sutta-passage.

To the question: "Your own happiness?" and the rest (the opponent) denies, because he thinks that we are not able to hand over our own happiness, or others' happiness, to another. Does the producing of happiness to another mean handing over his own happiness? But to the question: "Nor his own?" and the rest he assents, because he holds that what is known as producing happiness (in others) is not like this.¹

"Indeed, not!" is spoken of because there is no such happiness.

The Word of the Exalted One, '*happinesses doth he bestow*,' explains 'how [159] the arising of happiness in others is conditioned. Producing happiness in others is not like bestowing food upon them; hence [the citation] is inconclusive.'²

The controversy about producing happiness in others is ended.

IV

Now follows the controversy about attending³ to all at once.

'Attention' has two aspects, according as we consider the method or the object of attention. To infer from the observed transience of one or more phenomena that 'all things are impermanent' is attention as method. But in attending to past things, we cannot attend to future things.

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 305.

² The doctrine of transferring merit (and its results in 'happinesses') is a prominent and accepted article of faith in such works as—*e.g.*, the *Petavatthu*, interesting to compare with its rejection here.—Ed.

³ *Manasikāra*, lit. work of mind. This term only attains the technical force of our 'attention' (in modern psychology) in later Buddhism. Thus 'considering' would here be equally fit.—Ed.

We attend to a certain thing in one of the time-relations, *e.g.*, past, and the rest. This is attention by way of object of consciousness. Moreover, when we attend to present things, we are not able at the present moment to attend to the consciousness by which they arise.¹ Now because of the Word, '*All things are impermanent*,' some, for instance the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas hold that, in generalizing, one can attend to all things at once. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Now inasmuch as in doing so we must also attend to the consciousness by which we attend, therefore to urge on the opponent by way of the consciousness—"By that consciousness?" has been asked. The opponent denies, because it cannot be subject and object at once.

To the question: "[Do we know] as consciousness the consciousness . . .?" the opponent assents, because we are already aware of the nature of our thought in general, and then denies, because it cannot be subject and object at once. He assents, because of his view based on "*When he by wisdom doth discern and see: All things are impermanent*,"² and the rest.

This is the method also in the remaining two questions.

To the question: "[Do we feel a feeling] by that feeling?" the opponent, however, denies, because he does not see that there can be such a feeling.

To the questions concerning past, and the rest the acknowledgment and the denial should be understood as explained above.

The rest should be understood according to the text.

"All things," and the rest are spoken of with reference to the consideration by way of the method, [160] and not by way of the object at once; hence it is inconclusive.

The controversy about attending to all at once
is ended.

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 305.

² *Dh.* ver. 277 f. *Theragāthā*, ver. 678 f.

V

Now follows the controversy about matter¹ as a moral condition.

'Condition' [*hetu*]² may signify more specially one of the moral conditions (lit. roots) or motives and the like, or more generally, any condition or causal relation whatever. Some, for instance the Uttarāpathakas make no such distinction, but relying on the letter of the Word, '*the four primary qualities³ are conditions [of secondary qualities]*' hold indiscriminately, that bodily or material qualities may be [moral] conditions.⁴ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

By "Is disinterestedness⁵ a moral condition?" is asked: Is material quality or moral condition called disinterestedness? The opponent denies.

This is the method also in the remaining portion.

"Are not the primary qualities conditions of the secondary material qualities that are derived from them?"—here 'condition' is spoken of in the sense of any condition or causal relation, but not in the sense of root cause or moral condition; hence it is inconclusive.

The controversy about matter as a moral condition
is ended.

VI

Here also the meaning should be understood in the same way⁶ as in the controversy about Matter as accompanied by moral conditions.

The controversy about matter as accompanied by moral
conditions is ended.

¹ =*rūpaṃ*.

² Cf. *Tikapañhāna and Commentary*, 11 P.T.S. ed. On Buddhaghosa's analysis of *hetu*, see *Bud. Psy. Eth.*, § 1053. See also *Compendium*, p. 279.

³ I.e., extended, cohesive, calorific and mobile elements.

⁴ See, for translation, *P. of C.*, p. 307.

⁵ *Alobho*, lit. non-lust.

⁶ See above, XVI, v.

VII

Now follows the controversy about matter as morally good or bad.

Because of the Word, '*Acts of body and speech are good or bad*,' and because among these acts of body and speech we reckon intimations of our thought by gesture and language, some, for instance the Mahīṣāsakas and Saṃmitiyas hold, that the physical motions engaged therein are [morally] good or bad.¹ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Are material qualities [morally] good?" The opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent that, if material qualities are [morally] good, they must not be merely like this—"Have they a mental object?" and so forth is asked [161].

On the other hand, this is the method also in the question about material qualities as [morally] bad.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy about matter as morally good or bad
is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy about matter as result.

Some, like the Andhakas and Saṃmitiyas hold that, just as consciousness and its concomitant attributes arise because of an action that has been wrought, so also do material [*i.e.*, corporeal] qualities arise as results [of karma].² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent that, if for you material qualities are results [of karma], for you it must not be treated like this,—“Is matter of the nature of pleasurable feeling?” and so forth is asked.

The rest should be understood according to the text.

The controversy about matter as result is ended.

¹ See, for translation, *P. of C.*, p. 308.

² *P. of C.*, p. 300. On 'result' (*vipāka*), see above, VII. vii, viii.

IX

Now follows the controversy about matter as belonging to the Brahmā¹ and the immaterial spheres.

'Some, like the Andhakas hold that, since matter, which is the product of actions done in the world of sense-desire,² belongs therefore to that world, so if it be the product of actions done in the Brahmā, or in the immaterial sphere, it belongs equally to those spheres.'³ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Does matter belong to the material and the immaterial spheres?" The opponent assents.

The rest here is similar to what has been explained above. The controversy about matter as belonging to the material and the immaterial spheres is ended.

X

Now follows the controversy about lust for life in Rūpa or Arūpa spheres as included therein.

Some, like the Andhakas hold that, inasmuch as lust for life is included in the world of sense-desire, therefore lust for life in Rūpa or Arūpa spheres must also become included in those spheres. [162] Regarding them the Sakavādin asks and the opponent assents.

The rest should be understood as explained above.⁴ The only difference in the expression is, that it has been stated therein that matter belongs to the Brahmā and the immaterial worlds. And that is a view of both the Andhakas and the Saṃmitiyas, but this is of the Andhakas alone.

The controversy about lust for life in Rūpa or Arūpa spheres as included among the data thereof is ended.

Here ends the Sixteenth Chapter.

¹ I.e., *rūpadhātu*. The twofold meaning of *rūpa*, as *rūpaṃ* and *rūpadhātu* (or *-āvacara*) must not be overlooked (as is frequently the case). As a *dhātu*, it is *kāma-* that is, used for material world (this and the next). *Rūpadhātu* (sphere of Vision) is the better world of the Brahmā devas (not of Brahma, ultimate Deity).—Ed.

² On the term 'world of sense-desire' (*kāmāvacara*), see *Compendium*, p. 81, fn. 2. ³ P. of C., p. 310. ⁴ See above, XVI, ix [1].

CHAPTER XVII

I

[163] Now follows the controversy about an arahāṇas having accumulation of merit.

Because an arahāṇa may be seen sharing gifts, saluting shrines, and so on, some, for instance the Andhakas, hold that an arahāṇa accumulates merit. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent that, if an arahāṇa who has put away both merit and demerit, were to work merit, he would be liable to work evil as well—"Does he accumulate demerit?" and so forth is asked. The opponent denies, because he does not see that there can be acts like life-taking, etc., in the case of an arahāṇa.

To the question: "Does he practise meritorious karma?" and so forth the opponent denies, because an arahāṇa does not produce actions conducing to rebirth.

To the question: "May not an arahāṇa give gifts?" and so forth the Sakavādin assents, because giving of gifts and so on may take place with consciousness of merit and demerit. The opponent, without assuming consciousness, puts forward the thesis by showing the mere possibility of actions. But as it has been carelessly asserted, it is (practically) not asserted.

The controversy about an arahāṇa as having accumulating merit is ended.

II

Now follows the controversy about an arahāṇa not having an untimely death.

By carelessly grasping the Sutta: '*I declare, monks, there is no annulment of intentional deeds without their result having*

been experienced,'¹ some, for instance, the Rājagirikas and Siddhatthikas hold that, since an arahān is to experience the results of all his karma before he can complete existence, therefore he cannot die out of due time.² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent that, if the arahāns have no untimely death, there can be no murderers of arahāns—"Are there no murderers of arahāns?" is asked. The opponent denies because there are deeds producing immediate effect, [164] and persons who can do such deeds. To the question: "Does not poison get access (to the body of an arahān)?" he denies, because he holds that it does not get access until his former deeds are exhausted.

The rest here should be understood according to the text.

The Sutta: '*I declare, monks,*' etc., has been said with reference to this. "*There is no annulment*"—that is, the complete cutting off of the recoil—of deeds done unintentionally without their result having been experienced—i.e., obtained, partaken of. Nor do I declare that such destruction may be realized under present conditions, but not hereafter. Nor do I declare that such destruction may be effected in the very next rebirth, or the rebirth next to that; nor that it may be effected in subsequent rebirths; nor that it may be effected on one rebirth where opportunity of maturing results arises, and not in another where no such opportunity arises. Thus in all manner of conditions, given renewed existence and eventuation of karmic result, there is no place on earth wherein a living being may be freed from the consequences of his own evil deeds."³

Hence the opponent's view—that an arahān cannot have an untimely death—which he records by the surmise, that any act which has not obtained its turn of eventuation should invariably be experienced by an arahān as result—can hardly be established.

The controversy about an arahān not having an untimely death is ended.

¹ *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, v, 292 f.; see also *P. of C.*, p. 313 and fn.

² *P. of C.*, p. 313.

³ *P. of C.*, pp. 313 ff., fn.

III

Now follows the controversy, that all this is due to action.

Because of the Sutta, '*It is by action that the world fares on,*'¹ some, for instance, the Rājagirikas and Siddhatthikas hold, that all this cycle of action, corruptions and results is from action. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "All this?" The opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent that, if this be so, action itself is also due to action—"Is action itself also due to action?" is asked. Again the opponent denies, because he thinks that, if action is due to action, then action would be simply the result of hygone causes. "The result of hygone² causes?" is asked in order to urge that, if all [165] is from action, this must have been the result of hygone causes.

"From the result of still earlier action?" is asked in order to urge that, if all this is from action, then that causal action effected in a past life must have been the result of action effected in a still earlier life. The opponent rejects lest he holds that it would be the result of action effected in a still earlier life. The opponent rejects, because he thinks that the continuity of life is the result of karma just as a shoot is the product of a seed. When asked again he rejects, because action is the result of previous action, just as a seed is the product of another seed.

"Would he commit murder?" and so forth is asked in order to urge that, if all action is itself productive of result, one would kill beings, and so on, through the result of action again. The opponent assents, because he holds, that the evil intention is, for the same reason, the result of previous action. "Is it productive of result?" has been asked in order to urge that, if there be life-taking through the result of action, that result itself, like life-taking, would be productive of result. The opponent assents, because he sees that life-taking is conducive to rebirth in hell, and so on, and then

¹ *Sutta-Nipāta*, ver. 654. The rendering 'round' in *P. of C.* is wrong. The Pali is *vattati* (Ssk. *vart*), not *vattati*. Buddhism did not anticipate Tycho Brahe to that extent!—Ed.

² *Pubbe*, lit. 'earlier.'—Ed.

denies, because he does not see that this has been said to be due to the result of action. This is the method also with regard to theft, and so on.

"Is giving of help and medicine in illness productive of result?"—is asked concerning the result of giving by way of gift.

The Sutta, '*Fares on by action*,' etc., rejecting the view, "there is no action," explains that there is action, and things done by action, but not that all is produced by action; hence it is inconclusive.

The controversy, namely, that all this is from action,
is ended.

IV

Now follows the controversy about being bound up with sentience.

'Ill' must be understood in two ways: as bound up with, and as not bound up with faculties (*indriya's*). According to the former, Ill is referred to the seat of suffering; according to the latter, Ill covers liability to trouble through the law of impermanence [166] with its 'coming to be and passing away.' But the Hetuvādins, for instance, do not draw this distinction. They hold that painful sentience alone constitutes that *dukkha*, to understand which the holy life, according to the teachings of the Exalted One, is led.¹ To show them that insentient things also constitute Ill the Sakavādin asks: "Is it only that which is bound up with sentience?" The opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent that because the Exalted One has said: '*That which is impermanent is Ill*,'² and because that which is bound up with sentience is impermanent, therefore "Is only that which is bound up with sentience impermanent?" and so forth is asked. "Is not that which is not bound up with sentience impermanent?" means 'are not insentient objects, like the earth, a hill, a rock, and so on impermanent?'

To the question: "Is it not true to say that only that which

¹ *P. of C.*, pp. 315-16.

² *Eg.*, *Majjhima* iii, 19.

is bound up with sentience is Ill?" the Sakavādin denies: "No."¹

Insentient objects cause both physical pain (*dukkha*) and affliction (*domanassa*) in a sentient subject; for instance, fire in hot weather, or air in cold weather. Again, the destruction of property, etc., is always a source of mental pain.² Hence the insentient may be called "Ill" even without a reference to the idea of impermanence; but as they are not produced by action and corruption, they cannot be said to constitute the 'Ariyan fact' of Ill.

Likewise with regard to the Way. Moreover, the destruction of grass, wood, etc., and of such physical things as seed, etc., does not constitute the 'Ariyan fact' of the cessation of Ill. It is therefore the sentient that is both Ill and also an Ariyan fact!³ But the insentient is just Ill. To show this difference the Sakavādin accepts.

The expression again, "just as Ill that is bound up with sentience," and so forth shows that the understanding of Ill as bound up with sentience cannot constitute the understanding of the higher life. It is for this reason that the Sakavādin here denies.

By the expression, "That which is impermanent is Ill," one cannot, however, deny that the fact of Ill is included in the insentient; hence it is inconclusive.

The controversy about ill as wholly bound up with
sentience is ended.

V

[167] Now follows the controversy about 'save only the Ariyan Way.'

Inasmuch as the Ariyan Way was stated by the Exalted One (in the Fourfold Truth) as 'a course going to the stopping

¹ The P.T.S. reads here *Amantā* instead of negation.

² It is of interest to compare the earlier use of *dukkha*, as 'bound up' with the physical agencies—birth, old age and illness, dying, with the Abhidhamma extension to mental ill, and with Ledi Sayadaw's broader view, *J.P.T.S.*, 1911.—Ed.

³ *P. of C.*, p. 316, fn. 4.

of Ill,¹ therefore some, for instance, the Hetuvādins hold that, save only the Ariyan Way, all other conditioned things may be called Ill. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent that, if this be so, the cause of Ill would be also Ill—"Is the cause of Ill also Ill?" and so forth is asked. The opponent denies with reference to the nature of cause. When asked again, he assents, because it has its manifestation. To the question: "Are there but three Truths?" he denies for fear of contradicting the Sutta, and then assents, because of his own view.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy about 'save only the Ariyan Way' is ended.

VI

Now follows the controversy, namely, that it ought not to be said: 'The Order accepts gifts.'

In the ultimate sense of the word, the Order is the Ways and the Fruits.² Save only in the Ways and the Fruits, there can be no Order. These cannot be said to accept anything. Therefore some, for instance, the Vetulyakas, who are known as Mahāsuññatāvādins hold, that it ought not to be said: 'The Order accepts gifts! Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Ought it not to be said?" The opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent that, if the Order does not accept gifts, the Teacher would not have praised it as worthy of offerings, etc.—"Is not the Order worthy of offerings?" and so forth is asked.

"Are there not they who give to the Order?" is spoken of to urge that, if there be not those who accept gifts, to whom would the giver give?

The Sutta: '*As doth the holy flame its offering*,'³ etc., is brought forth from the opponent's doctrine.

¹ *Buddhist Suttas* (S.B.E. xi), 148 f.; *Vinaya Texts* i, 95.

² I.e., persons faring in one of the four stages and persons at the point of attaining one of the four results.—Ed.

³ Not traced.

Therein 'great cloud' refers to the rain cloud. The earth accepts the rain, but not the cloud (as such).

"Can a Way accept?" is asked, because the opponent holds that the Order is the Ways and the Fruits. No, [168] the Order consists of those who are known as the eight classes of individuals for their pure existence through the Ways and the Fruits; hence it is inconclusive.

The controversy, namely, that it ought not to be said:

'The Order accepts gifts,' is ended.

VII

Now follows the controversy, namely, that it ought not to be said: 'The Order purifies gifts.'

Those who hold the view that the Order is the Ways and the Fruits,¹ and that these are not able to purify gifts, hold that therefore it ought not to be said: 'The Order purifies.' Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

To show that, if the Order be not able to purify gifts, the Teacher would not have praised it in this way,—“Is not the Order worthy of offerings?” and so forth is asked.

'Purifies' means makes more fruitful. A little offering to the Order becomes much, much (when so) offered becomes more.

'Worthy of gifts' means a worthy recipient of gifts, fit for offering, able to fructify gifts.

'Make their offering effective' means 'they gain, they win great fruit even by a trifling offering.'

The rest is similar to what has been explained above.

The controversy, namely, that it ought not to be said:

'The Order purifies gifts,' is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy, namely, that it ought not to be said: 'The Order enjoys.'

¹ See above, XVII, vi.

Those who hold the view that the Order is the Ways and the Fruits,¹ and that these do not enjoy anything, hold that, therefore, it ought not to be said: 'The Order enjoys, drinks, eats, lies down.' Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent that, if the Order do not enjoy, the preparation of the meals of the Order would be useless—"Are there not those who prepare the meals of the Order?" and so forth is asked.

"Are there meals taken in company?" and so forth is asked in order to urge that, if the Order do not enjoy, [169] for whom would there be meals taken in company, and so on? "Are there eight kinds of drinks?" is also asked in order to urge that, if the Order do not drink, for whom did the Teacher speak of these drinks?

The rest here should also be understood as explained above.

The controversy, namely, that it ought not to be said:

'The Order enjoys,' is ended.

IX

Now follows the controversy, namely, that it should not be said: 'Anything given to the Order brings great reward.'

Those who hold the view that the Order is the Ways and the Fruits,¹ and that we are neither able to give them anything, nor are these able to accept gifts, nor does anyone strive to be benefited by giving gifts to them, hold, that therefore it should not be said: 'Anything given to the Order brings great reward.' Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"Worthy of offerings," and so forth is spoken of in order to show that, if a thing given to the Order do not bring great reward, the Teacher would not have praised it in this way.

The rest should be understood according to the text.

The controversy, namely, that it should not be said: 'Anything given to the Order brings great reward,' is ended.

¹ See above, XVII, vi.

X

Now follows the controversy, namely, that it should not be said: 'Anything given to the Bddha brings great reward.'

Those¹ who hold that, because the Exalted One, the Buddha, did not really enjoy anything, but only seemed to be doing so out of conformity to life in this world, therefore nothing given him was really helpful to him, hold that it should not be said: 'Anything given him brings great reward.' Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

To show that anything given even to wicked persons brings reward a thousand times, not to speak of such a highest person—"Is not the Exalted One the highest of all two-footed creatures?" and so forth is asked.

This rest here should be understood according to the text. The controversy, namely, that it should not be said: 'Anything given to the Buddha brings great reward,' is ended.

XI

[170] Now follows the controversy about the purification² of the gift.

'If a gift were purified by the recipient, it would become a great blessing. Now if the donor gives and the donee produces the result, this would mean that the former causing the latter to act for him, his own happiness and misery would be wrought by another.³ In other words, one would act and the other would feel the consequence. It is for these reasons that some, for instance the Uttarāpathakas hold that a gift is sanctified by the giver only, not by the recipient; the purification of the giver's heart only produces the result. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

To show that, if the recipient were not to purify the gift,

¹ *Ibid.*, XVII, vi, vii, viii, ix.

² In the Christian tradition 'sanctification' were perhaps fitter.—Ed.

³ *P. of C.*, pp. 321 ff.

what would be done by his being worthy of offerings,—“ Is he worthy of offerings ?” and so forth is asked.

“ Does one cause the other to act for him ?”—‘ this question would be suitable, if the opponent had meant that the donor’s intention becomes acting (lit. being done) by the donee. But he meant that the donor’s will is purified, in the sense of great fructification depending upon the person of the donee.’¹ Hence it is to no purpose. A gift may be purified by the recipient also.

The controversy about the sanetification of a gift is
ended.

Here ends the Seventeenth Chapter.

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 322, fn. 2.

CHAPTER XVIII

I

[171] Now follows the controversy about the dwelling of the Exalted One in the world of mankind.

By carelessly grasping the Sutta, '*The Exalted One was born in the world, grew up in the world, dwelt, having overcome the world, undefiled by the world,*'¹ some, for instance, the Vetulyakas² at present, hold that the Exalted One, when born in the Tusita heaven,³ dwelt there but visited this world only in a shape (specially) created. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Then to convince the opponent by the opening given in what he has said and by the proving of the Sutta—"Are there not?" and so forth is asked.

"Was he born in the world of mankind?" is asked by the opponent with reference to the city Tusita. "But did not the Exalted One?" is asked with reference to the world of mankind.

"Having overcome the world?"⁴ is asked by the opponent, because he holds that the Exalted One dwelt, having overcome, mastered, the world. But the Master (actually) dwelt, having overcome the things in the world.

"Undefiled by the world?" is asked by the opponent with reference to the fact that the Exalted One was undefiled by the world of mankind. But the Master dwelt, undefiled by the corruptions of heart with respect to the things in the world. Hence the citation of the Sutta is inconclusive.

The controversy about (the dwelling of the Exalted One in) the world of mankind is ended.

¹ *Samyutta Nikāya* iii, p. 140.

² See above, XVII, vi.

³ Traditionally the Buddha's last other-world life before the last rebirth on earth. We have here in I and II a 'heresy' akin to the Christian Docetism.—Ed.

⁴ Refers to the cited Sutta (n. 1).

II

Now follows the controversy about the teaching of Dhamma.

Some, for instance, the Vetulyakas hold that, while the Exalted One dwelt in the city Tusita, he created and sent forth a special shape for teaching Dhamma. In compliance with his teaching the venerable Ānanda taught Dhamma on earth, but the Exalted Buddha himself did not teach. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Then to urge on the opponent that, if he could teach Dhamma, he must have been the Master—"Is this created thing the Conqueror?" and so forth is asked. [172] The opponent, who does not admit it as such, denies.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy about the preaching of Dhamma is ended.

III

Now follows the controversy about pity (felt by the Exalted Buddha).

'The procedure of those who have not conquered their passions, on the occasion of misfortune to the objects of their affection, inclines the beholder to say that pity is only passion.'¹ Hence some, for instance, the Uttarāpathakas, hold that the passionless Buddha felt no compassion. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

By virtue of the corruption-free state, the seven objects of thought, the enfranchisement of mind, and the eleven kinds of profit,² pity is in the same category with amity, and so on. Hence, to urge on the opponent that, if the Exalted One had no pity, he would also have no amity, etc.,—"Did not the Exalted Buddha feel amity?" and so forth is asked.

¹ *Rāga*. *P. of C.*, pp. 325 f.

² Cf. *Anguttara* v, No. 16 (p. 340), and the annexed gospel of the four Brahmavihāras:—amity, pity, jey, poise.—Ed.

In the question: "Did he lack pity?" the opponent denies, because he does not see such thing in the Exalted One.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy about pity is ended.

IV

Now follows the controversy about fragrant things (in the person of the Buddha).

Out of an indiscriminate affection for the Exalted Buddha, some, for instance certain of the Andhakas and the Uttari-pathakas hold, that even the excreta of the Exalted One excelled all other odorous things. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest here should be understood according to the text.

The controversy about fragrant things is ended.

V

Now follows the controversy about a one and only way.

Out of an indiscriminate affection for the Buddha, some, for instance, those who hold the view just discussed,¹ also hold that the Exalted One in becoming stream-winner [173] realized the Fruit of once-returner, in becoming once-returner realized the Fruit of never-returner, in becoming never-returner realized the Fruit of arahanship, and thus he realized all these four Fruits by one single Ariyan Way. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"Is there a fusion of the four mental contacts?" etc. and so forth have been asked in order to urge on the opponent by way of putting together the four distinct mental contacts, etc., which arise (separately) with each of the four Fruits.

"By the Path of stream-winner?" and so forth is spoken of to ask: By which Way did he realize? When the opponent answers: "By the Way of arahanship," the Sakavādin urges, because the theory of the complex,² etc., would, in

¹ See above XVIII, v.

² *Sakkāya*, Cf. 'person-pack' in *Kindred Sayings* iii, 134.

that case, be removed by that Way. To the question: "Can the Exalted One be called stream-winner?"—the Sakavādin gives denial, because he who has become Buddha is no longer a stream-winner.

In the two subsequent questions, too, this is the method.

The rest here should be understood according to the text.

The controversy about a one and only Way is ended.

VI

Now follows the controversy about the transition from one Jhāna to another.

Because of the successive teaching: '*Here, monks, when a monk, aloof from sense-desires, etc., . . . and uplifted above attention and reasoning, attains to and abides in First, Second, Third, Fourth Jhāna,*'¹ some, for instance the Mahimsāsakas and certain of the Andhakas hold, that progress from one Jhāna-stage to another is immediate without any accessory procedure. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

To urge on the opponent that, if one can rush on to the practice of Second Jhāna, and can pass over through the distance from First to Second Jhāna, he could also pass over from First to Third, from Second to Fourth Jhāna—"From First Jhāna?" and so forth is asked.

"That called up for First?" and so forth is asked in order to urge that, if First arises after Second, or Third, and the rest arise after Second and the rest, they would arise by the same adverting of mind.

"From the harmfulness of sense-desires" means, first one considers the harmfulness of sense-desires [174] and then one arrives. But during the Jhāna-moment one considers only the sign.²

¹ *Dialogues* i, 84 f.; also in *Further Dialogues*, *passim*.

² *Nimittam*.

"Is that identical with First?" and so forth is asked in order to urge that, if it arises immediately, just as the second apperception¹ arises from the first apperception, it would according to characteristics be identical with that (Second) without being first and second. In this way the meaning should be understood everywhere.

The citation, "aloof from sense-desires," etc., explains that the Jhānas have been taught in succession, but not that one may pass over immediately (from Jhāna to Jhāna).

The controversy about the transition from one Jhāna to another is ended.

VII

Now follows the controversy about a Jhānic interval.

Soms, for instance the Sammitiyas and certain of the Andhakas hold the view that, in the fivefold Jhāna series,² the Exalted One did not intend to classify, but only to indicate, three forms³ of concentration. But not knowing that form of concentration to be possible which is accompanied by sustained thought (*savicāra*), and counting only initial application (*vitakka*), they hold that the former intervenes between First and Second Jhāna.⁴ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Now concentration is a mental state with (mental) contact, etc. Hence "Is there an intervening stage between (mental) contacts?" and so forth is asked in order to urge on the opponent that, if there be no intermediate stage between First and Second Jhāna, there would be no intervening stages between contacts and so on. "Between Second and Third Jhāna?" is asked in order to urge that, if there be an intermediate stage between First and Second Jhāna, there would also be intermediate stages between Second and the rest.

¹ *Javanam*.

² I.e., 'when First Jhāna is divided into two, according as it is accompanied or unaccompanied by initial application of thought.'—*P. of C.*, p. 329, fn. 3.

³ See above, IX, viii.

⁴ *P. of C.*, p. 329.

The opponent denies, and then assents, only because there is no such view. When asked: "Because First and Second Jhāna?" etc., he assents, because of his own view.

"Is it accompanied by sustained thought and initial application?" and so forth is asked in order to urge that, among the three forms of concentration, when there is concentration of mind without sustained thought and initial application, there is a Jhānic interval, and not otherwise; but is there any reason for this difference?

"Because the manifestation of two stages of Jhāna?" etc., is asked with reference to First and Second Jhāna. The opponent assents, because he holds that, [175] in the interval between their manifestation, there is concentration in sustained thought only, without initial application of thought. When asked: "Is not the First Jhāna at an end?" he assents, because it is not proper to hold that the three would proceed at the same moment.

"Does concentration as abiding in the signless¹ constitute the First Jhāna?" is asked with reference to the fourfold classification. The Sakavādin denies, because this is not included in that classification.

"Did not the Exalted One declare three forms of concentration?" Here of the three forms of concentration, as held out by the opponent, two forms of concentration are Jhānas, but not Jhānic intervals. Similarly, the other also must have been Jhāna, but not a Jhānic interval.

The controversy about a Jhānic interval is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy concerning one who has attained Jhāna as able to hear sound.

Because the Exalted One said: '*Sound is a thorn to First Jhāna*,'² and since sound, if not heard, cannot be a thorn in the flesh of one who has attained Jhāna, therefore some, for

¹ *Animittavīhāro samādhi*. On this technical phraseology, cf. *Buddh. Psychol. Ethics*, §§ 514-26.—Ed.

² *Anguttara Nikāya* v, pp. 133-5.

instance the Puhhaseliyas hold, that one who has attained Jhāna hears sound. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"Can he by the eye see visible objects?" and so forth is asked in order to urge that there is no five-door proceduro (of sense) in Jhāna and this being so, if he would hear sound, he could also see objects.

"Sound is a thorn"—this was said because sound induces distraction. 'When a loud noise strikes the ear, one is aroused from First Jhāna.'¹ Hence the citation is inconclusive.

"For second Jhāna?" and so forth is asked in order to urge that, just as there is no other thorn actually present on the winning of Jhāna, even so is the hearing sound?

All the rest is clear in meaning.

The controversy concerning one who has attained Jhāna as able to hear a sound is ended.

IX

[176] Now follows the controversy, namely, that one can see visible objects with the eye.

Because of the Word: '*When he sees an object with the eye,*'² some, for instance the Mahāsaṅghikas hold that the sentient surface of the eye is that which 'sees.' Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"Does one see matter by matter?" and so forth is asked in order to urge that, if one can see matter with the eye, he could also see matter by matter. The opponent rejects, because of the separate category, "object of vision." When asked again, he assents with respect only to the eye. Here its implication is: Is matter able to distinguish matter?

We ask: "Does he see?" with reference to the act of distinguishing, but not to the mere taking up by the eye. So you must now answer: Does one who has eyes distinguish matter by matter? The opponent rejects, and then assents as before.

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 311, fn. 2.

² *Dhammasaṅgani*, § 597; cf. *Saṃyutta Nikāya* iv, p. 104.

"Is matter mind?"¹ is then asked in order to urge on the opponent that, if so, matter amounts to mind. Is it true to say that one can differentiate it? The opponent, not finding a trick, rejects.

"Can the eye 'advert'?" and so forth is asked in order to urge that, if the 'eye' sees for the purpose of distinguishing, it should be immediately preceded by 'adverting' in the same way as the sense of sight.² "Nay," the opponent denies, because sight is not dependent on 'adverting,' the former arising immediately after the latter.

With regard to "Can one hear sound by the ear?" etc., also, the method is similar.

"Here, monks, a monk sees objects with the eye" is spoken of following the method of naming a (necessary) instrument.³ Just as when we say, 'wounded by a bow,' when the wound was inflicted by an arrow, so the words 'sees with the eye' are spoken of a seeing by visual consciousness.⁴ Hence this is inconclusive.

This is the method also in the rest.

The controversy, namely, that one can see visible objects with the eye is ended.

Here ends the Eighteenth Chapter.

¹ *Manovijñānaṃ*: mental awareness.

² *P. of C.*, p. 332, fn. 3.

³ *Sambhāra*.

⁴ *P. of C.*, p. 333, n. 1.

CHAPTER XIX

I

[177] Now follows the controversy about putting away corruptions.¹

Inasmuch as there is such a thing as putting away corruptions, and for one in whom this is completed both past and future, as well as present, corruptions are put away, therefore some, certain of the Uttarāpathakas for instance, hold that we can now put away the corruptions of our past, etc.² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Of the past?" and so forth. The opponent assents.

The rest should be understood according to the text.

In the opponent's question: "Is there no such thing as the extirpation of corruptions?"—the putting away of corruptions, past, future or present, is not a work comparable to the exertions of a person clearing away rubbish-heaps. With the following of the Ariyan Way having nirvana as its object, the corruptions are 'put away,' simply because they do not arise.³ Hence the Sakavādin denies: "It is not so." "Then we can put away the corruptions of our past," etc., means that as we should not say: There is no such thing as the extirpation of corruptions, therefore we can put away corruption, past, future or present. But this is spoken of by a trick.

The controversy about putting away corruptions is ended.

¹ *Kilesā*. This term is much more used in Abhidhamma and later exegesis than in the Suttas.—Ed.

² *P. of C.*, p. 334.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 335, fn. 2.

II

Now follows the controversy about the Void.

The Void (or Emptiness) has two implications: (a) absence of a self as a salient feature of the five aggregates (mind and body); and (b) nirvana. As to (a) absence of a self, some marks of 'no-self' may be included under mental coefficients (the fourth aggregate) by a figure of speech. Nirvana is not included thereunder.¹ But some, for instance the Andhakas drawing no such distinction hold, that the Void is included in the aggregate of mental coefficients. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The 'Signless' means nirvana, which is free from signs or attributes. This is also a synonym of 'Not-hankered-after.' But why have they been adduced? [178] They are adduced to expose the flaw in a theory which does not discriminate. According to him who indiscriminately holds that the entire Void is included in the fourth aggregate, nirvana may also be included thereunder. To expose this flaw the 'Signless,' the 'Not-hankered-after' are adduced. The opponent denies, because he does not want it to be included therein.

"Is not the fourth aggregate impermanent?" and so forth is asked to show the defect in holding the 'Signless' called nirvana to be impermanent.

"Is the 'emptiness' of the fourth aggregate included?" is asked in order to urge that, if the 'emptiness' of other aggregates be included under any of the aggregates, the 'emptiness' of the fourth aggregate must also be included under any of the remaining four.

"Should it not be said that the aggregate of mental coefficients is empty?" is asked to show by the indirect method that, if the 'emptiness' of the fourth aggregate be not included under any of the other four, the 'emptiness' of the remaining four aggregates also cannot be said to be included in the fourth aggregate.

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 335.

The Sutta, 'Empty is this, monks—the *saṃkhāra's*'¹ is adduced from the opponent's doctrine. The doctrine (we hold) suffers it to stand, because it is not inconsistent with the orthodox "*sabbe saṃkhāra aniccā*" (i.e., all *saṃkhāra's* are impermanent), where *saṃkhāra* stands for all five aggregates. Moreover, it is well-known in our doctrine that these (aggregates) are empty in the sense of what belongs to self.² But inasmuch as it explains that the fourth aggregate includes the 'Void,' therefore it is inconclusive.

The controversy about the void is ended.

III

Now follows the controversy about the fruit of recluseship³ (as unconditioned).

Our doctrine has judged that the term 'fruits of life in religion' means the mind (*citta*) which results from the processes of thought in the Ariyan Way, and occurs in the mental process attending the attainment of its Fruits.⁴ But some, for instance the Pubbaseliyas, not taking it in that sense, hold that 'fruits of life in religion' is just the putting away of corruptions and success therein, and hence it is unconditioned. Regarding them [179] the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Because of the explanation given above, the rest here should be understood according to the text.

The controversy about the fruit of recluseship is ended.

IV

Now follows the controversy about attainment (as unconditioned).

Some, for instance the Pubbaseliyas hold, that the winning of this or that is both acquisition and unconditioned. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

¹ *Saṃyutta Nikāya* iv, 296. See above, I, 1.

² See *Dīgha Nikāya*, 2nd Suttanta.

³ *Attaniya*.

⁴ *P. of C.*, p. 336.

Because of the explanation given above the rest here should also be understood according to the text.

"Is it not true to say?" is spoken of to expose the view by which the opponent holds that the winning itself is unconditioned. The Sakavādin, while rejecting by the words: "It is not right to say," does not wholly admit that the winning itself is matter, etc.¹ Winning is not a thing, nor does it admit of being unconditioned. The opponent, however, by the mere denial, establishes the view that it is unconditioned. As it has been carelessly recorded, it can hardly be established.

The controversy about attainment is ended.

V

Now follows the controversy about 'Thusness' (or 'Suchness').²

Some, for instance certain of 'the Uttarāpathakas hold, that there is an immutable something called thusness (or suchness) in the very nature of all things, material or otherwise (taken as a whole). And because this "thusness" is not included in the (particular) conditioned matter, etc., itself, therefore it is unconditioned.'³ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest here is also clear, because of the explanation given above.

The controversy about 'thusness' is ended.

VI

Now follows the controversy about what is morally good.

All 'good' mental states are so called, either because they can, as faultless,⁴ insure a desirable result (*vipāka*), or because they as faultless are free from the corruptions. The idea of

¹ *Rūp-ādi-bhāvanam*; referring presumably to the aggregates of body and mind.—Ed.

² *Tathatā*, the eminent Mahāyāna technical term.—Ed.

³ *P. of C.*, p. 333.

⁴ *Anavajjam*.

faultlessness is applied to all except immoral states. [180] The desirable result takes effect in the future, in processes of future occurrence. The first term in the triad: good, bad, indifferent, applies to the moral cause producing such a result.¹ But some, for instance the Andhakas make no such distinction, and call nirvana 'good' just because it is a faultless state. To make it clear to them that nirvana cannot be called 'good' because it insures a desirable result-in-sentience the Sakavādin asks. The opponent assents, because of his own view.

The rest here is also clear in meaning because of the explanation given above.

The controversy about nirvana as morally good is ended.

VII

Now follows the controversy about the attainment of final assurance.

Because of the Sutta—"The one is immersed once (for all)," etc.,² some, for instance, certain of the Uttarāpathakas, hold that the average man may possess final assurance. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"Matricide," etc., is spoken of in order to urge that he who commits matricide, etc., must also have final assurance, even when there is wrong assurance for one who is assured of cherishing his wrong opinion or commits matricide, etc. The opponent, holding wrong views on assurance, stubborn as to continued existence³ (*samsāra-khāṇuko*), is assured that, in course of becoming "in just this or that incarnation" denies: "Nay." "Could he feel doubt?" it is asked: Could he feel—"This is assurance and this is not so?" The opponent assents, because he does not see any reason for the absence of such feeling. But when asked: "Could he not feel?"—he assents, because a man cannot doubt his own opinion if

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 339.

² *Anguttara Nikāya* iv, 11=*Gradual Sayings* iv, 7:—"These seven persons like men in water are found in the world. . . ." The technical expression "final assurance" is later.—Ed.

³ *Bhavantare*, lit. within becoming.—Ed. *P. of C.*, p. 340, fn. 3.

it be repeatedly cherished. Thereafter when asked: "Has he put away?"—he rejects, because it has not been put away by the Ariyan Way, and then assents, because he thinks that doubt does not override the cherished opinion.

Inasmuch as what is known as the putting away of doubt is not possible except by the Ariyan Way, therefore to urge by way of it—"By the Way of a stream-winner?" etc., is asked. The opponent rejects, because it cannot be put away by a single Way.¹ Again, when asked: "How, then?" [181] he answers: "By a bad Way" with reference to the wrong Way.

"Could the Annihilationist view be adopted?" is asked with reference to the happening of finite assurance. Because of the Word, '*the folk of Ukkala, Lenten speakers of old, Casualists, Deniers of the Deed, Sceptics*,'²—the opponent thinks that these three definite wrong views may be adopted by a person, and therefore he assents.

"If," etc., is spoken of in order to urge on him—'is he not possessed of final assurance?' Assurance for a finite period is useless to him who is possessed of final assurance.

In the question: "Could it not be adopted?" he considers that what is adopted as Eternalism by the Eternalist view will only be annihilated, and assents with reference to its not happening.

When asked: "Has he put away?" he denies, because it has not been put away by the Way. He assents, because it does not happen as explained.

In the question: "Could the Eternalist view be adopted?" and so forth, this, too, is the method. The rest in the section about doubt is similar to what has been explained [above].

"Is it not true to say?" is asked by the opponent.³ The Sakavādin assents, because there is that Sutta. But he is not immersed in future existences as well. Here the sense

¹ I.e., of the four Ways or 'Stages.'

² The P.T.S. reading: *Ukalāvassahaññā natthikavādā ariyavāda ahetuvāda* should be read as *Ukkalāvassa-lhaññā natthikavādā akiriyavādā ahetukavādā*. See *Samyutta Nikāya* iii, 73. Also quoted above (I, vi).

³ In P.T.S. edition for *pucchā sakavādisa* read *pucchā paravādisa*.

is this: In this existence only, he is unable to abandon that view; hence it is inconclusive.

"Is a person, having come to the surface, immersed all the time?" and so forth is asked [by the Sakavādin] in order to show the necessity of research into the spirit¹ (of texts), without relying too much on the letter.¹

The controversy about final assurance is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy about the controlling powers (or faculties).²

Some, for instance the Hetuvādins and Mahimsāsakas hold, that faith is not valid as a controlling power in worldly matters. Similarly, there can be no effort, or mindfulness, or concentration, or wisdom in worldly concerns. Wisdom is not valid as a controlling power. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Inasmuch as the mental properties like worldly faith and the rest, are qualities in the sense of controlling powers, and there can be no controlling power of faith, etc., other than faith, etc., [182] therefore to show that a worldly faith and the rest are the controlling powers of faith, and the rest—"Can there be no faith in worldly matters?" and so forth is asked.

"Is mind valid in worldly matters?" and so forth is asked in order to explain, by an illustration that, just as the mental properties, like a worldly mind and the rest, are the controlling powers of mind, etc., so a worldly faith, and the rest are also the controlling powers of mind, etc.

The rest here should be understood according to the text.

The controversy about the moral controlling powers
is ended.

Here ends the Nineteenth Chapter.

¹ *Attho* as versus *vacanam*.

² See *P. of C.*, p. 342, fn. 1. Buddhism at an early date set up this fivefold category of spiritual faculties or functions, as it were over against the five physical senses.—Ed.

CHAPTER XX

I

[183] Now follows the controversy about unintentional (crime).

Inasmuch as the grounds for immediate retribution after death are very weighty and grave,¹ some, for instance certain of the Uttarāpathakas hold, that even the unintentional infliction of such injuries involves retribution immediately after death. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Even when unintentionally committed?" The opponent assents because of his view.

"If I accidentally take away life," and so forth is spoken of in order to urge on the opponent, that actions which involve immediate retribution are those concerning the ways of moral conduct. And if there be exceptions in the case of acts, done unintentionally, the remaining acts like life-taking, etc., also would be unintentionally committed. The opponent rejects, because there is no such view. The rest should be understood according to the text.

"Is it not true to say that there are murderers of mother?" —is asked by the opponent. The Sakavādin assents with reference to accidental loss of life under medical treatment, etc. Also to the question: "But does not the fact remain that the mother's life is taken?" the Sakavādin assents with reference to accidental loss of life. But the opponent, not taking this sense, establishes his view: "If," etc. As it has been carelessly recorded, it can hardly be established.

This is the method also in the case of one who kills father, and so on. But in the case of a schismatic the Sakavādin asks: "Does a schismatic incur retribution immediately after death?" The opponent, carelessly interpreting the Word, *'He who breaks up the Order is doomed to remain for an æon*

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 343.

in states of suffering and woe,'¹ assents. Again, to the question "All?" he denies, because he is judging such an one to be convinced that his side is in the right; he assents, in the case of one who knows that right is on the other side.² This is the method in the two questions concerning a schismatic who is conscious of [stating what is] right.

The Sutta, 'Was it not said by the Exalted One,' is cited just to show, that a schismatic who is conscious of [stating what is] right incurs retribution immediately after death. Also in the verse, '*he who incurs disaster, purgatory, misery*,'³ a person who adheres not to Dhamma is meant. But the other, [184] not grasping the sense, records his opinion. As it is carelessly recorded, it can hardly be established.

The controversy about unintentional crime is ended.

II

Now follows the controversy about insight.

'Insight (*ñāṇa*) is of two kinds:—mundane and supra-mundane. The former is concerned with various attainments, and in noting the course of action by way of righteous acts of giving, etc.; the latter is concerned with the Ways and their Fruits, Way-insight being learned by analysis of truth.'⁴ Now some, for instance, the Hetuvādins, not drawing this distinction, hold that only Path-intuition is insight, and the other is not so; hence the average man has no insight. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"Wisdom," etc., is spoken of in order to show that there is no insight as well. What it explains, is this: If a worldly man has no insight, neither has he wisdom, etc. If he has wisdom, etc., he has also insight. Why? Because wisdom and the rest are not distinct from insight.

"First Jhāna," etc., is spoken of in order to show insight

¹ *Vinaya* ii, 205; v, 202, 203; *Vinaya Texts* iii, 268.

² *P. of C.*, p. 344, fn. 1.

³ *Vinaya* ii, 205; v, 202, 203; *Vinaya Texts* iii, 268.

⁴ *P. of C.*, pp. 344-5. The term rendered by 'analysis' is *paricchedakam*.

concerned with various attainments. "Is he capable of going?" etc., means does he recognize the truth about Ill through action done by him? This explains only the supramundane Way-insight, and not that insight as such is supramundane.

The controversy about insight is ended.

III

Now follows the controversy concerning the guards of purgatory.¹

Some, for instance the Andhakas hold that hell-doomed actions, in the shape of hell-keepers, purify² the sufferers, and there are no such beings as guards in the purgatories. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"Are there no [punishments] in the purgatories?" and so forth is asked in order to urge on the opponent that, if there be no guards in the purgatories, there would be also no reaction (or, punishment) of the deed³; and if there be punishment, there must be executioners [185].

"On earth are there?" etc., is spoken of to make him understand personally. Here the sense is this: Just as on earth there are both punishments and executioners, so also in purgatory.

The Sakavādin asks: "Is it there in the purgatories?" The opponent assents.

The Sutta, '*Not Vessabhū nor yet the Petas' King*,'⁴ is quoted by the opponent from his own doctrine. The Sakavādin however admits that it is included in the Teaching.

Therein '*Vessabhū*' means a deva, the '*Petas' King*' means a mighty Peta in the Peta-region. Soma, and the

¹ *Niraya*.

² The P.T.S. edition reads: *vaddhenti*, while the Burmese edition has *sodhenti* which seems to be more correct.

³ On the term *kamma-kāraṇāni*, see *J.P.T.S.*, 1884, 76; *Jāt.* i, 174.

⁴ It is sad that twenty-five years have not made us wiser about this verse from a lost tradition.—Ed.

rest are clear. What is meant is this: Vessahhū, and the rest do not punish him who, driven from this world, attains to the world hereafter. But the actions whereby he is driven there are his own, and they punish him there. Thus it explains the doing of acts, and not that there are no guards in the purgatories.

To this the Sakavādin says, "Nay," by quoting the Sntta-passages, "*Him, monks,*" etc.¹

The controversy concerning guards of purgatory is ended.

IV

Now follows the controversy concerning animals [in the next world].

Among devas many, for instance, Erāvāṇa and other sons of devas assume animal shapes, such as those of elephants or horses, but no animals are reborn as such among them. Some however like the Andhakas assume that, because such deva-shapes have been seen, therefore² animals are reborn among the devas. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"Are animals reborn among them?" etc., is asked in order to urge on the opponent that, if animals may be reborn among devas, devas may be reborn also among animals. "Moths?" etc., is asked to indicate those creatures which, according to him, are not found there.

To the question: "Is Erāvāṇa there?" the Sakavādin assents, because it is found there, and not because it is reborn there as an animal.

"Elephant stables?" etc., is asked in order to urge that, if there be elephants, etc., there would be also elephant stables, etc. Here 'fodder' means [186] a wood full of grass. 'Trainers' means elephant trainers and others who can effect various tricks through training. 'Cooks' means those who cook food for elephants, etc.

¹ *Majjhima Nikāya* iii, 182 f.; *Anguttara Nikāya* i, 141.

² *P. of C.*, p. 347. Erāvāṇa was Sakka's elephant. Cf. *Dict. Palī Proper Names*.—Ed.

[The Sakavādin] denies: "Nay," because he would not admit such a thing as this.

The controversy concerning animals is ended.

V

Now follows the controversy about the Way.

Both because of the Sutta, '*For him who has hitherto been quite pure in action of body . . . of livelihood,*'¹ etc., and also because [the three eliminated factors—] right speech, action, and livelihood—are not states of consciousness,² some, for instance the Mahimsāsakas hold, that in general terms the Way is only fivefold. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Is the Way fivefold?" The opponent assents.

"Is right speech a factor of the Way, and not the Way?" etc., is asked by way of others' doctrine. In others' doctrine, right speech, and the like have gained acceptance as factors of the Way. These being material³ are explained as not Way.

"Is right view a factor of the Way?" etc., is asked to show that there cannot be 'non-Wayness' in the Way.

In the Sutta, '*One who has previously been quite pure,*' it has been shown, that making the Way become is possible for one who is quite pure in conduct, and not for others. 'One who has been quite pure in action of body and of word and of livelihood' is spoken of to show purity of the Way to be approached, and not to show that the Way, excluding these [three] is fivefold. Therefore, it was said (by the Exalted One): '*For him . . . this Ariyan eightfold Way will go to perfection of development.*'⁴

By the Sakavādin the Sutta quoted has been explained.⁵

The controversy about the Way is ended.

¹ We cannot trace it.

² Like the other five in the so-called eightfold Way. See above, X, ii.

³ *Rupatā*, presumably as involving material adjuncts.—Ed.

⁴ Lit. of making become.—Ed.

⁵ Cf. *Āṅguttara* i, 70.—Ed.

VI

Now follows the controversy about insight.

With reference to the 'twelve constituent parts' in 'The Turning of the Dhamma-Wheel'¹ some, for instance [187] the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas hold, that knowledge based on those twelve is supramundane. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"Are they twelve?" etc., is asked in order to urge on the opponent that, if insight be based on those twelve, there would be twelve kinds of Way-insight. The other denies, because of the oneness (of the Way); he then assents, because of the diversity of insight—as to nature, the need to do and the being done—respecting each Truth.² This is the method also in 'Are there twelve Stream-winning Ways' and so forth.

The Sutta, 'Was it not said by the Exalted One,' etc., explains only the diversity of insight, as prior and later, and not the twelve kinds of Insight of the Ariyan Man; hence it is inconclusive.

The controversy about insight is ended.

Here ends the Twentieth Chapter.

The Fourth Chapter of the Fifties is ended.

¹ Traditionally known as the First Sermon of the Buddha. (The 'twelve' occur in the (fairly obvious) later gloss; they are the 'four truths' each as a getting rid of, a realizing, a making become (i.e., grow)=twelve points in all. See my *Sakya*.—Ed.)

² *P. of C.*, p. 349, fn. 3.

CHAPTER XXI

I

[188] Now follows the controversy about [our] teaching.¹

Because after the three Councils [at which the differences in our teaching were settled], some, for instance certain of the Uttarāpathakas hold that it has been made new, that there was a person making it new and that it is possible yet to make it new.² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks in the three questions, and the opponent assents.

The "Applications in Mindfulness," etc., is spoken of in order to urge, in those three points, that the Ariyan doctrine includes the Applications in Mindfulness, etc., and the teaching on good, etc. Making anew in the teaching could be effected only by producing the Applications in Mindfulness, etc., other than those taught by the Exalted One, or by making what is bad, etc., to be good and so on.

The rest should everywhere be understood according to the text.

The controversy about (our) religion is ended.

II

Now follows the controversy about experience of what is not separate.

'Our doctrine only teaches that the individual is inseparable from such [mental] phenomena as arise at present in him.'³ But inasmuch as the understanding of an ordinary person

¹ *Sāsaṇa*.

² *P. of C.*, p. 351: there called 'reform.' Pali has *navam katham*, etc.—Ed.

³ *P. of C.*, p. 352. On the gradual casting off of these spiritual hindrances cf. *Dh. saṅgaṇi*, §§ 1002 ff.—Ed.

does not suffice to distinguish the phenomena of all the three worlds of life, therefore the same seet,¹ for instance, holds that, at one and the same moment, he is inseparable from all the three kinds of phenomena. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"From contacts?" and so forth is asked in order to show, that it is not correct to say that contacts, etc. belonging to all three spheres arise at one and the same moment.

The rest is clear in meaning everywhere.

The controversy about experience as inseparable from personality is ended.

III

[189] Now follows the controversy about Fetters.

Inasmuch as even an arahān does not know the whole range of Buddha-knowledge, therefore some, for instance the Mahāsaṅghikas, understanding that there must have been the Fetters of ignorance and doubt he has not cast off, hold that arahānship is won without a certain 'Fetters'-quantity being cast off. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"Is it won without the extirpation of the theory of the complex?"² and the rest is asked in order to show that an arahān casts off all kinds of Fetters.

The two questions: "(Does an arahān know) the whole range of Buddha-knowledge?" are rejected because an arahān lacks omniscient insight, and not because he has not cast off the Fetters of ignorance and doubt. But the opponent records his view: "Then, indeed," etc., with respect to these as not being cast off. This, being carelessly established, can hardly be called established.

The controversy about (certain) fetters is ended.

¹ See above, XXI, n.

² *Sakkāya*.

IV

Now follows the controversy about supernormal potency¹ (*Iddhi*).

"*Iddhi*" is only possible in some ways not in other ways. It is absolutely impossible by it to make for instance permanent what is impermanent.² But it is possible by *Iddhi* to effect the transformation of one character into another in the continuity of anything, or to prolong it in its own character. This may be accomplished through merit or other causes, as when, to feed monks, water was turned into butter, milk, etc., and as when illuminations were prolonged at the depositing of sacred relics. This is our orthodox doctrine.³

But with reference to the venerable Piliṇḍavaccha resolving⁴ that the palace of the king be of gold,⁵ some, for instance the Andhakas hold that *Iddhi* may always be wrought by resolve. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Can *Iddhi* always be wrought by resolve?" Here '*Iddhi*' wrought by resolve means that *Iddhi* is just resolve. *Iddhi* means an accomplishment according to resolve [190]. The opponent who stands merely on his view, assents: "Yes."

Then "Let trees be ever green!" and the rest is said in order to ask as to the permanence of things which are impermanent.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

In the recording of his view, too, "hut (the palace of the king) was of gold" means, that it was even so supported by the king's merit, and not merely by the them's willing; hence this is inconclusive.

The controversy about potency is ended.

¹ *Iddhi*: lit. making effectual.—Ed.

² In text read *ekanten' eva na ijjhati*.

³ *P. of C.*, p. 353.

⁴ This and following renderings by 'resolve' are (a) *adhimucchi* and (b) *adhippāyo*=hyper-release and hyper-onset. There was no such strong simple word as 'will.'—Ed.

⁵ *Vinaya Texts* ii, 65.

V

Now follows the controversy concerning Buddhas.

With the exception of differences in body, age and radiance,¹ at any given time, Buddhas differ mutually in no other respect. Some however, like the Andhakas hold that they differ in other qualities in general.² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Do Buddhas differ?" The opponent assents.

"In respect of the Applications in Mindfulness?" etc., is said in order to ask the opponent as to the qualities of Buddhas. The opponent, who does not see their differences in those respects, rejects.

The controversy about Buddhas is ended.

VI

Now follows the controversy about [a Buddha's persisting in] all directions.

'Some, like the Mahāsaṅghikas hold, that a Buddha exists in the four quarters of the firmament, below, above and around, causing his change of habitat to come to pass in any sphere of being.'³ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

When asked: "In the eastern quarter?" [the opponent] denies with respect to [the locus of the historical] *Sākyamuni*; again when asked, he assents, since by his view the persisting is in different places.

"How is [this Eastern] Buddha named?" and so forth is asked in order to urge the opponent do you then know his name; etc.? of a Buddha.

In this way the meaning should everywhere be understood.

The controversy about all directions is ended.

¹ *Pabbhava*.

² *P. of C.*, p. 354.

³ *P. of C.*, p. 355.

VII

[191] Now followa the controversy about phenomena (*dhammā*).

'Judging from the fact that nothing [bowever it may echange] gives up its fundamental nature, matter, e.g., being fixed as matter, and so on,'¹ some, for instance the Andhakaa and certain of the Uttarāpatbakas hold that all tbinga are by nature immutable.² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "All things?" The opponent assents.

"Are they immutable in wrongness?" and eo fortb is asked in order to urge on the opponent that, if they are immutable, they would be immutable in wrongness, or in rightness; apart from these two ways is there any other immutable order of tbinga? The opponent first rejects, and then assents.

"Is matter fixed as matter?" and so forth is asked in order to urge through the meaning in which it is eaid to be fixed. Here tbe sense is tbis: 'Matter is fixed as matter.' This is to be said in the sense that matter is nothing but matter, and has not the nature of feeling, etc.³ This is not to be said otherwise. Therefore, since there is no other material quality apart from tbe fact 'matter,' the nature of matter itself is a fact as eueb. The nature of matter is nothing bnt material quality; it cannot be distinct from matter. But this is the definition in general to point out its differences from feeling, and tbe rest. Therefore it is said: 'Matter is fixed as matter.'

Tbinga may be immutable in two ways: in wrongness, or in rightness. Apart from these, there is no other way.

Then why does [the opponent] assent? Because of the difference between the [two] meanings. 'Matter ie fixed as matter'—bere it means that matter is nothing but matter, and bae not the nature of feeling, etc. Therefore be assents. But is it not immutable in any other eense? "Ie it immut-

¹ *P. of C.*, pp. 355 f.

² See above, V, iv; VI, I. More literally 'fixed' (*niyata*).—Ed.

³ *I.e.*, immaterial or mental.—Ed.

able in wrongness?" and so forth is asked in order to urge again by that sense. This is all clear in meaning.

Thus the view: 'Matter,' etc., being carelessly recorded, can hardly be established.

The controversy about phenomena is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy about action.

Inasmuch as 'actions which work out their own effects under present conditions in this or in the next life, or in a posterior series of lives, are fixed with respect one to the other,'¹ therefore the same sects,² for instance, hold that all actions are 'immutable.'³ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

[192] "Is action which eventuates in this life a fixed fact as such?" Action which eventuates in this life, 'if capable of eventuating at all, [invariably] works out its effects in this very life; if not, it becomes inoperative [*ahosi-kammam*].'⁴ So the Sakavādin assents. But this cannot be fixed as a thing can be fixed as either in wrongness or in rightness.

All [the rest] should be understood as explained above.

The controversy about action is ended.

Here ends the Twenty-first Chapter.

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 356.

² See above, XII, vii.

⁴ *P. of C.*, p. 357, fn. 1.

³ See preceding talk.

CHAPTER XXII

I

[193] Now follows the controversy about the passing utterly away.

‘Inasmuch as the arahān completes existence without casting off every Fetter with respect to the range of omniscience,’¹ some, for instance the Andhakas hold, that life may be completed without a certain Fetter-(quantity) having been cast off. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest here is similar to what has been explained above.²

The controversy about the completion of life is ended.

II

Now follows the controversy about moral consciousness.

Inasmuch as the arahān, even while passing utterly away, is lucidly conscious,³ therefore some, for instance the Andhakas hold, that the arahān is ethically conscious at final death. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Now the moral mind inevitably involves a concurring of meritorious action, etc., having produced happy result. Therefore, he urges on the opponent on that ground—“Does an arahān achieve coefficient of merit?” and so forth is asked.

The rest here should be understood according to the text.

“Mindful and aware?” is spoken of with respect ‘to the arahān’s lucidity and awareness while dying, to his ethically

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 358.

² See above, XXI, III. (theory of the Mahāsaṅghikas).

³ A striking compound: *sati-vepulla-patto*: has attained abundance of attention.—Ed.

neutral and therefore inoperative presence of mind and reflection at the last moments of the cognitive process [*javana*]. But it was not intended to show the arising of morally good thoughts¹; hence this is inconclusive.

The controversy about moral consciousness is ended.

III

Now follows the controversy about imperturbable consciousness.

Some, for instance certain of the Uttarāpathakas, understanding that the Exalted One, while passing utterly away was in sustained Fourth Jhāna hold, that the arahān completes existence imperturbably (*ānañje*). Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"With ordinary consciousness" means with consciousness of becoming.² All sentient beings are normally in this mental state. When that ends [194], they expire with the 'decease-thought'.³ To urge the opponent on that ground this is said: 'Although the arahān's ordinary mind,⁴ when on the plane of four immaterial aggregates (i.e., Arūpa plane), would be to some extent imperturbable. But this question is asked with reference to the life-plane of all five aggregates.'⁵ Therefore he says: "Nay, that cannot be truly said."

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy about the imperturbable is ended.

IV

Now follows the controversy about comprehending Dhamma.⁶

'Some, that is certain of the Uttarāpathakas hold, that one

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 358.

² *Bhavanga-citta*. I hold this interesting term first appearing in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka meant an abstract form of *bhava*: *bhavangya*; 'becoming' We have introduced the notion of the 'sub-conscious'; it is not Buddhist.—Ed.

³ *Outicitta*.

⁴ *Pakaticittaṃ*.

⁵ *P. of C.*, p. 359, fn. 5.

⁶ The rendering of Dhamma by 'Truth' (*P. of C.*) misleading.—Ed.

who in his previous birth was a stream-winner and remains so, must have [as a newly resultant consciousness] grasped Dhamma while an embryo.¹ Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

"Can an embryo be instructed in Dhamma?" and so forth is asked in order to urge on the opponent that, if one could grasp Dhamma, while an embryo, there must have been to it instruction in Dhamma and the like by its causes.

"By one who is asleep?"² . . . is asked with reference to the door of becoming.³ In an embryo, there is, as a rule, a continuous flow of becoming. So a being is asleep because of the absence of occasion and process of action. He who is without application to meditation, is "languid."⁴ He who is lacking in mindfulness and self-possession over grounds for opportunity for action, is called "blurred in intelligence," unreflective. How can there be penetration of Dhamma by such an one?

The controversy about penetration of Dhamma is ended.

V

- (a) *On attainment of arahanship by the embryo.*
- (b) *On penetration of dhamma by a dreamer.*
- (c) *On attainment of arahanship by a dreamer.*

'The attainment of arahanship by very young stream-winners, [notably the story of] the [phenomenal seven-year-old son of the lay-believer Suppavāsā,⁵ led the same sectaries⁶ to believe in even ante-natal attainment of arahanship. They hold further, seeing the wonderful feats, such as levitation, etc., experienced in dreams, that the dreamer may not only

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 360.

² In P.T.S. edition for *Puttassa* read *Suttaṣa* (p. 194, 1, 15).

³ Burmese *v.l.* is *pāraṃ*, not *dvāraṃ*; probably more correct.—Ed.

⁴ *Pamatto*.

⁵ See *Psalm of the Brethren* lxx; *Jātaka*, No. 100; *Udāna* ii, 8; *Dhammapada Commentary* iv, 192 f.

⁶ See above, XXII, iv.

penetrate Dhamma, hut also attain arahanship.¹ [195] Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest here is similar to the foregoing controversy.²

The threefold controversy is ended.

VI

Now follows the controversy about the unmoral.³

From the Word, '*There is intention, and that intention is negligible*,'⁴ some, for instance certain of the Uttarāpathakas hold that all dream-consciousness is unmoral. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest here should be understood according to the text.

"Dream-consciousness is negligible" is spoken of with reference to ecclesiastical offence. Although a dreamer may entertain evil thoughts of murder, etc., no injury to life or property is wrought. Hence they cannot be classed as 'offence.'⁵ Hence dream-thoughts are a negligible quantity, and for this reason, and not because they are unmoral, they may be ignored.⁶

The controversy about the unmoral is ended.

VII

Now follows the controversy about correlation by repetition.⁷

'Inasmuch as all phenomena are momentary, nothing persisting for more than an instant, nothing can be so correlated as to effect repetition,'⁸ hence some, for instance, the same parties,⁹ hold that there never is repetition, and correlation

¹ *P. of C.*, p. 361.

² *I.e.*, XXII, iv.

³ *Aṭṭakāṭa*: lit. undeclared, indeterminate.

⁴ *Vinaya* iii, 112. *Abboḥāri-ka* (or -*ya*) is literally rendered as 'not of legal or conventional status,' see *P. of C.*, p. 361, fn. 4.

⁵ *Āpatti*, the technical Vinaya term.

⁶ *P. of C.*, pp. 361 ff.; on this cf. *Compendium*, pp. 47, 52.

⁷ On the term *āsevāṇā*, see *P. of C.*, p. 294, fn. 2.

⁸ *P. of C.*, p. 362.

⁹ *I.e.*, certain of the Uttarāpathakas, see above, XXII, vi.

by way of repetition. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

Then to convince the opponent by way of the Sutta—*"Was it not said by the Exalted One:—'The taking of life,'"*¹ etc., is employed. All this is clear in meaning.

The controversy about correlation by repetition is ended.

VIII

Now follows the controversy about the momentary.

Some, for instance the Pubhaseliyas and the Aparaseliyas hold that, since all conditioned things are impermanent, therefore they endure but one conscious moment. Given universal impermanence—one thing ceases quickly, another after an interval—[196] what, they ask, is here certain?² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Are they momentary conscious units?" The opponent assents.

As to the question: "Does the earth last [only so long] in consciousness?" etc., the opponent denies, because he does not see anything of such nature.

"The sphere of sight," etc., is spoken of in order to urge that, if all things are momentary conscious units, the sphere of sight, etc., would come into being and cease together with the visual cognition, and so on. But the opponent rejects with reference to the arising of insight even in an embryo, and then assents by his own view with reference to process.³

The rest here is clear in meaning.

It is but arbitrary to say that because things are not immut-able, therefore they all last but one conscious moment; hence the expression, "Therefore all things are momentary conscious units" amounts to saying nothing.

The controversy about momentary duration is ended.

Here ends the Twenty-second Chapter.

¹ *Saṃyutta Nikāya* v, 54.

² *Niyāmo. P. of C.*, p. 363.

³ *Pavaiṣaṇa*.

CHAPTER XXIII

I

[197] Now follows the controversy about united resolve.

Some, for instance the Andhakas and the Vetulyakas¹ hold, that sexual relations may be entered upon with a united resolve by a human pair who feel mutual sympathy in worshipping, it may be, at some Buddha-shrine, and aspire to be united throughout their future lives.² Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest here should be understood according to the text.

The controversy about united resolve is ended.

II

Now follows the controversy concerning apparent arahans.

Some, for instance certain of the Uttarāpathakas, noticing the dress and deportment of evil-minded monks, hold that non-human beings, taking the shape of arahans, follow sexual desires. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest here is clear in meaning.

The controversy concerning apparent arahans is ended.

III

Now follows the controversy about performance through desire for authority.³

¹ See above, XVII, vi.

² *P. of C.*, p. 365; also fn. 3.

³ *I.e.*, power, lit. lordship: *issariya-kāma-kāritā*. I question if this compound has yet been met with elsewhere. The P.T.S. Dict. omits it.—Ed.

Some, for instance the Andhakas hold that the Bodhisatta, in the case of the Six-toothed Elephant Jātaka and others,

(a) was rehorn as an animal or in purgatory,

(b) entered a womb,

(c) performed difficult tasks,

and (d) worked penance under alien teachers of his own accord and free will. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks, and the opponent assents.

The rest in the first controversy is clear in meaning.

In the second controversy, "with potency" is spoken of in order to urge that, if he be reborn of his own accord, he should be reborn through a specific power or gift, and not through (previous) actions. The opponent, in the first question, denies with reference to *iddhi* as accomplished by practice,¹ and then, in the second question, he assents with reference to *iddhi* as accomplished by merit.

[198] In the third controversy, "the world is eternal," etc., is spoken of in order to urge that 'he, of his own accord, performed difficult tasks' means he performed them through a wrong view, and if he does so, he would also fall back on wrong views such as this.

This is the method also in the fourth controversy.

The controversy about performance by desire for authority is ended.

IV

Now follow the controversies about counterfeit states of lust and so on.

Some, for instance the Andhakas hold

(a) that there is, with regard to amity, pity and approbation, that which is not lust but which counterfeits it;

(b) that there is, with regard to envy, selfishness and worry, that which is not hate, but which counterfeits it;

(c) that there is, with regard to the sense of the ludicrous, that which is not dulness, but which counterfeits it;

¹ Lit. by making become.—Ed.

and (d) that there is, with regard to the suppressing of the discontented, the helping of kindly monks, the blaming of the bad, the praising of the good, the calling others by the venerable Pilinda-Vaccha 'outcasts,'¹ the declarations of the Exalted Ones about the incompetent or foolish,² that which is not corruption, but which counterfeits it. Regarding them the Sakavādin in all the controversies asks, and the opponent assents.

"Is there that which is not contact?" etc., is asked in order to urge on the opponent that, inasmuch as, in the case of that which resembles contact, etc., there is not that which is contact, and so on, therefore, in the case of lust, etc., there is not that which is lust, and so on. The opponent rejects, because there are no such things.

The rest is clear in meaning everywhere.

The controversy about counterfeit states of consciousness is ended.

V

Now follows the controversy about the undetermined.³
Because of the Word:

*'Tis simply Ill that riseth, simply Ill
That doth persist, and then fadeth away.
Nought beside Ill it is that doth become;
Nought else but Ill it is doth pass away.'*⁴

Some, for instance certain of the Uttarāpathakas and the Hetuvādins hold, that only Ill is determined, and that the rest—the aggregates, elements, controlling powers—are undetermined. Regarding them the Sakavādin asks: "Is matter undetermined?" The opponent assents.

"Is not matter impermanent?" and so forth is asked in order to urge on the opponent that, if matter be undeter-

¹ *Vasālā. Uddāna* iii, 6.

² *P. of C.*, p. 625, also fn. 4.

³ *Aparinipphanna. Of. above, XI, viii; XV, vi.*

⁴ Verse of the nun Vajirā. *Samyutta Nikāya* i, 135; *Pss. of the Sisters*, p. 191; *P. of C.*, p. 368.

mined, it would not have the nature of impermanence, etc. [199] The opponent who does not see such matter rejects. By the expression, "Is not matter impermanent?" etc., the Sakavadin rejects one of his views and, while questioning again, asks: "Is it not that, if [Ill] be permanent?" etc.

Here the sense is this: The first Truth is not Ill in an absolute sense.¹ But whatever is impermanent, that is Ill:—such is that which is impermanent. Hence this is also determined in your saying that matter was undetermined, and only Ill was determined. But you cannot maintain that only Ill is determined. This is the method also in the interpretations of those originating in feeling, etc. But the sense-factors and elements should be understood as impermanent by way of all mental objects, save nirvana. The controlling faculties are just impermanent.

The controversy about the undetermined is ended.

And so far:

Here ends the commentary of the book entitled *Kathāvatthu* (Points of Controversy) comprising all discussions of twenty-nine sorts, taught by him, who was a conqueror and was skilled in the tradition, in four (chapters of the) Fifties and in three sections. This with only thirteen chapters of the text has been prepared by me so that the Doctrine may endure long. By the merit acquired through it let the worlds of men and devas find taste of the Very Dhamma of the King of Dhamma.²

The commentary of the book entitled *Kathāvatthu*
is ended.

¹ *Kevalam*.

² *Dhammarāja*, an epithet of the Buddha. This paragraph is in metric prose. (The 'twenty-nine' and 'thirteen' need explanation.—Ed.)

EDITOR'S AFTERWORD

WHEN Dr. Law made known to me his generous wish to make yet another contribution to the Pāli Text Society issues, both as translator and as donor towards the cost of publication, and I commended to him this work, two reasons determined my choice: the historic importance and interest of the Patna Debates, termed in the Pāli Canon *Kathāvatthu*, and the need of making good the faulty punctuation running throughout Minayeff's edition of the Commentary on them (*JPTS*, 1889). Now that the work is done, I am still persuaded it is a needed work, even if, for the most part, the Commentator is 'a dull boy'; even if our translation of the text of the Debates in *Points of Controversy* (1915) has in part anticipated the present translation. For it was only by displaying the Commentator's work in full, that the English reader could grasp his naïf unawareness, that, when the Vesālī visitors to the Patna Congress contended for the Master's teaching of the reality of the very man, the distinction between 'conventional' and 'ultimate' truth *had not become a criterion*, as it had in his later day come to be. The reader can now see how, in the text of the great first debate on the 'man' as real, the distinction is not brought forward, *save only in the Commentator's special appendix* (p. 33); how slight, on the other hand, is the reference in the (later) text V, 6.¹ Now, too, he can compare with these two stages the emerging appearance of the antithesis in the intermediate *Milinda Questions*.² No, without the literature of the Patna Council, ignored though it is by Mahāyānists, the history of Buddhism can never be understood.

Then too there are other interesting emergences of terms and of doctrinal emphasis made by this translation more

¹ Above, p. 96.

² Cf. *Milinda Questions*, S.B.E. I, 226.

clear. Such as the claim for man's reality when he is 'man-in-a-More,' viz. has psychic power (*iddhi*: p. 30); the use of the term *bhavanga only in the Commentary* (and the later *Paṭṭhāna*), the interesting psychological *aperçu* on awareness of space as involving more than vision as such (p. 106), and so forth. Of such contexts I append a short Index. When readers survey in these the help given in this work to a more historically critical study of Buddhism than yet has come to birth, they may forget to be impatient with the old world exegesist, and dwell only, in grateful appreciation, on the able way in which Dr. Law has spent himself—not always to the benefit of his health—in making accessible to us much that is of value in a work mainly tedious.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

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